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IMMANUEL KANT,

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THE bicentenary of Kant has, we read, overshadowed the celebrations in Germany in honour of Byron—a philosopher has received more honour than a poet! Yet this is not surprising, for although in this country, and still more in Scotland, we like to remember that Kant's grandfather was Scotch, Kant is foremost a German and a national hero, the parent of the intellectual dominance of German thought in the nineteenth century. It is remarkable how easily, perhaps too easily, nearly every current of modern thought outside Catholicism can be traced back to Kant—more remarkable still when we remember what a curiously simple old gentleman Kant was. Providence seems to deal jestingly with great men and reputations. This intellectual revolutionary was, we are told, hardly more than five feet high, as abstemious as a hermit in his diet, a faded student without strong emotions, as regular as clockwork in his habits, and a continual source of amusement to students for his absent-mindedness.

Yet there can be no doubt that in the lists of eminent philosophers most would rank Kant after Plato and Aristotle. The reasons will vary. In a leader in *The Times* for April 22, we are told that "whenever speculative fashion has threatened to quench mind in materialism or to dissolve the moral dignity of man in a flux of sensations, he has been a standard to rally round." This is not a complete explanation, for many another philosopher has been "on the side of the angels." A better reason is given shortly after: "Kant replaced man, who had been set

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by Copernicus on the negligible fringe of reality, once more at the centre of the Universe." Paradoxically, Kant likened himself to Copernicus, but in quite a different sense, so far as man is concerned, from that of the writer in *The Times*. The latter, however, does state accurately enough why Kant fills such a place in the history of thought. He did revolutionize the attitude of men's minds towards God, nature, and the self. He created a new vocabulary, and many of his distinctions have become the stock-in-trade of scientific and philosophic writers. Just as Plato and Aristotle shaped language and thought with the meaning they impressed on certain terms, such as ideas, or matter and form, so, too, Kant with his distinction of noumena and phenomena, his doctrine of the categories of the mind, his limitation of the validity of thought to experience, and his reliance on the Practical Reason, left to the nineteenth century an inheritance—a *damnosa hereditas*, some would say—which it can never forsake. Scientists and philosophers can no more escape his influence than a student of Socrates can ignore Plato or an Anglican forget Luther.

Kant's bicentenary, therefore, calls for a review of his influence rather than of his actual thought. The precise value of his theories will ever arouse fierce discussion; and, unfortunately, he has not made an estimate easy by lucidity of style or explanation. A vast literature has been written round his name, and he has suffered by having had foisted on to him every kind of subsequent view. When a severe and analytical critic such as Mr. Prichard ruthlessly exposes Kant's inconsistencies, he is told that he has missed the wood for the trees, that his minute criticisms rest on misunderstanding. On the other hand, Edward Caird, William Wallace, and even Adamson are so concerned to show what Kant must have meant, and to correct slips and misleading expressions, that they arouse the suspicion that their reconstruction has little of the original left in it. More startling is Professor Kemp Smith's thesis that the *Critique* is a collection of various notes and views of different dates massed together in one volume and pub-

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lished when their author feared lest old age or death might prevent the manuscripts ever seeing the light of day. Catholics, too, have varied in their estimate. In far-off days Kant received no quarter from writers like P. Liberatore, but more recently a tendency has shown itself to compare him, unfavourably indeed, but still to compare him, with Aquinas; and he is cautiously commended for having seen the necessity of examining the presuppositions of knowledge and metaphysics.

Fortunately, there is a fairly fixed doctrine which is traditionally labelled Kantian, and it is this doctrine which affected the development of ideas later, whether or not Kant really sponsored it. To understand this doctrine a word is necessary on the condition of philosophy antecedent to Kant. In his early years Kant had become acquainted with the views of Leibniz and Wolff. Neither satisfied him; but he had not realized the urgency of a new theory of knowledge, till Hume "awakened him from his dogmatic slumbers." Hume had taken over from Locke and Berkeley the view that our knowledge was produced by a series of impressions called ideas, which were either copies of the real world or the real world itself. The mind in this theory was like a target with the various marks of the bullets upon it. Hume had little difficulty in showing that this theory led to utter scepticism, for there could be no room for a universal idea, no room for causality, no room, in fine, for a permanent soul unifying and assisting in the production of thought.

This sceptical result alarmed Kant and set him inquiring into the presuppositions of knowledge. "Know" we must, and can; therefore, *how* is it possible, and what are its conditions and limitations? Once on this scent he made the discovery which he likened for its revolutionary character to the discovery of Copernicus. The mind was not just passive to impressions and experience, a mirror of the real world, a registering machine. In all knowledge that could be called valid, both the real world and the mind contributed a part. We experience something—that is, we are affected by the real world; but we can never know

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the real world as it is in itself, because to understand we have to condition it by our own minds. We clothe it first in forms of space and time, for space and time are conditions of perception. The understanding, further, has to shape and organize the "given," and this is rendered possible by the Categories, which synthetically combine the detached elements of experience. Moreover, this experience and this combination demand an apperceptive unity—the ego. Hence, as Kant said, "without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding no object could be thought." Thoughts without contents are empty; perceptions without concepts are blind. Clearly, if this copartnership is required for knowledge, we never see pure reality; and there is left over a thing in itself, which is sometimes called "noumenon," although the term "noumenon" emphasizes another aspect—to wit, a thing which we can think of but can never show to be true, because it is outside experience.

This limitation of knowledge to the phenomenal and the consequent expulsion of metaphysics from philosophy might seem at first hearing a catastrophe, but Kant viewed the result with complacency, and hoped to save thereby what was imperilled and yet vital—namely, the conception of God and a substantial soul; for if these, as being outside experience, cannot be verified, neither can they be disproved. They become objects of faith—that is, objects held for true on grounds sufficient to act upon but not sufficient to satisfy fully our intelligence. And it is here that the Practical Reason comes to the rescue, perhaps as a *deus ex machina*. What were mere problems and unverifiable to the theoretic reason are postulates for the practical reason. In our moral consciousness we are aware of a categorical imperative—a rule expressed in general terms and therefore a deliverance of reason. And this deliverance of reason is not theoretical, but practical; not problematic, but imperative. Duty summons us, and if it is our duty to act we must be free to act. And so by means of the practical reason, freedom, immortality, and God come back to us, no longer the airy castles of metaphysics, but resting on

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firm foundations because demanded by what cannot be gainsaid—namely, a rational will.

To repeat, then, Kant vindicated knowledge against Hume by showing that the latter had misunderstood its nature. Certainly mere empiricism cannot give knowledge; on the other hand, neither can mere abstract reasoning independent of experience. Only when the two—experience and the mind—work together can knowledge be called legitimate. In this way Hume is swept aside, and, consistently, the old abstract metaphysics and natural theology go also. The latter, however, are saved in part by the Practical Reason, which is concerned not with sterile problems but with postulates of the moral order. A moral man, Kant makes morality go bail for our most sacred and fundamental beliefs.

This well-intentioned Critical Philosophy proved soon to be a second Pandora's box. We do not now look back with entire satisfaction on many of the tendencies of the nineteenth century. Indeed we are a little ashamed of its idols, its war-cries, its enthusiasms, its creeds and ideals. During it Germany became the school of Europe and, perhaps, particularly of England, so that it is humiliating now for English people to realize that they praised so extravagantly what was at times simply false and pernicious. But not even yet is it recognized that the innocent prescriptions of Kant have been responsible for much that has gone wrong. And yet it is not difficult to show this. The most striking impression left from Kant's philosophy is the inability of the intellect to attain truth. Hence the reaction to will. Kant, indeed, insisted on the rational will, but the attribute was easily forgotten when the value of reason had been so impugned. The conception of God and personality steadily receded into the background, because they were no longer subject to proof; metaphysical notions were scouted as verbiage and resolutely neglected. And so after a period of Agnosticism and Pantheism, in which there was no theism, we find prevalent to-day at best a sentimental belief in God, which sadly needs a dose of astringent logic.

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In religion the Kantian distrust of reason fitted in only too well with Lutheran Protestantism, which in its doctrine of faith had never given to the intellect its proper part. Still, orthodox Protestants were hardly prepared for the vagaries that now manifested themselves. Schleiermacher and Ritschl, setting aside the old proofs of Christianity, placed the essence of faith in a felt need—whether of the individual or community does not matter. In other words, the practical reason has religion in its keeping. The theory followed naturally from the premisses and issued into Modernism, with its value-judgements which turned Christianity upside-down; for the historical reality of Christ's Redemption and Resurrection was waived aside to give place to a felt and therefore true sense of their value.

In philosophy a movement closely related to this Modernism went under the name of Pragmatism. For here the test of truth was once more value—in fact, it was not so much the test as the definition and new meaning of truth. The old logic and principles of reason were forsaken for a postulate which worked. This extraordinary theory—if it can be called a theory—betrays its ancestry from yet another point of view. Kant had confined legitimate speculation to the phenomenal world and relegated metaphysics to the lumber-room. Now the phenomenal world is the domain of science. Not unnaturally, therefore, science began first to despise philosophy and then to usurp its place and function. In science, assuredly, truth was to be found, and there was no other truth outside science. The nineteenth century saw this usurper wax and grow strong. But it overreached itself; its success was too rapid; the dictum of one day was corrected or contradicted by the dictum of the next. Scientists perforce became less dogmatic and more modest, and truth was treated as an hypothesis to be retained as long as it worked. Such an attitude led easily to Positivism and Agnosticism; but let all knowledge—scientific, psychological, moral, and religious—be regarded as nothing more than a working hypothesis, and we see Pragmatism spelt for us once again.

These are some of the disintegrating effects of the

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Critique, and there are others which are even more directly attributable to the ideas set in motion by Kant. The two most prominent are represented by Hegel and Schopenhauer, contradictory philosophies which later on arrived at rather similar conclusions. Hegel, the founder of Absolute Idealism, was dissatisfied with the precarious condition of the "thing in itself" as Kant had left it. He thought that Kant had made a great discovery and then been too conservative to follow it out. He had, like Anaxagoras, glimpsed the rôle of mind and then apportioned it only a secondary and regulative part, with the "thing in itself" unexplained and unintelligible. He therefore abolished the "thing in itself," and made the ideas of reason constitutive of reality and not merely regulative. "What is real, is rational; and what is rational, is real." It belongs to the very nature of reality to be expressed in a subjective and objective side; for mind, if we examine it, involves a subject and an object. The world, then, of objects is nothing but the objective side of mind, and unfolds itself to mind as a rational system. William Wallace, a whole-hearted admirer of this system, thus describes this new apocalypse: "All is, indeed, one life, one being, one thought; but a life, a being, a thought which only exists as it opposes itself within itself, sets itself apart from itself, projects its meaning outward and upwards, and yet retains and carries out the power of reuniting itself. The Absolute may be called one, but it is also the All; it is a one which makes and overcomes difference; it is, and it essentially is, in the antithesis of Nature and Spirit, Object and Subject, Matter and Mind; but over and above the antithesis it is fundamental and completed unity."

This Absolutism, as it has been called, had varying fortune, for its followers divided into a right and left wing. The "right" school flourished best in England, with compromises, of course, as befits Englishmen, and is found in the writings of Sterling, Green, the two Cairds, W. Wallace, Bradley, Bosanquet, and many another—a remarkable list. Green and his Oxford friends used Hegelianism to promote spiritual values, to vindicate the

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spiritual dignity of man and the right function of a State. But they were dogged by failure and harassed by very awkward problems. For how certify the spiritual dignity of the individual, how safeguard personality, if "Unity and the All are one life, one being, one thought"? And again, how talk of the betterment of men's souls if the All is already "a completed unity"? What, indeed, remains of the problem of evil and the reality of time? The ghost of Hume must have laughed sardonically when Mr. Bradley wrote his long epitaph of free-will, time, personality, and God in his *Appearance and Reality*! And when the war came the difficulties of these earnest philosophers were increased tenfold, for they saw over in the country of Hegel a theory of the State which bore a sinister resemblance to the one they had been advocating with such moral fervour. Their characteristic compromises over the spiritual worth of the individual and his organic connection with a greater whole, the State, outside of which the self had no substantiality, were a credit to their moral sense but alien from the logic of Absolutism. For in Absolutism the "Idea," the Deity, or whatever name it prefers, unfolds itself and expresses itself in that concrete whole, the State. Consequently the State has no superior moral arbiter to check and judge it; it juggernauts by right divine. Given the tendency to the left, to a materialism and a real *Politik* (and the tendency is not unjustifiable since matter and mind are equally the expression of the "Idea"), the doctrine of power and force was bound to ride this philosophy when applied to practical affairs. We touch here on a well-worn theme; and the connection between philosophy and the militaristic State has already been developed in Baron F. von Hügel's *The German Soul*. He quotes Naumann and Troeltsch to show how perplexed even good men were to reconcile Christian morals with the Hegelian philosophy of the State, and points out how Hegel himself in 1801 taught "that liberty is possible only within the legal union of a people into a State"; sympathized with Machiavelli and inculcated the extreme view that the highest duty of the State is self-preservation; that the crimes of private life

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can become duties, for "gangrenous limbs cannot be healed with lavender-water."

Thus the whirligig of time brought the system which exalted mind into harness with the system that advocated will and force. Poor Kant, who had given up human reason and made will and ethical considerations his lines of defence against scepticism and irreligion, had to suffer equally from those who supplemented his theory of the understanding and those who exploited his Practical Reason till it became the gospel of mere will and force. This is the tragedy of Kant. First Fichte cuts out the thing in itself and brings will more into the limelight. Then Schopenhauer makes it the principal dominating character, discovers that life is an unfortunate episode and ends in utter pessimism. Even in France, the country of clear ideas, the scene is affected; there are traces of the Practical Reason in Fouillée's *Idée-Force*, and still more in the *élan vital* of Bergson, a philosopher so like to Kant in his cheapening of reason and belief in the superiority of another faculty. But the mad climax of it all has been only too visible in the Nietzschean apotheosis of the Superman and the insane laughter at Christ, and the bitter close of the political doctrine that might is right.

This is the box of Pandora opened by Kant—the all-embracing Idealism of his German successors, the Agnosticism that has bitten so deep into modern ideas, the pathetic trust in science as the solitary bridge between the unseen and the seen, the resort to will and the consequent abandonment to the non-rational sides of self, desire, force, emotion, the Unconscious. These strange twists and turns of thought are not fully intelligible unless they are connected up with the philosophy of Kant. Certainly Kant would have held up his hands in horror at the abuses to which his apologetic of God, freedom, and morality has led. His intentions had been excellent; he denied that he was an Idealist; he fought with almost puritanical zeal for duty uncontaminated by any lesser motive; and he strove to preserve what was most sacred in life. Then, too, he gave, undoubtedly, a new impetus to scientific pursuits and

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turned the attention of writers to the interior workings of the mind, to the part played in judgement by those various factors of temperament and disposition which are apt to colour our likes and dislikes. We must not forget that in his day philosophy "shorn and parcelled" was straining along through beds of sand. The narrow stream of the Descartes-Locke "image" theory of knowledge had dried up. Kant cut a new channel—a channel badly engineered and ending in disease-breeding swamps, yet withal broad enough to suggest that, had it been constructed with greater art and more attention to tradition, on it might human ventures somehow and at long last have reached the sea over which the Spirit of Truth broods. .

M. C. D'ARCY.

THE CIVIL CONSTITUTION OF THE CLERGY

THE origins of the Civil Constitution of the French Clergy are complex. It might be described as the product of a triple alliance between Freethinkers, Gallicans, and Jansenists, but these crisp definitions are seldom sufficient. The Freethinkers all desired the suppression of the Establishment, and many of them desired the ruin of religion. The Gallicans, both clerical and lay, wanted a National Church "free," as they expressed it, "from the servitude of Rome." The Jansenists wanted a National Church remodelled from top to bottom in accordance with their peculiar ideas of "antiquity." All were united in regarding the wealth of the Establishment as the only remedy against national bankruptcy. The majority of the clergy were eager for reform. The higher clergy had proved their readiness to surrender a very large portion of their wealth on the 4th of August, 1789; the *curés* were the most determined enemies of privilege* in the Assembly. Both higher and lower clergy were sure that they had a mandate for sweeping reforms; none were prepared to defend the abuses of the *ancien régime*, and nearly all were thoroughly afraid of being regarded as reactionary.

To the crowd of lay deputies the religious question was nought and the financial question everything. These men looked upon Catholicism, and indeed all supernatural religion, as a rapidly expiring superstition, and were perfectly indifferent as to what arrangements were made for the maintenance of public worship, because they deemed that one more generation would see the end of it all. Their spokesmen were jurists imbued with the principles of Roman Law; in their eyes religion was one form of national activity, just like any other, and, as such, ought to be under the control of the State. Those among them who were revolutionaries held that the National Assembly had succeeded to all the rights, powers, and prerogatives

* Lindet, *Correspondance*, *passim*.

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of the Kings of France, and therefore was supreme over everyone and everything. Public worship being a public function, they had the right to make regulations for the control of it—"l'Église est dans l'État et non l'État dans l'Église." Accommodation with them would have been exceedingly difficult, for they were determined to put the Church into a strait-jacket; but it would not have been impossible, just because they despised theological and canonical questions. More difficult would have been agreement with the ecclesiastical lawyers, who maintained the traditional Gallican position that the Pope was a constitutional sovereign in the Church, whilst the King was absolute monarch in the State. This dogma of the French magistracy and official class was older than the Gallican Articles, and had been the *terrain* of the interminable quarrels of the seventeenth century. In this they had been more royalist than the Kings and more unyielding than all the English Erastians who ever rendered to Cæsar the things that are God's.

The purpose of this paper is to show that it was neither *philosophes* nor *légitistes* who did the mischief, but a certain group who were possessed by strong Jansenist and ultra-Gallican tendencies; and the danger lay in the fact that these Jansenist and ultra-Gallican tendencies were not altogether repugnant to the majority of the French episcopate. The men who made the coalition possible were those who, with their programme of simplification, "return to antiquity" and "primitive uses," the election of Bishops and the extrusion of the Pope, furnished the common platform upon which all the critics, reformers, and enemies of the Church found themselves able to unite. Regalists combined with revolutionaries, Jansenists with freemasons; even the Huguenot, who had no part nor lot in the matter, was ready to help to disorganize or to presbyterianize. Camus and Martineau accepted them all as allies. Men whose shibboleths were "Antiquity," "The Fathers," "The Councils," were anxious to place their learning and their eloquence at the service of those whose watchword was "Ecrasez l'infâme,"

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and were infatuated enough to believe or hypocritical enough to pretend that the support of such allies would be disinterested and effectual.

On the night of the 4th of August the Church had lost its position of privilege and one of the sources of its wealth. By the legislation of the 2nd of November and the subsequent enactments its property was secularized. The disruption of the religious orders had proceeded concurrently; and by the decree of the 13th of February, 1790, on monastic vows, it was practically accomplished. The secular clergy, however, could not be disbanded and pensioned off. Public worship had to continue, and when the old status and endowments were gone the Assembly had to face the double problem of providing sustenance for the clergy and of defining their new position in the State. They had ceased to be proprietors or an Estate of the Realm in the old constitutional sense. The conception of a Free Church had not occurred to anybody,* and if it had it would not have got a hearing—no change of régime in France seems to make any difference in the conception of an all-powerful, all-controlling State. The Ecclesiastical Committee, which hitherto had chiefly occupied itself with the dissolution of the monastic orders, were therefore charged with the duty of bringing forward a solution of the larger problem.

A committee of fifteen had been appointed as early as the 20th of August, 1789. There were two Bishops,† two noblemen, three priests, and eight lawyers, and amongst these lawyers the Church had but one single friend. D'Ormesson and Durand de Maillane were at best neutral; Lanjuinais, Martineau, and Fréteau de St. Just were Jansenists. Treilhard, who had already shown himself to be the enemy of all religion, is compendiously described as *légiste*, *Césarien*, and *philosophe*. Camus and the Abbé Grégoire were not actually members of the committee. Of the additional fifteen appointed in February, 1790, little need be said here. Fourteen of

* Except, perhaps, to Condorcet and to Thémynes, Bishop of Blois.

† Of Clermont and of Luçon.

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them were revolutionaries,* including the turbulent Carthusian Dom Gerle, and the three *curés* Expilly, Massieu, and Thibault, who were to become notorious as constitutional Bishops. When this enlarged committee, which had been doubled to swamp the Conservatives, produced a majority report aiming at the speedy dissolution of all the religious orders, the two Bishops and seven of their colleagues protested and resigned. The rest proceeded to draw up the *Constitution Civile du Clergé*, which was eventually introduced into the Constitutional Assembly at the end of May, 1790.

The nucleus of the Civil Constitution is to be found in the report presented to the committee by Durand de Maillane on the 23rd of November, 1789. The first proposals were reasonable enough. On the vacancy of a bishopric three names were to be submitted to the King: one by the chapter of the diocese, one by the two neighbouring Bishops, one by the departmental council as representing the laity. All chapters other than cathedral chapters were to be suppressed. In the cathedral chapter, half the places were to be reserved for priests of the diocese, and all the places to be in the gift of the Bishop and to carry equal salary. All parish priests to be appointed by the Bishop of the diocese. Compared with the old scale of emolument and with the *portion congrue*, yearly stipends of 1,200 livres for the *curé* and eight or nine hundred for the *vicaire* who served smaller places seemed exceedingly liberal. There were, however, two singular innovations which showed the determination to invade the ecclesiastical and even the spiritual sphere. No assistant priest under the age of thirty was to be allowed to hear confessions or to work by himself in a parish. Up to that age he was merely to catechize children, to assist in ceremonies, and to preach. The other was exceedingly serious, and destined to be a fundamental part of the *Constitution Civile*. Canonical institution of a newly elected Bishop was reserved to the Metropolitan. There was to be no "inter-

* See the list of the names in Gazier, *L'Abbé Grégoire à la Constituante*, p. 13.

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vention" by the Pope. The new Bishop was to write to the Pope a letter containing a profession of faith in token of being in communion with the Holy See. Here without disguise was the invitation to schism.

The second instalment was comprised in the report of Martineau dated the 21st of April, 1790. According to Martineau, the one thing necessary to purify the Church was a return to the ancient discipline; purification was to be attained by wholesale suppression of what was unnecessary. Such were all benefices without cure of souls; all canonries, prebends, chapelries, and chantries; all chapters, whether cathedral or collegiate; all abbeys and priories for either sex. All rights of patronage and presentation were extinguished.

The complete project abolished the hundred and thirty-three episcopal sees of France, and proposed that for the future there should be eighty-three new dioceses to coincide in number and in area with the eighty-three recently formed Departments. The title of Archbishop was to be abolished, and ten Metropolitans only were to be allowed: at Paris, Rouen, Reims, Besançon, Lyon, Aix, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Bourges, and Rennes. All ecclesiastical offices were to become elective. The Bishop was to be chosen by the electors of the Department, the *curé* by the administrative assembly of the district. No elector to be debarred from voting by the fact that he was not a Catholic, the sole qualification being attendance at the High Mass sung before the holding of the election. In order to be eligible to a bishopric, it was necessary to have worked as a priest in the diocese for fifteen years. The Metropolitan or senior Bishop was to examine publicly the elect as to his doctrine and mode of life, and to give canonical institution if he deemed him fit. He was not to refuse it without consulting his *conseil épiscopal*, and must then give reasons in writing. The consecration of the Bishop-elect to be performed by the Metropolitan or, in the case of appointment to a Metropolitan see, by the senior Bishop. It was absolutely forbidden to recognize in any case and under any pretext the authority of any ordinary or Metro-

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politan whose see was within the territory of a foreign Power, as well as that of its delegates residing in France or elsewhere. Before consecration the elect was to take the triple oath of fidelity to the Nation, the Law, and the King. He was to uphold to the utmost of his power the Constitution decreed by the National Assembly and accepted by the King. No other oaths beyond the profession of the Catholic religion and the promise to watch diligently over those committed to his charge were to be demanded. The new Bishop was expressly forbidden to apply to the Pope for the purpose of obtaining from him any confirmation of the election; he could do no more than write to the Pope ("il ne pourra que lui écrire") as the visible head of the Church in token of unity of faith and of being in communion with him. A priests' council to be associated with the Bishop in the administration of the diocese. These *vicaires épiscopaux*, twelve or sixteen in number, according to the size of the diocese, were to be nominated by the Bishop. But he could not dismiss them nor perform any act of jurisdiction without their assent.

The third part of the decree dealt with salaries, which were carefully graduated in accordance with the conception of a Civil Service. The Metropolitan at Paris was to receive 50,000 livres; the other Metropolitans, 20,000 livres; the Bishops, 12,000 livres. The salaries of the *vicaires épiscopaux* were to vary according to the size of the cathedral city (in more than sixty Departments, the *chef-lieu*) from 8,000 down to 2,000 livres. A more elaborate classification divided the *curés* into eight classes. In Paris a parish priest would receive as much as 6,000 livres; in the larger towns, 4,000 or less, according to the importance of the place; in the smaller towns, 3,000. Parishes with populations of less than 1,000 were fixed at 1,200 livres. Similarly, the stipends of the *vicaires paroissiaux* ranged from 2,400 livres at Paris down to 700 in the villages. No voluntary offerings or other honoraria to be allowed. Residence was to be rigorously enforced without distinction or exception. Bishops were not to be absent from their dioceses for more than fifteen days in

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the year, except in very special circumstances and with the consent of the local authorities.

The peremptory language of the proposed decree is in keeping with its drastic provisions. Only in the last article is there a change, when the King is humbly requested to take the necessary steps to put the decree into force. Of those necessary steps ("mesures qui seront jugées nécessaires") a great deal was to be heard.

The debate opened on the 29th of May. The opposition was badly handled from the very outset. The Bishops were not effective speakers, and did not find it easy to argue with a hostile and tumultuous crowd of deputies. Boisgelin, the Archbishop of Aix, demanded that the whole matter should be remitted to a National Council. The Assembly, which had rejoiced in abolishing all "orders" and "corporations," naturally rejected the proposal. They would have done so in any case, for they were possessed with the sense of their own sovereignty, and did not intend that the clergy as such should have any voice in the matter. Boisgelin then made the immense tactical mistake of announcing that he and his brethren could take no further part in the discussion. The result of this policy of abstention was that clause after clause passed which could have been defeated or amended. Effective opposition soon drifted from the Bishops to a handful of obscure priests, and before long was almost wholly left to the Abbé Maury and an officer of cavalry, Cazalès. The measure was carried with very little amendment on the 12th of July, 1790.

If this measure had been wholly the work of unbelievers, of Mirabeau and of Talleyrand, it would have been much simpler, and would not have contained such extraordinary provisions. It would certainly have been drastic and oppressive, for the Assembly, which twice* refused to recognize Catholicism as the State religion, was nevertheless determined to exercise control over its practice. But the Jacobin Club was not interested in canonical institu-

* In February on the motion of the Bishop of Nancy, and in April on the motion of Dom Gerle.

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tion or mandates for consecration, and neither knew nor cared when Bishops had ceased to be elected by the whole body of the clergy and faithful of the diocese. Had it been their work, then indeed the measure would doubtless have fulfilled one description of it* as "a bed prepared upon which the last of Catholicism in Gaul could peacefully pass away." But it seems clear that the intention underlying many of these clauses was preservation in an altered form, not destruction.

The Jansenist lawyers and their clerical colleagues evidently cannot be credited with desiring the extinction of the Church in France. Their object was a national, schismatical Church, and if anyone cannot deduce that from the provisions of their Bill, he certainly can do so from their speeches in debate. There were, doubtless, motives other than ecclesiastico-political and doctrinal. Sieyès said plainly that some of them were seeking to revive the theology of Port Royal.† Mirabeau touched another place when he made the scoffing declaration that he was not a candidate for a bishopric. Grégoire probably was as sincere in his advocacy of the measure as in his subsequent acceptance of a bishopric, and appears to have persuaded himself that a passion for equality was highly evangelical, that it was truly righteous to bear an equal hatred to King and Pope. Expilly, Lindet,‡ and others *did* think that it was well to be a Bishop on any terms—as the sequel shows. From a study of their utterances it seems reasonably certain that they very much preferred a Church of France of their own fashioning to the Church of their fathers, and that they were ready to enter into any conflict to gain their ends. When the storm began to rage, those who merely wanted the endowments and did not want historical or theological controversy were quick to reproach Camus and Martineau with needlessly provoking a religious schism.§ "We busy ourselves too much about the clergy," wrote Mira-

* H. Belloc, *French Revolution*, p. 237 (Home University Library).

† In the debate of the 7th of May, 1791. Vide Jervis, *The Gallican Church*, p. 148.

‡ Lindet, *Correspondance*, p. 267.

§ Mirabeau, by P. F. Willert, p. 191.

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beau to La Marck; "we ought to pay them and let them be."* "Three Latin words," said another, "have been the ruin of France: *Deficit, Veto, Unigenitus*."†

It has been repeated from that day to this that the Assembly intended no interference with the doctrine or the constitution of the Church. These proposals are always described as "disciplinary and financial reforms," and as "legislation as to the temporalities of the Church." The answer is that if these descriptions were correct, there would not have been any schism. Of course, it is clear that not everything in the proposed law was an innovation or inadmissible. The election of Bishops by the clergy and laity of the diocese, though long discontinued in France, was not unknown in the history of the Church.‡ Canonical institution by the Pope had not always been the rule in France, though it had been habitual since the twelfth century§ and obligatory since the Concordat of Bologna. Many who worked for compromise sought to show that the election of parish priests by the parishioners was merely presentation by a body of patrons instead of by a single patron. The suppression of sees, the rearrangement of diocesan boundaries, the fixing of inadequate salaries, were all accepted for good and sufficient reasons by Pius VII in 1801. Moreover, that Pontiff was under the necessity of virtually deposing a number of Bishops in order to secure the benefits of a settlement which included all these things. But the *Constitution Civile* was not a measure of pacification to which the Holy See was one of the contracting parties; it was something very much the reverse, and it differs fundamentally from the Concordat of 1801. One need only mention the withdrawal of canonical institution of Bishops from the Holy See, the election of both Bishops and priests by a miscellaneous crowd who were not necessarily Catholics or even Christians, the repudiation of all Papal authority and

* *Mirabeau*, by P. F. Willert, p. 192.

† *La Révolution*, by Louis Madelin, p. 146.

‡ Election of Bishops by cathedral chapters had become general before the end of the twelfth century.

§ See Lavissee et Rambaud, *Histoire Général*, tome ii, p. 284.

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jurisdiction, the practical prohibition of episcopal visits *ad limina*. Under all and behind all is the naked principle of lay control. A little knowledge of the history of Europe would have preserved the politicians of 1789 from their egregious delusion; but they were eager to make all things new.

Some samples of the language held in the debate will serve to illustrate their mentality. When they speak of the Pope they use the same expressions as Henry VIII: "the Bishop of Rome," "a foreign Power." One can then appreciate the sincerity of the modern French anti-clericals who have not hesitated to assert that the promoters of this law were "for the most part sincere Catholics who desired not to injure religion, but to strengthen it by bringing its organization into harmony with the new institutions."* M. Mathiez has the hardihood to declare that they were far from being unbelievers, or "reckless innovators," or "embittered Jansenists." Now these expressions describe them accurately.† Their own colleagues and contemporaries repeated that the Constitution was "revenge for the Bull *Unigenitus*."

Two sentences from the introductory speech‡ of Martineau are exceedingly explicit: "The plan of regeneration" which he and his colleagues propose "consists simply in a return to the discipline of the primitive Church." And again: "Commissioned as you are, gentlemen, to regenerate the State in all its departments, you will not permit such abuses to subsist longer; you will extirpate them down to the very smallest vestige, and you will restore things to the condition of their primitive institution." He then descants on the discipline of the primitive Church, the election of Matthias as described in the Acts of the Apostles, the election and consecration of the first Bishops, the consent of the people to such elections, and so on.

* A. Mathiez, *Rome et le Clergé français sous la Constituante*, p. 7; A. Champion, *La Séparation de l'Église et de l'État*.

† Hume was more candid and more exact when he said that a Jansenist was less than half a Catholic.

‡ See Jervis, *The Gallican Church*, p. 59.

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Treilhard followed in the same strain: "Un état peut admettre ou ne pas admettre une religion." Then Camus:* "The Apostles and their successors knew nothing of territorial circumscriptions. The whole world was their territory. Ecclesiastical divisions were not instituted by Jesus Christ . . . Bishops were established in the cities, and these cities derived their rank from the civil organization . . . the Church of the Apostolic times conformed to the civil order. When, therefore, the State thinks it right to diminish the number of sees, it has power to do so. The ecclesiastical power ought to conduct itself in accord with the civil power." He goes on to the practice of election, quotes St. Cyprian, instances the election of St. Martin of Tours. When he comes to appeals to Rome, he denies the universal jurisdiction of the Pope, and proclaims that all causes should be heard and determined in the country of origin. In later debates he declared categorically that the Pope had no right whatever to give any orders to the Bishops of France.

Treilhard asserted that St. Peter possessed no superiority over the rest of the Apostles; Lanjuinais throughout the debates never spoke of Pius VI but as "the bishop of Rome"; in the discussion of the article abolishing canonical institution by the Pope the Abbé Grégoire made the celebrated announcement that "it was the intention of the Assembly to reduce the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to its just proportions, but at the same time it was equally resolved to avoid falling into schism."†

Camus went further. Dealing with the number and extent of the new dioceses, he maintained that the arrangement of ecclesiastical districts was merely a matter of expediency, and as such within the competence of the civil Government. No encroachment on spiritual jurisdiction could be involved. But note again how the language of

* See Jervis, *The Gallican Church*, pp. 61-62.

† Jervis, *op. cit.*, p. 69. Grégoire, however, carried an amendment by which the following words were added to Art. 5 of Part I, which forbade recognition of the authority of any foreign Bishop: "Without prejudice to the unity of faith and communion to be maintained with the Head of the Universal Church." Gazier, *Hist. Rel. de la Rév. Fran.*, p. 15.

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the speaker outruns his argument and reveals his attitude. "We are," he declared, "a National Convention, and have power unquestionably to change the national religion! But we have no thought of doing so. We intend to preserve the Catholic religion. We intend to have Bishops and priests; but we have only eighty-three episcopal cities, and we can only assign to the Bishops a territory limited in accordance with that fact. There is nothing spiritual in settling the question whether a Bishop shall have jurisdiction over nineteen parishes or twenty." It is noteworthy that Mirabeau on a subsequent occasion said the same thing in almost the same words. "When once a religion has been accepted, sanctioned, and established by the State, the State thereby acquires the right to determine all the details of its civil organization, the extent of its privileges, the conditions of its public worship; in short, everything except its essential doctrines, the truths and principles of its Divine origin."* Exactly. This is the essence of the Revolution and of modern *Étatisme*.† But it overrides the Divine command to preach the Gospel to all nations, and excludes the Apostolic Succession.

But there is no need to accumulate testimony. The fitness of the Assembly to legislate in Church affairs may be estimated by their performance in the sphere they understood best. The Constituent Assembly contained many able men, yet it produced a preposterous and unworkable Constitution. Was it likely that it would succeed better in the sphere of religious and ecclesiastical affairs? The monument of the revolutionary canonists was derided from its very inauguration. "Une élogue religieuse," was the gibe of a contemporary wit. "Il ne reste plus qu'à les marier!" said the Huguenot, Rabaut de St. Etienne. "Une église d'État instituée par des incrédules," says Sorel.‡ M. Louis Madelin calls it "the immeasurable blunder, the Pandora's box which let loose all the calamities."§ "En apparence apostolique et évangélique," says

* Jervis, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

† See Lanessan, *L'Etat et les Eglises en France*, Paris, 1906.

‡ *L'Europe et la Révolution Française*, ii 119.

§ *La Révolution*, p. 114.

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another,* "mais hypocrite parce qu'elle introduisait la Révolution dans l'église." Lord Acton's judgement is well known: "The Assembly, by a series of hostile measures carefully studied and long pursued, turned men who were enlightened reformers and true democrats into implacable enemies, and thereby made the Revolution odious to a large part of the French people."†

There was from the beginning of the discussion a strong current of opinion in favour of compromising with the Assembly. The *mot* of the Abbé Barruel that the thing to do was "to baptize the Civil Constitution" went round, and the idea with it. This implied the amendment of some of the most objectionable clauses and the embodiment of the substance of the proposals in some forms‡ that could be deemed to preserve the Apostolic Succession and the full communion of the French Church with the Holy See. That such forms could be devised the leading prelates§ were apparently quite confident, and they represented to the King that he could safely give a general assent subject to the ultimate approval of the Pope. Publication of the decree was, however, to be suspended during the period of negotiation with Rome, and they hoped that in the interval such approval would be obtained. Louis, despite strong misgivings, acquiesced in this course, because he imagined that he would thereby place the responsibility of accepting the measure upon the Pope, and meanwhile he would avoid collision with the Assembly. He accordingly sent a message to the Assembly on the 22nd of July assenting to the Civil Constitution, but declaring that he must postpone publication pending the necessary arrangements for putting it into force. By this he meant, and they understood, that he was about to open negotiations with the Pope.

The majority in the Assembly were quite indifferent as to what view of their handiwork was taken in Rome.

* Joseph Reinach, *Hist. de France*.

† *Lectures on the French Revolution*, p. 165.

‡ Gobel, even, desired the insertion of the words "et toutes les voies civiles et canoniques" in the last article.

§ La Gorce, *Hist. Rel. de la Révolution*, vol. i, p. 285.

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They were not prepared to admit that the Pope had any jurisdiction in the matter, but they did not formally object to the negotiations, because they were quite sure that the Pope was powerless. He would denounce the Constitution at his peril. If he ordered resistance to it he would not be obeyed, whilst his surrender would be their triumph. As a recent anticlerical writer* has expressed it, the Pope was to be given an opportunity of concurring with their work, but he was not to be suffered to oppose it.

Meanwhile, on the 10th of July, two days before the measure was passed, Pius VI had written to Louis and to the two Archbishops who were members of the Royal Council—Lefranc de Pompignan, of Vienne, who held the *feuille des bénéfices*, and Champion de Cicé, of Bordeaux, the Garde des Sceaux—warning them that no assent should be given to the decrees of the Assembly concerning the clergy. But a courier from Rome to Paris at that time took about fourteen days, and these letters arrived on the 24th, two days after the royal assent had been communicated to the Assembly.

Nevertheless, Louis XVI and his counsellors endeavoured to obtain the "baptism" of the Constitution at Rome. In the despatch to Cardinal de Bernis of the 1st of August, 1790, the Ambassador was instructed to obtain an immediate provisional assent to the measure as a whole, and specific assent to four of the principal provisions—viz., the creation of the new metropolitan sees, the rearrangement of the diocesan boundaries and the suppression of the sees abolished by the Bill, the transfer to the new *vicaires épiscopaux* of the rights and privileges of the cathedral chapters, and the election of Bishops to the new sees (and to some existing sees that had become vacant) by the new methods prescribed without any recourse to Rome either for leave to institute or for mandates for consecration.† At the same time Louis wrote a personal letter to the Pope declaring that he had done what he had done

* Mathiez, *ibid.*, pp. 178-179.

† The text, drawn up by the Archbishops of Bordeaux and Vienne, is quoted in Mathiez (p. 269). See also La Gorce, vol i, p. 290.

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for the sake of the unity of the Church. Pius VI replied on the 17th of August that the whole matter would have to be examined by a commission of Cardinals and theologians. On the same day the Assembly demanded the King's assent to publication within a week. Louis and his advisers had by this time become thoroughly afraid of the Assembly, and the assent was formally given on the 24th, before the Pope's reply had time to arrive. By this precipitate action Louis forfeited all power to influence the decision, and left the Pope face to face with the hostile Assembly, while still uncertain of the attitude of the majority of the French Bishops.

As to this Pius was soon to receive public and eloquent reassurance by the celebrated *Exposition des Principes* drawn up by Boisgelin in response to his formal request for the views of the French episcopate. This manifesto appeared on the 30th of October with the signatures of thirty Archbishops and Bishops and ninety-eight priests—the majority of the clerical deputies. It was sent to Rome on the 9th of November. But in pursuance of the tortuous policy of the Tuileries it was followed on the 3rd of December by a memorandum drawn up by Boisgelin himself, in which the Pope was again insistently urged to assent to the measure. This was in effect a repetition of the *Mémoire* of the 1st of August, making almost identical demands, and by a curious coincidence the procedure of the 24th of August was repeated. In the interval, the promulgation of the law during September and October, and the consequent action taken thereon by local authorities, had given rise to numerous incidents and created exasperation on both sides. The Assembly hastened to pour oil on the flames by the famous *Loi du Serment* of the 27th of November, by which it was enacted that all ecclesiastical functionaries who within a week from the date of the royal assent had not taken the oath of adhesion to the Constitution should be deprived.* A reluctant assent was extorted from Louis on the 26th of December, before

* The Constitution at large included by implication the Civil Constitution of the clergy, and was understood to include it.

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any reply had time to reach Paris from Rome. For the second time in five months he had consulted the Pope and then acted without waiting for the Pope's reply. This time the action was irrevocable.

Whilst the Assembly had been pressing for the King's assent, the Pope had passed through some of the most anxious days of his sorely troubled reign. The interview with Cardinal de Bernis was difficult enough, for he had to point out to the Ambassador that by the very terms of their *Exposition des Principes* he was precluded from accepting the representations of Boisgelin and the other prelates. He was, moreover, convinced that the enforcement of the law by the Assembly must lead to schism or to persecution. Haunted by thoughts of Clement XIV—and of Clement VII—the Pontiff sat up all night in his private library going over the representations and himself drafting the reply that was to refute them. His determination not to assent to the proposals as they stood* was echoed in the commission of Cardinals, who were unanimous in demanding further explanations. The French Bishops were to be asked to amend their submission. But while the courier was on the return journey Louis had yielded and ratified the *Loi du Serment*. As Montlosier said at the time, this act of the Assembly "broke down all the bridges" and rendered persecution inevitable.

There followed the famous 4th of January, 1791, the second "Day of Dupes,"† the taking of the oath by the seven Bishops,‡ by ninety-one of the clergy in the Assembly, and by many thousands outside. From that day there was schism in France, and two kinds of clergy, *assermentés* and *insermentés*, jurors and non-jurors, soon to be *intrus* and *réfractaires*. The beginnings of formal schism were made by Talleyrand. Assisted by Gobel and Miroudot, he consecrated the first pair of "constitutional"

* La Gorce, *Hist. Relig.*, vol. i, p. 300.

† Lindet, *Correspondance*, p. 255. He knew before long who were the dupes.

‡ Talleyrand (Autun), Loménie de Brienne (Sens), Martial de Loménie (nephew and coadjutor), Jarente (Orléans), Savines (Viviers), and two auxiliaries, Gobel of Lydda and Miroudot of Babylon—in *partibus infidelium*.

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Bishops, Expilly and Marolles, on the 24th of February, 1791. Soon afterwards he instituted Gobel, the Cranmer of the Revolution, to the metropolitan bishopric of Paris—which he himself had declined—whereupon he divested himself of his priesthood and episcopal office. In later times he was wont to amuse himself by declaring that by these consecrations he and none other had preserved the succession of the ancient hierarchy of France!

On the 10th of March Pius VI issued the brief *Quot aliquantulum* to the prelates of the National Assembly, condemning formally the principles of the Revolution and the provisions of the *Constitution Civile*. This was followed on the 13th of April by the brief *Caritas* addressed to the Archbishops, Bishops, clergy, and the faithful of the Kingdom of France. Therein he reiterated his condemnation of the schismatic "Church"; denounced the fatal act of Talleyrand; suspended and excommunicated him, together with Expilly, Marolles, and the rest of the schismatical intruders; pronounced their election and consecration to be illegitimate, sacrilegious, null and void; and suspended all ecclesiastics who had taken the civil oath unless they should retract it within forty days. The brief concluded by exhorting the orthodox clergy to remain faithful to their flocks, the laity to give ear only to their lawful pastors, and both to hold fast to the Chair of Peter. By this solemn pronouncement the matter was decided, although the decision had already been anticipated by events. The Bishops were warned of the trap and forbidden to enter it. Left to themselves, the majority would certainly have done so, hoping for the best, and soon the Church in France would have been hopelessly entangled in confusion, schism, and error. Severed from the centre of unity, they would nowhere have found strength or cohesion to resist the agencies of disruption. Such is the fundamental weakness of a merely national Church. But they were saved from themselves. There was above them and outside of France an Authority that had the discernment to forbid the fatal act and the power to prevent it.

J. J. DWYER.

A PROTESTANT CONTROVERSIALIST'S METHODS

Truly, Glaucon, the power of the art of controversy is remarkable.

Why so?

Because it seems to me that many a man falls into it against his will, and fancies he is reasoning, whereas he is merely debating, because he cannot define and distinguish, and so know that of which he is speaking, but attacks the mere words in the spirit of contention and not in that of fair discussion.

PLATO, *Republic*, Bk. V.

THESE are days when one puts on record one's experiences, whether they be those of a traveller, a psychologist, or a salvationist. Why should one not also relate one's controversial experiences? Controversy is a hateful thing, yet sometimes called for, more especially when challenge after challenge is publicly proclaimed by those who are hostile to the Faith; for to keep silence in such a case may sometimes seem like cowardice. For sixteen years Mr. Coulton, Mediævalist and Don of St. John's College, Cambridge, has been throwing down gauntlets to Catholic priests, of whom many a one must have been tempted to offer the called-for reparation. In my own case the temptation proved too strong. Maybe others will care to know what a Coulton controversy involves, that, should they accept one of the oft-repeated challenges, they may know what to expect, and, should they refuse it, may have justifying reason.

To the trained historian, though Mr. Coulton's knowledge of his own period is unquestioned, his method is somewhat suspect. Thus, in a brilliant but not unkindly article in *History* (January, 1924), Professor Powicke writes:

Mr. Coulton is not an inaccurate scholar, although he can be caught tripping, like everyone else. Why, just when one would fain be convinced, does one suddenly feel that the argument is like a discussion in a dream in which ordinary critical judgement is impossible?

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And again :

If we are to understand the religious life—whether in the cloister or the village—of this age, we must not isolate the varieties of experience. It is just here that Mr. Coulton is so puzzling. His facts seem to be all right; the stories which he culls from unimpeachable medieval sources, while generally new, have in themselves little to surprise a student of medieval history. Whence comes this uneasy atmosphere of overwrought emotion, so seldom at rest, sometimes heavy with intense pathological suggestiveness like a Scandinavian novel?

It is not Mr. Coulton's material but "his manner of arranging his material" that troubles Professor Powicke: "Stretches of serene and beautiful prose—no better prose has appeared in our time—and passages of pithy criticism are sometimes interrupted by incoherent wastes in which the facts and quotations are flung together as by a hay-fork." This, to the historian, is both meaningless and annoying; but upon the casual reader it tells. The rhetoric carries him away; the pithy criticisms captivate him; the overwhelming list of quotations and of facts complete the conquest by convincing him of the writer's astounding learning. Even the "overwrought emotion" plays its part—though to the psychologist it may seem pathological—for it serves to persuade the reader of the stern morality, the righteous indignation, the honesty of purpose of the author whose pages lie before him. To the historical value of Mr. Coulton's work all this is doubtless detrimental, but to its effectiveness as a piece of controversy it adds enormously. Which, since we must needs at times be controversial, is the second reason why I would urge the study of Mr. Coulton's method.

Whether Mr. Coulton is acutely anxious for his challenges to be accepted, I am not at all sure. It is the challenge itself that matters; for it creates the impression of fairness and fearlessness, so essential to the controversialist who wishes to be believed, and at the same time serves to damp the ardour of the would-be critic in whose subconsciousness will ever lurk the fear lest his criticisms should unwittingly provoke a wordy duel. Nor is it

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nothing to be able to assert that for sixteen long years one has always challenged one's critics to battle, giving them equal opportunities with oneself, yet ready—win or lose—to pay the printer. It would none the less be more effective, and certainly less expensive, if one could add that the challenges had invariably been refused. Almost, therefore, I feel that I have been guilty of an impropriety, if not also of an injustice, in taking Mr. Coulton at his word.

It was in this way that I came to do it. There is a book called *Anglican Essays*, of which the constant refrain is "Away with the Anglo-Catholic and his Romanizing." Mr. Coulton's contribution concerns *Rome as Unreformed*. I reviewed the book, and, grateful for the frequent kindness with which Mr. Coulton has pointed out the mistakes of Catholic writers, ventured to indicate some of his own. Being cautious, and having other articles in the book to review, I restricted myself to eight of these errors, one of which was an obvious mistranslation, and the other a misquotation from a well-known Creed. It was enough. In a letter to the *Yorkshire Post*, someone called attention to my article. A few days later in the same paper the challenge appeared; and the student of the controversial art should note with what skill this particular weapon may be used. The letter ran as follows:

SIR,—A friend sends me the anonymous letter appearing in your issue of the 12th inst., which instances a very carelessly translated sentence in a recent essay as typical of my historical accuracy. The slips in that sentence are indefensible; and, though they in no way affect my argument, I am taking immediate measures to insert an erratum slip in the essay. But your correspondent goes on to assert that the Roman Catholic *Month* has exposed six other mistakes of mine, "which can only have been occasioned by what looks like bias." I am therefore giving the best pledge of sincerity. I am convinced that in those six cases my critic has blundered; I have therefore written to make an offer which I have repeatedly made to those of his Church who impugn my accuracy, and which they steadily decline. If he has the courage of his own criticisms, and will submit them to counter-criticism under an arrangement which will give neither of us the advantage of the last word, I will print the whole at my own expense, and

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leave the general public to judge between my cause and his. If, like his predecessors, he shrinks from this test, I trust that all fair-minded readers will understand why I spend no further time upon his arguments.

With what frankness Mr. Coulton admits that it is indefensible in Latin to turn an indicative into a subjunctive or to make a demonstrative pronoun in the feminine agree with a neuter noun! Yet how skilfully he turns the point of his opponent's sword by the more questionable remark that the mistake "in no way affects his argument." Again, how carefully chosen are the words: "which they steadily decline"! The reader might know, though he probably would not, that some time back the challenge had been taken by Fr. Lescher. Then, the remark about my courage, the offer to bear expense, the appeal to a fair-minded public, and, above all, the pledge that the controversy shall be so conducted as to give "neither of us the advantage of the last word." Mr. Coulton is unquestionably an artist.

I accepted those terms, but asked for an arbitrator who should "pronounce judgement between us," for I hardly thought that, unaided, the general public would be able to judge of the historical and legal questions that were bound to arise. Mr. Coulton replied that it would take years to find an arbitrator acceptable to both sides; and then asked the Editor of the *Yorkshire Post* to "suspend the correspondence," since the challenger would "be out of hearing for nearly two months." This the Editor did. My so-called "imported foreign conditions" were thus eliminated. Yet, after all, it was I who had been the person challenged.

The discussion began in October and ended in April—seven months. We agreed that each should write a letter of 5,000 words, then another of 1,000, and finally a summary of 500 words, the two summaries to be composed independently so that neither should get the advantage of the last word. These terms were fixed by Mr. Coulton, yet he had scarce started to write the first letter, when he

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asked me to extend its length to 6,000 words, which I did. He next begged for an indefinite extension of the second letter, but declined the 50 per cent. increase which I offered. Then, when the greater part of our correspondence was complete, came an insistent demand that "documents" also should be published. If I did not agree, I was to be denounced for keeping back the truth from the "reading and thinking public," to whom we were supposed to be making our appeal. I was thus constrained to sacrifice yet more precious time in preparing a work for the public, which scarce a thousand will ever read. Mr. Coulton's promise was alluring, but it is a myth to suppose that he bears the whole expense. Why, our intervening and unpublished correspondence alone weighs nearly two pounds!

Another allurement which it is necessary to examine is the promise of "an arrangement which will give neither the advantage of the last word." It must not be taken too literally. Our respective summaries were to have been our last words. But the last sentence in Mr. Coulton's reads: "Anyone sending a stamped envelope to the Wessex Press, Taunton, may obtain documentary test of Fr. Walker's accuracy." Continuity between the "last word" and those that follow is thus established. Yet I cannot but wonder whether it is really "my mentality" or his own that Mr. Coulton is describing when he says in this fly-sheet: "His apologetic mentality is such that it never occurs to him to consider whether such conduct is diametrically opposed to the ordinary practice of intelligent human beings who are really struggling to find the truth."

The fly-sheet is entitled "A Roman Catholic Calumny." It is, if Roman Catholic be in the objective case. But of it I will merely remark (a) that Mr. Coulton therein appeals to a friendly arbitrator, whose judgement he prints in leaded type, the matter judged being a question of law, and the arbitrator, strange to say, a philosopher; and (b) that one of my arguments, still molesting him in the Discussion,* is here laid decently to rest.

* The full title of our joint work is *Roman Catholic Truth*—an open discussion (Simpkin, Marshall and Co., 3s. 6d). Mr. Coulton calls it also

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For further enlightenment as to the meaning of the arrangement about neither side getting the last word, *The Death-penalty for Heresy* should be consulted. Mr. Coulton was preparing this during our Discussion; announced it on the cover; published it at the same time and through the same firm. In it he *re-discusses* in the text or appendices *all the main arguments I had used*, thereby compensating himself—occultly as we say—for my refusal to allow the controversy to be indefinitely prolonged. Do not be deceived, then, ye who think of accepting Mr. Coulton's challenges! You will get your last word; and so will he; but he will get *his* alone in his glory without any carping critic at his side.

But if challenging is an art, so also is controversy itself, more especially that part of it which concerns documents. If these are to be effective, they require most tactful handling. The historian's method must not be confused with the controversialist's, for the hay-fork arrangement, so distasteful to historians, may well serve the controversialist's purpose, so long as only favourable instances are chosen. It is also important to begin quoting and to stop quoting just at the right place, or one may disprove the very point one is seeking to establish. Again, not all documents have precisely the same value. The decree of an œcumenical council, for instance, is not quite the same thing as a Papal brief, addressed to an individual. The weaker evidence, therefore, needs a little bolstering, and there are many ingenious ways in which this meretricious support may be provided. To be successful as a controversialist one must acquire finesse in the use of these various weapons. Let me therefore illustrate from the work of one who is admittedly a past-master in the art.

One desires, let us say, to prove that Catholic historians are unreliable because unvaracious. That Mr. Coulton should display such a desire indicates a suicidal tendency,

Medieval Studies, No. 17. *The Death-penalty for Heresy* is called Medieval Studies, No. 18. Same publisher, same price, but *please* do not mistake the numbers.

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if, as Professor Powicke assures us,* "but for the labours of Roman Catholic scholars during the last four centuries, three-fourths of Mr. Coulton's material would have been inaccessible to him." Yet, given the desire, it is obvious that if Newman can be made to say that Catholic historians are unveracious, his opinion will carry great weight. Now in his *Development of Doctrine* Newman wrote: † "It is melancholy to say it, but the chief, perhaps the only English writer who has any claim to be considered an ecclesiastical historian is the infidel Gibbon!" True, Newman has just pointed out that: "Whatever be historical Christianity, it is not Protestantism"; and is here developing the further point that "Protestantism has ever felt this." There is no need to mention this fact, however, since it would clearly spoil the argument. Indeed, it will be advisable definitely to state that "the condemnation fell equally upon his old and his new Church" (*Anglican Essays*). It did *not*, in point of fact; and in later editions Newman actually adds to the above passage the words: "To be deep in history is to cease to be a Protestant." This further difficulty can be obviated, however, by quoting from the 1845 edition; provided, of course, the context be ignored.

Another instance of the value of apt quotation without reference to context, is the oft-cited passage from a letter to Fr. Coleridge, in which Newman wrote: "Nothing would be better than an Historical Review—but who would bear it? Unless one doctored all one's facts, one should be thought a bad Catholic." The letter was published in the *Month* for January, 1903, and in this case apparently the Catholic Editor forgot to "doctor" his facts, to the great advantage of unscrupulous Protestant controversialists, who, by citing the passage without the explanation which Newman immediately gives, can make it look like a condemnation of the historical honesty of Catholics.

Newman, however, straightway continues:

The truth is, there is a keen conflict going on just now between two parties, one in the Church, one out of it—and at such seasons extreme views alone are in favour, and a man who is not

* Art. cit., p. 264.

† P. 5, ed. 1845; p. 8, ed. 1903.

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extravagant is thought treacherous. I sometimes think of King Lear's daughters—and consider that they after all may be found truest who are in speech more measured.

To what parties—one in the Church, one out of it—does Newman refer? To Protestants and Catholics? Hardly, since he would not speak of Catholics as a "party within the Church." He probably had in mind Ultramontanes on the one hand, and on the other that false Liberalism which was then threatening the very existence of the Papacy, and was so often condemned by Pius IX. In any case he is referring not to the past nor to the future, but to a "keen conflict *going on just now*." Pick out a single sentence; isolate it from its context; ignore the historical situation to which it refers—the letter was written in 1864, the year in which Garibaldi visited London, and only six years before the Vatican Council—overlook the fact that Newman is a little aggrieved at Fr. Coleridge's persistence, and it is possible to make the man who in that very year had bared his innermost soul in defence of the veracity of the Catholic priesthood seem to deny that which he had written his *Apologia* in order to establish. Yet that thus to separate quotations from their context has value, no one can deny who has followed a recent discussion in the *Yorkshire Post*, in which the passage cited by Mr. Coulton was used as a convenient anti-Catholic weapon by a correspondent who clearly regards the latter as an "authority" in such matters.

The method is so effective that yet another illustration may perhaps be pardoned. In my discussion with Mr. Coulton, I had pointed out that the third Canon of the Fourth Lateran is not a Canon of Faith but of Discipline. Mr. Coulton desires to prove the contrary. He can find no authority for this; but has discovered that Melchior Cano—"an imperishable name," "one of the greatest scholars the Church has ever had," etc., etc., classes *another* decree as a Canon of Faith. Between this—the decree *Ad abolendam* of Lucius III—and the Fourth Lateran decree a parallel can be established, *if only the first*

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part of the former be omitted. Mr. Coulton does not tell his readers that he has omitted the first part of this decree, in which the Pope condemns certain heresies in virtue of his apostolic authority. Apparently he has quoted the whole. He also fails to notice that in any case the decree does not fulfil one of the conditions requisite to a Canon of Faith which Melchior Cano himself has laid down; since nothing is "expressly and specifically pronounced to be firmly believed or to be accepted as a dogma of Catholic faith." The whole force of the argument thus depends upon Mr. Coulton's manipulation of the documents. It is plausible, without doubt; but I know what Mr. Coulton would say of one of our theologians if he had recourse to such devices.

Another real problem in controversy is how to deal with documents which do not fit one's own pet theory. Mr. Coulton solves it by bespattering their authors with mud. Those who fail to agree with the de Luca-Lepicier account of the Church's right to inflict the death-penalty are dubbed illogical, unorthodox, modernist. They "wriggle to conclusions" and are guilty of gross misstatement of facts. Fr. Vermeersch is a particular offender in this matter. "He simply ignores past theology, and Canon Law, and common sense, whenever he finds them inconvenient," and "produces his flattering conclusion just as the friend of the evening produces a white rabbit from his sleeve to amuse the children." "He is fortunate to live in a country and in an age in which he runs no risk of being called upon to explain his doctrines before an Inquisition."

Fr. Vermeersch's real offence is that he disagrees with de Luca and Lepicier about the death-penalty, and that he believes in the sincerity of Protestants; which is the more significant in that the country in which he lives is, in point of fact, Italy, and the university in which he is Professor is the Gregorian at Rome—de Luca's own university. This is unfortunate, for it contradicts what Mr. Coulton has just said about "living in a country," etc. Yet facts are facts. Hence, as a concluding remark to the Vermeersch Appendix. Mr. Coulton adds:

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It is astounding that a body with the reputation which the Society of Jesus enjoys within its own communion can put up a writer of this sort as Professor of Moral Theology at the Gregorian University in Rome, and as the champion of modern ideas as against (*sic*) great Jesuits like Bellarmine and Suarez, who, whatever else might be said of them, were deeply versed in Roman Catholic theology and generally reasoned with rigid logical accuracy.

A bow to the Society, and a hit at its reputation; a word of praise for Bellarmine and Suarez, and a hint that it needs much qualification; a suggestion of doctrinal contradiction; an acknowledgement of fact with its significance wiped clean away—all in one sentence!

Should the documents to be cited, on the other hand, happen to support one's own view or to contain sufficiently "grisly extracts," it is just as well to bring forward testimonials as to the writer's orthodoxy or competence or renown. Papal briefs commending authors, though not infallible, will be especially useful to this end; and for the lack of infallibility one can make up by a discreet use of large type. Thus, if the author happens to have printed the brief by way of advertisement on the cover of his book, the heading can be reproduced in this way:

Papal letter to the Author

TO MY BELOVED SON

MARIANUS DE LUCA, S.J.

POPE LEO XIII

BELOVED SON, HEALTH AND APOSTOLIC BENEDECTION

It will suffice to give the letter itself in small print, as advertisements are wont to do; for it is the headlines that matter. So convinced of this, in fact, is Mr. Coulton, that, whereas in our Discussion he reproduced this advertisement in full, in *The Death-penalty* he gives a facsimile reproduction of the headlines only, without the letter!

Mr. Coulton is a first-class psychologist from the point

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of view of the publicity-agent. He both appreciates style and knows how to use it, and in the art of comparison is an adept. How forceful, for instance, is the comparison of the respect due to Granderath's tolerance with that due to "the sexual continence of a centenarian"! How appropriate to liken the convert's pledge to "exterminate heretics" to that of a "backer bound to meet his bill if his friend fails to settle it"! Or, again, consider the following passage:

In Switzerland, where Protestants and Roman Catholics are exceptionally equal in numbers and friendly to each other, the outward resemblances are striking between one village congregation and another. At Protestant Adelboden, as at Roman Catholic Argentières, the church is packed on Sunday, and the natural meeting-time for the peasants is after service. Protestants and Roman Catholics worship one God; but at bottom there is a deep division.

The point which Mr. Coulton is about to make concerns the exclusiveness of Catholic marriage laws, the dirtiness of Catholic villages, and the lower level of Catholic civilization generally. But how cleverly he leads up to it. Compared with the delightful alliteration, it is a small matter that Argentières should happen to be in France.

Nor is Mr. Coulton at all particular as to the authorities to which he appeals, so long as they suit his purpose. On the question of Infallibility the *Rambler* and the *Cambridge Chronicle* are preferable to the Vatican decrees because they say what Mr. Coulton wants people to say, whereas the Vatican decrees say something quite different. On the question of the privileges of a parish priest, he consults an "experienced priest" of his acquaintance, whose statements he asked me to publish as a nameless document! I suggested that the decrees of Canon Law would be more official, if not also more correct; but Mr. Coulton declined the alternative. In regard to the distinction between Canons of Faith and of Discipline, he appeals again to "the rector of a large and educated Roman Catholic congregation"; "confronts him with my assertion and his own

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doubts"; and asks him to "commit himself" to some clear criterion. He got, he says, "the answer he expected":

I know of no other criterion than the substance of the decree or canon itself, from which, like Fr. Walker, I should have thought it would always be obvious as to whether the canon were dealing with faith or discipline—whether it was laying down that I am to make a certain profession subject to an anathema, or that I am to follow or avoid a course of action.

The criterion does seem rather obvious; and if only Mr. Coulton had less facility with his scissors, I think that even he might possibly see it. But, why this habit of running hither and thither about the town for scraps of information—to the Professor of Latin for the meaning of a phrase, to the Professor of Roman Law for the meaning of a mediæval term, to the Professor of Philosophy about a point of law, to the neighbouring priests for their "experience" of documents? Does Mr. Coulton seek to transfer the home of lost causes to Cambridge? Why this urgency in bidding "great" booksellers search Rome for second-hand copies of the works of de Luca and Lepicier, so strangely out of print, if they indeed be as famous as Mr. Coulton would make them; why this tireless search of newspapers, old and new, *Ramblers*, *Morning Posts*, *Church Times*, *Civiltà Cattolica*, *Analecta Ecclesiastica*, for any old thing wherewith to beat the Protestant drum, and to put to shame the Catholic, whether Anglo- or Roman? Why this ceaseless energy in producing controversial pamphlets, sometimes two at a time, under the high-sounding title of Mediæval Studies; this frenzied haste in adding to them just-as-I-was-going-to-press and since-going-to-press postscripts? Is Protestantism dying out so fast that there is need to make this bother about the business?

A skilful use of argument is of no less importance in the art of controversy than is an appropriate choice of material and a forceful style. Of especial value is that form of argument which logicians call *ignoratio elenchi*—first misinterpret your adversary, then refute him. I do not for a moment attribute Mr. Coulton's use of this argument to

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insincerity or malice. I attribute it rather to pent-up emotion engendering deep-felt but erroneous conviction. Mr. Coulton is determined to prove—as against Fr. Rickaby and myself and, *par exemple*, Fr. Vermeersch—that, on Thomistic principles, we ought to burn, or otherwise “exterminate from the world by death,” not only the Archbishop of Canterbury and Dean Inge, but all those who loyally defend their Protestantism. It is, as Mr. Coulton is aware, a ghastly charge to bring against one's fellow-men. He brings it, therefore, only because, like few people now existing in the world, he is convinced of its truth. But the question is by what conceivable argument can he justify it, in face of our repeated denials.

In the course of my Discussion with Mr. Coulton, I had argued that, though heretics-born existed in St. Thomas's day, the Saint, in treating of heretics, does not envisage them. I pointed out that the heretic is depicted in the documents which we jointly published, as resisting faith after accepting it, as intentionally breaking promises and corrupting beliefs, as neither seeking truth nor willing to be amended, as insincere. I submitted that this description of the heretic—and hence the penalties prescribed for such—is inapplicable to the heretic of to-day. I further called Mr. Coulton's attention to the fact that for centuries it was assumed that heretics *maliciously* combated the faith; and that, in consequence, no distinction was made between the heretic-born and the heretic-by-election. To-day, however incomprehensible the fact may be, that differences in faith are compatible with sincerity of conviction is universally acknowledged. It is the recognition of this far-reaching and significant fact, I urged, that has changed the whole situation. The death-penalty for heresy and other such penalties have therefore been abolished once and for all.

If Mr. Coulton admits the force of this argument, the very ground upon which his elaborate and many-sided anti-Catholic propaganda has been built, is cut from beneath his feet. Realizing this, he published, simultaneously with our Discussion, and in spite of the pledge given about no

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last word, a treatise on *The Death-penalty for Heretics*, the main purpose of which is to refute the above argument and to establish yet more firmly his position that, on orthodox Catholic principles, we are bound to exterminate heretics so soon as opportunity may arise.

In the first nineteen pages of this treatise, Mr. Coulton reviews the situation as it existed in Innocent III's day. He admits that, on looking more closely into all the details, the Third Canon of Lateran IV is less absolutely explicit than he had at first judged. The door is "more or less deliberately left open for death," but as yet there is no death-penalty in the proper sense of that term. The next seven pages are devoted to proving (a) that there existed heretics-born in these times—which I had admitted; (b) that both Innocent and Aquinas must have been aware of their existence—which doubtless was the case; and (c) that, in spite of this, neither Innocent nor Aquinas made any exception in their favour, the which I had both granted and explained. There follow five propositions formulated with such accuracy and care that they almost persuade me Mr. Coulton could become a theologian, if it were not for his emotional *malaise*. Their purport is to show that all the baptized are in the technical sense *fideles*, and hence in the technical sense subject to the laws of the Church. Mr. Coulton proves this to the hilt and under the pain of the Church's own anathema, as it is also proved by the documents which we had published in our joint work. He also proves—as once again I had granted—that in principle the Church has not changed, but still maintains that, *so far as the mala fide or formal heretic is concerned*, the death-penalty is theoretically justifiable.

Thus far, then, we are agreed; and one naturally hopes that Mr. Coulton, coming at length to the point at issue, will either give ground for denying that the recognition of the sincerity of heretics makes the applicability of penal laws impossible on Catholic principles, or else will admit it. Instead, while allowing that the penal laws against heresy have been abolished by the Church's new Code, he asserts that this tolerance is "a mere accident of circumstance";

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"the moment persecution became opportune, it (the death-penalty) would become not only permissible, but a binding duty upon the orthodox." Granderath denies this. Therefore Granderath, who, when he was saying things that pleased Mr. Coulton, had a name that will "live for ever amongst scholars," is declared to be orthodox *only with respect to the first part of his article!* For the rest he is either "astoundingly ignorant or flatly dishonest." So also does this self-made infallible pope pronounce all theologians who agree with Granderath to be unorthodox and to be in danger of the Church's anathema. A man may live for ever, so long as he agrees with Mr. Coulton. If he disagree, he merits the death-penalty, and should the Church neglect to administer it, Mr. Coulton will gladly do so by means of a Mediæval Study.

It is admitted that persecution has grown morally repulsive even to Catholics. Yet Mr. Coulton does not enquire why. Instead, he asserts that "in logic no orthodox Roman Catholic dare face the issue." This is obvious, if all who have faced it are to be stigmatized as unorthodox. Yet the logic which no orthodox Catholic has faced is scarce overwhelming. It runs as follows:

If the Church is in fact infallible in faith and morals, and if God intends to assign each of us to an eternity of inconceivable bliss or horror mainly on grounds of our belief or disbelief in the things asserted in the Westminster Penny Catechism, then the cruellist methods of forcing this penny catechism upon us must also be the kindest, provided only that they be effectual (p. 36).

True, the argument is subtle, and might even be conclusive, if it were not for the false supposition implied by the qualifying phrase "provided only they be effectual." But forced conversions can *never* be effectual, and Mr. Coulton knows this; for he knows that in Aquinas's teaching faith involves an act of free-will, and that the attempt to *force* people to believe is contrary to Catholic principles. He also knows that penalties for heresy are not defended by "orthodox" theologians on these grounds, but on the grounds of self-defence against attempts to destroy Christian teaching. His argument, therefore, supposes the

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impossible, both psychologically and morally; and hence is fallacious.

Lest the reader be fatigued by this logical effort, the pressure is now relieved by a dramatic appeal to the Archbishop of Canterbury to cease playing with fire at Malines. Then (p. 42) in a still more subtle argument the case against Rome is thus summarized:

The orthodox doctrine, as formulated by St. Thomas Aquinas and confirmed and elaborated by later Dominicans and by Jesuits like the Blessed Robert Bellarmine and Suarez, runs as follows:

1. All baptized Christians are, *ipso facto*, subjects of the Roman Catholic Church.

2. That Church is "a Perfect Society" in the medieval philosophical sense.

3. Therefore she has full rights of coercion and punishment over all her subjects.

4. Not only of spiritual punishment, such as excommunication, but also corporal punishment.

5. Not excluding the extreme penalty of death.

6. Heresy—*formal* as apart from mere *material* heresy—is a crime.

7. And therefore punishable in proportion to its sinfulness and to the damage it causes.

8. *Formal* heretics are all who, not being invincibly ignorant (or practically, in other words, intellectual deficients), refuse pertinaciously to accept the Roman Catholic faith when put before them.

9. It is not for the individual to judge the point at which this refusal becomes pertinacious, nor for the state, nor for society in general; the sole judge here is the Roman Catholic Church.

Here are nine propositions of which the conclusion is obvious: since all heretics, save the intellectually deficient, are formal heretics, when opportunity arises, to all will the death-penalty be applied. Where shall we break the chain? Where, indeed? There lies the beauty of it. If there is a flaw, it is so cleverly concealed that "the reading and thinking public," unversed in Catholic teaching, will scarcely notice it. One might qualify No. 3 by reference to the end for which the Church exists; No. 5 by reference to the diverse opinions prevalent on this subject; and No. 9 in several ways. But let us not quarrel about this. Sub-

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stantially, propositions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 are correct. "Which of these nine links," then demands Mr. Coulton, "would Cardinal Mercier himself dare to break by publicly proclaiming to his flock: "It is false that . . .?"

Why trouble Cardinal Mercier? If I think of it, I will ask the Pope to put Proposition 8 on the next Syllabus of Errors. The plain answer to a plain question would then run somewhat as follows: *It is false, erroneous in faith, and—assuming vincible ignorance—deceitful and dishonest to assert that "Formal heretics are all who, not being invincibly ignorant (or practically, in other words, intellectual deficients), refuse pertinaciously to accept the Roman Catholic faith when put before them."* I am astounded that Mr. Coulton does not know this, after so long and so careful a study of selected documents. He is in invincible ignorance himself, and it is of the species which theologians call *crassa*; but one would scarce describe him as "intellectually deficient." Why, then, does he identify "invincible ignorance" with "intellectual deficiency"? Why did he not, before committing himself to so preposterous a fallacy, look up some textbook of Moral Theology? If he prefers a Spaniard, there is Arregui, who distinguishes *vincible* from *invincible* ignorance—*Prout, adhibita juxta rei et personæ condiciones morali diligentia, deponi possit vel non* (according as it can or cannot be got rid of by ordinary means appropriate to the circumstances and the person concerned). If he prefer an Englishman, there is Fr. Slater:

Invincible ignorance cannot be dispelled by the use of ordinary diligence. This may arise in my mind either because no thought of my want of knowledge occurs to me, and so the idea of making enquiries never enters my head, or because I have failed to acquire knowledge on the point, though I made all reasonable efforts to do so.

If he would rather have a mediæval authority, why not Aquinas?—"Ignorantia invincibilis dicitur, quia scilicet studio superari non potest" (invincible ignorance is so called because it cannot by reasonable care be overcome). Or, if Mr. Coulton were pressed for time, Murray's Dic-

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tionary would have sufficed: "An ignorance, the means of overcoming or removing which are not possessed by the ignorant person himself."

I quite realize the necessity of equating invincible ignorance with intellectual deficiency *for the purpose of Mr. Coulton's argument*. He has to prove that we would, if we could, and if it were not for that temporarily abolished death-penalty, make a bonfire of the average Englishman, the Anglican clergy, and most of the Cambridge dons. Invincible ignorance (=intellectual deficiency) alone can excuse them. But the average Englishman cannot be described as intellectually deficient. Still less can the Anglican clergy or the Cambridge graduate be so described. Ergo, as soon as we choose to revive the death-penalty for heresy, these unfortunate people will have been deprived of all hope of salvation by the ingenuity of their good friend Mr. Coulton.

Yet this gigantic superstructure, which it has taken a whole book to erect, rests solely upon the slender basis of the arbitrary and incorrect definition which Mr. Coulton has so neatly inserted in the midst of an otherwise correct proposition. The formal heretic is supposed *vincibly* ignorant; and *vincible* ignorance signifies that the means of overcoming his ignorance *are* possessed by the ignorant person himself, but that he does not choose to use them. He is insincere. He could find out the truth about the Catholic religion if he chose, and could believe it if he willed, but he doesn't choose and he doesn't will. Instead, he deliberately chooses not to hear, or hearing, not to see.

Are there such people in England to-day? Possibly there are; yet I have never come across them. It seems to me that when it dawns upon the average Englishman that the Catholic religion may possibly be the true religion, he usually begins to study it, and often enough ends by embracing it. If he fail to do so, it is either that it has never occurred to him to enquire into the matter, or else that, having done so, inherited prejudice and centuries of misrepresentation have obscured the issue. But, if so, the average Englishman is not a formal heretic, has committed

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neither sin nor crime, and so, being innocent, is, though a baptized person, in no wise subject to laws which punish guilt.

The existence or non-existence of invincible ignorance in the sense defined by moralists is a question of fact. I submit that, with respect to the truth of Catholicism, it is in this country very prevalent. I submit also that the Church takes cognizance not only of the possibility, but also of the existence, of invincible ignorance with respect to revealed truth. If this statement requires proof, here it is, in the words of Pius IX,* conjoined significantly with a reassertion of those very claims which our invincibly ignorant brethren think so arrogant:

It is to be held as of faith that outside the Apostolic Roman Church no one can be saved; that this Church is the one ark of salvation, and that he who has not found entrance will perish in the flood; it is none the less similarly to be held for certain that those who suffer from ignorance of the true religion, if their ignorance be insurmountable (*invincibilis*), are involved in no guilt on this account before the eyes of the Lord. But as things are, who would make so vast and arrogant a claim as to count himself able to define the limits of ignorance of this sort, in view of the various character of peoples, environments, temperaments, and other considerations? Assuredly, when, released from these bonds of flesh, we see God as He is, we shall realize to the full how close and how beautiful is the bond which binds divine mercy and justice together; but, so long as we dwell on earth, weighed down by this mortal clay, which dulls the soul, let us firmly hold as of Catholic teaching that God is one, faith one, and baptism one; it were wrong to press further our enquiry.

It was said by the *Commonwealth* of that grisly mediæval fantasia, entitled *Friar's Lantern*, that it is "a book worthy to be placed beside *The Cloister and the Hearth* as a true work of art." This should be said of all Mr. Coulton's publications. He is certainly an artist. But he is less successful as a logician; and, for the future, would be well advised, I think, to leave the deducing of conclusions from Catholic premisses to those who understand the meaning of the terms used.

LESLIE J. WALKER, S.J.

* From the Allocution, *Singularis quadam*, December 9, 1854.

LINNÆUS AND HIS COLLECTIONS

THE name of Linnæus is familiar to all who are even remotely acquainted with science, and the main facts of his life may be found in all general encyclopædias. But it was not until 1903 that a biography bringing together in connected form a detailed and accurate account of the life of the great Swede was issued by his fellow-countryman, the late Professor T. M. Fries, and this, being written in Swedish, was practically inaccessible to English readers. For these the work has now been translated and adapted by Dr. B. Daydon Jackson,* who, as Secretary to the Society which was founded in Linnæus's honour and bears his name, has had special opportunity for obtaining information which has accumulated during the last twenty years—information which is incorporated in the volume before us. It is thought that some account of the man whose collections are among England's most treasured possessions and of the collections themselves may be of interest to the general reader, who is probably unaware of their existence.

Carl Linnæus was born on May 23, 1707, at South Råshult, in the Swedish province of Smaland, where his father was minister. In the lives of the saints we are familiar with early indications of the sanctity of which they are to become conspicuous examples; in like manner we read of the boy—who later was to reorganize botanical science and to suggest the contemporary epigram, "*Deus creavit, Linnæus disposuit*"—that even as a baby, when he was unreasonable and could not otherwise be pacified, he became quiet as soon as a flower was put into his hands. As in cases of infant piety, parental influence had much to do with the result; both Carl's father and mother had a strong affection for flowers; the former, indeed, was no inconsiderable botanist, and the boy, when barely four years old, accompanied him on his rambles, showing an insatiable desire for the names of the plants they met with.

* *Linnæus: The Story of his Life.* Witherby.

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At his first school, to which he went in 1714, the future professor "delighted to gather flowers in the fields and to teach his comrades about them, thus gaining for himself, when barely eight years old, the title of 'the little botanist.'" The headmaster of the school was himself interested in plants and encouraged the boy, and his acquaintance with a Dr. Rothman awakened thoughts of a medical career:

During the holidays at home, Carl amused himself with his brothers and sisters, made a lancet of wood, as though he would bleed them, tested their slightest symptoms by their pulse, and sometimes sought for plants by which to cure their ailments.

His parents, however, had determined that Carl should follow his father's profession and become a minister; for this the boy felt he had no vocation, but many difficulties had to be overcome before he was allowed to follow his inclination. Meanwhile he had pursued his favourite science, not only in the field, where he knew every plant within five Swedish (nearly thirty English) miles of his home, but with such botanical literature as he could find.

From the Gymnasium, to which he had proceeded from the school, Carl in 1727 went to the University of Lund; here he made the acquaintance of Kilian Stobæus, one of the professors, with whom he lodged during the whole of his stay in that city, and of whom he writes: "He loved me not as a pupil but as a son." Stobæus had an excellent museum of all kinds of natural objects, and this determined Carl to provide himself with an herbarium, to supply which he undertook numerous excursions. On the advice of Dr. Rothman, who pointed out to his parents the advantages of Upsala for a prospective physician, Carl entered the University there in 1728, having obtained from his parents "100 dalers in silver (£7 10s.) once for all, as they could not afterwards assist him."

The advantages of the University proved to have been greatly exaggerated; its state, in fact, at the time when Linnæus went there, was incredibly bad, both as to the hospital and the botanic garden; anatomical teaching "had

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sunk to such insignificance as at the present day is inconceivable"; the University did not possess a chemical laboratory, such lectures as were delivered being given at the house of the University apothecary, and there was practically no zoological collection:

To sum up, it may be said with reason that a worse provision for medical teaching could hardly exist. Linnæus said that he worked at medicine during the greatest barbarism at Upsala. But in considering this, it can only awaken surprise and wonder that, almost without guidance, he developed under such conditions in a few years into a great man and pioneer not only in natural history but also in the domain of pure medicine.

At this period Linnæus suffered from extreme economical depression. The money he had received from his parents had been spent in two visits to Stockholm to attend lectures, in University fees and the like;

He really began to suffer want; he had to run into debt for food, and to go almost barefoot, as he could not sole his shoes, but had to substitute paper.

But relief was at hand. Dean Olof Celsius—who, although a professor at Upsala, had for some time been engaged in ecclesiastical business in Stockholm—during a sojourn in Upsala in the spring of 1729 visited the dilapidated garden, where he saw an unknown student describing plants. This was Linnæus, with whom Celsius—himself a botanist—entered into conversation, and, finding him proficient, took him to his house, where he subsequently provided him with food and lodging. Linnæus was, in fact, treated almost as a son, and thanked God, "who had so graciously given him another Stobæus in Upsala." As an acknowledgement, he presented Celsius on New Year's Day, 1730, with a little tract, to which he prefixed this graceful dedication:

It is an old custom to awaken one's eminent patrons on New Year's Day with verses and good wishes, and I also find myself obliged to do so. I would gladly write in verse, but must bewail that it is true as the old proverb has it: Poets are born, not made! I was not born a poet but a botanist instead, so I offer

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the fruit of the little harvest which God has vouchsafed me. In these few pages is handled the great analogy which is found between plants and animals, in their increase in like measure according to their kind, and what I have here simply written, I pray may be favourably received.

In the last sentence allusion is made to the sexuality of plants, which had been set forth as an indisputable fact by Sebastien Vaillant in Paris in 1717 and had greatly attracted Linnæus, who, as is well known, later made it the basis of his system of classification.

The little memoir, thus, one might say, almost casually produced, was destined to exercise a great influence upon Linnæus's career. He had already planned and begun to write many of the works which he afterwards elaborated and completed, but so far had published nothing. Copies of the memoirs were made and circulated in manuscript; it was communicated to the Royal Society of Science of Upsala, who ordered it to be printed and published. As a consequence, Linnæus obtained the post of demonstrator in botany to the University, a position which he filled with immediate and continued success; he had usually from two to four hundred auditors, whilst the professors seldom had more than eighty.

In 1732, at the expense of the Society of Science, Linnæus had the long-desired opportunity of visiting Lapland. The journey, which was in those days an adventurous, even a dangerous, undertaking, occupied him from May to October, and was carried to a successful issue; though the hardships which he underwent were such that he said he would not undertake it again for the equivalent of £300. During the journey Linnæus kept a diary, "which must be regarded as a masterpiece"; in this he entered observations on and descriptions of the animals and plants encountered (the latter forming the basis of his *Flora Lapponica*, published in 1737), with notes and sketches concerning the habits and customs of the Lapps. It was on this occasion that Linnæus met with the charming and deliciously fragrant little plant, found also in our Scottish woods, by which he chose to be com-

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memorated. When Linnæus published the name *Linnæa* he attributed it to his friend Gronovius, of whom more will be said later; but the analogy between the plant and himself, even at the time of publication (1737) reflected unfairly upon both:

Linnæam dixit cl. Gronovius plantam Lapponicam depressam, vilem, neglectam, brevi tempore florentem et consimili suo Linnæo.

The Lapland journey was succeeded, in 1733-4, by one in Dalecarlia, undertaken under far more comfortable circumstances, in which Linnæus was accompanied by seven of the Upsala students. He had previously visited Falun to increase his knowledge of mineralogy, and spent the Christmas of 1734 at that place, where he met the girl who, after an engagement of six years, became his wife.

Under December 19, 1734, Linnæus entered in his diary:

At 8 in the morning I said good-bye to Upsala Academy, to which Almighty God so marvellously conducted me, living now in difficulty, now in enjoyment; now in poverty, now in abundance; now in blame, now in honour. To Thee, great God, be thanks.

Having finally determined to follow medicine as a profession, he had been advised to take a foreign medical degree; this he proposed to do at Harderwijk, a small town in Gelderland, which possessed a University much frequented by Swedes; and for this place Linnæus set out on the April following his departure from Upsala. The necessary formalities, including the presentation of a thesis which Linnæus had already prepared in Sweden, were speedily completed; and he next entered himself as a student at the University of Leyden. He had brought with him the manuscript of several works which he wished to get printed, and was fortunate enough to make the acquaintance of John Frederick Gronovius, a wealthy senator of Leyden and keen botanist, to whom he showed the MS. of his *Systema Naturæ*. Gronovius at once offered to pay the cost of printing the work, which appeared in 1735.

Linnæus and his Collections

At Leyden Linnæus also met Hermann Boerhaave, "the chief medical oracle of the time," and also distinguished as a botanist. With his usual good fortune the young Swede ingratiated himself with Boerhaave, who recommended him as resident physician to George Clifford, a very wealthy Leyden merchant and director of the Dutch East India Company, who had a magnificent garden at Hartecamp, between that place and Haarlem. Clifford and Linnæus had already met in the medical garden at Amsterdam, and a visit to Hartecamp was the result. Linnæus was overcome with delight at the treasures of the museum and gardens and was delighted at the possibility of residence there; he took up his abode at Hartecamp in September, 1735, and was accustomed to describe the two years spent there as the happiest of his life.

During this period, besides arranging Clifford's herbarium and cataloguing the plants of his garden, Linnæus was preparing various works for the Press, among them the *Genera Plantarum*, published in 1737, which at once became a botanical classic. This year, which was also that of the publication of the great catalogue of Clifford's garden, the *Hortus Cliffortianus*, represents the period of Linnæus's greatest literary activity.

While at Hartecamp, Linnæus, at Clifford's expense, visited England in order to see its large museums and become acquainted with its principal naturalists; his journey from Rotterdam to London took nearly a week, owing to the contrariness of the wind. His first visit was paid to Sir Hans Sloane, President of the Royal Society and founder of the British Museum, the fame of whose museum and collections in Jamaica was world-wide. Linnæus was introduced to Sloane by Boerhaave in a graceful letter:

Linnæus, who brings you this letter, is particularly worthy of seeing you, and of being seen by you. He who sees you together will look upon a pair of men whose like can hardly be found in the world.

He then visited Philip Miller—"hortulanorum princeps"—the administrator of the Apothecaries' Garden at Chelsea,

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who conducted Linnæus through the garden and showed him his treasures, but formed no favourable opinion of the young Swede: "This Clifford's botanist does not know a single plant," a remark duly reported to Linnæus. On the following day the garden was again visited, and Linnæus further affronted Miller by criticizing the long names then in use for plants, and indicating a shorter method which subsequently became, as it is still, universally adopted. He then went to Oxford and made the acquaintance of Dillenius, the keeper of the Sherardian Herbarium, which in Linnæus's opinion excelled all others in Europe. Here again, owing to misunderstanding, perhaps mixed with a little professional jealousy, his reception was at first unfavourable; but cordial relations were afterwards established, and Dillenius, who had received Linnæus "so haughtily that he was scarcely invited to step in," when he left, "embraced him and parted from him with tears, having before that invited him to live and die there, as the professional salary was sufficient for both." In connection with this visit of Linnæus to England that the pretty legend arose which Dr. Jackson, with the iconoclasm of science, ruthlessly destroys:

Sir J. E. Smith mentions as a tradition that Linnæus was so enchanted with the gorse in full flower on Putney Heath that he flung himself on his knees before it; but as the gorse is a spring-flowering plant, and Linnæus was only in England in late summer, the tradition is unfounded.

On his return to Hartecamp, Linnæus again set to work on Clifford's collections and on his own publications; but the Dutch climate did not suit him, and, in spite of all persuasion, after a visit to Leyden he returned to Sweden. But the time spent in Holland, during which "there were published, besides smaller treatises, no fewer than twelve or fourteen works for the development of botany, some of them epoch-making," established Linnæus's fame and reputation, and

he returned, not as an insignificant student, but as one of that period's most eminent naturalists, a celebrated and esteemed man of science.

Linnæus and his Collections

In September, 1738, Linnæus settled in Stockholm as a practising physician; before this, however, he had visited Paris, where he was received and honoured as "*princeps botanicorum*," and was elected a Foreign Correspondent of the Académie des Sciences. But his scientific reputation, did not secure him medical practice, and several months passed without any real improvement in his position. At last the tide turned; he obtained a reputation as skilful in chest disorders, and this was destined to have an important influence upon his future.

Among his patients was a court lady who suffered from an irritating and obstinate cough, and for its relief was ordered pills of tragacanth. . . . This lady was playing at cards with the Queen Ulrika Eleonora, when she was obliged to take a pill from her box. On the Queen asking what it was, as she herself had a cough, she was given the physician's name; Linnæus was called in, and his prescription having the desired effect, he became known and consulted among the highest ranks of society.

During his three years in Stockholm Linnæus exhibited astonishing activity. He took a leading part in founding the (Royal) Academy of Science, of which he was the first President; he lectured on plants and minerals, as always, with great acceptance, and had an extensive medical practice, becoming one of the leading pathologists of Sweden. But this practice became an oppressive burden, and he "longed for a return to the quiet world of botany." This desire was fulfilled: the chair of Medicine and Botany at Upsala became vacant, and Linnæus was appointed by the King to the vacant post. On October 6, 1741, he took up his abode in Upsala, there to remain for the rest of his days.

This appointment may be regarded as the closing of the first and most interesting part of Linnæus's career, during which, to quote his biographer:

Often under untoward conditions he laboured with youthful energy, rising from an undistinguished position to one of world-wide reputation, and in various countries, helped by their sympathy, acquired devoted friends and warm-hearted benefactors.

As compared with this, what follows is somewhat pro-

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saic. The enjoyment of success, delightful as it may be, is less exciting than the struggles which have led to its achievement; and although in the case of Linnæus the struggles were not strenuous, they present features of interest which were absent from the later and settled portion of his life.

All the qualities which had obtained Linnæus his reputation were exhibited by him in the large field now open to him. From his installation in 1741 to the end of 1776, a year before his death, he never (save when unavoidably prevented) missed a single lecture. His fame drew pupils from all European nations, including one Englishman, as well as an Algerian and an American; and of those who attended his lectures, many afterwards took a high place in botanical science. Among these was one who, though a Swede, came to England in 1760 and never returned to his native land; this was Daniel Solander, who became librarian to Sir Joseph Banks, and accompanied him in Cook's first voyage round the world; his collections and MSS. are among the treasures of the British Museum.

Apart from his professional work, though in connection with it, was Linnæus's administration of the Upsala Botanic Garden, which, he was able to say, was in 1762 the richest in Europe in plants of all kinds. His zeal in importing economic species sometimes received a check from the ignorance of his underlings; thus a living cactus sent from Surinam with the cochineal insects upon it was received by a gardener who, seeing it swarming with vermin, cleaned it so thoroughly that not an insect was left.

Thus Linnæus's hope of establishing the cochineal in the orangery was blasted; this troubled him so much that he had megrim forthwith—one of the severest attacks he had ever experienced.

Up to his sixtieth year Linnæus on the whole enjoyed good health, notwithstanding attacks of gout and other occasional illnesses, but the account of his later life is painful reading, and his last two years were periods of

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great suffering. The summer of 1777 brought some improvement, but this was only temporary. Dark shadows, too, rested on his home; he was neglected by his wife, and his eldest son, whose relations with his mother were strained, was a source of anxiety to him. His death at Hammarby, his country house, on January 10, 1778, must have come as a welcome ending; at his deathbed were present only the University Proctor and his one English pupil, John Rotheram, who had graduated M.D. at Upsala two years before, and became Professor of Physics at St. Andrews, where he died in 1804.

"The most noteworthy trait of Linnæus's character," says his biographer, "was his ardent piety." This is indicated in passages which have already been cited, and notably in the memoranda intended only for his children, in which he mentions his special grounds throughout life for thankfulness to God, who had "conducted him with His own almighty hand." Save for an incidental remark that when in Brussels in 1738 Linnæus "observed the Papist religion in its highest ceremonies," there is no evidence that Catholicism ever presented itself to him, nor is it likely that such was the case. Pope Clement XIII had indeed forbidden the introduction of his writings into the Papal States because he had made the arrangement of animals in a different way from Moses, but in 1774 Clement XIV, when instituting a new botanical professor, ordered him to set forth Linnæus's views in his lectures. Linnæus's own opinions were in advance of a period when the Bible was regarded as the main source of information even on scientific matters:

He doubted the existence of a universal flood, or that only six thousand years had passed since the creation of the world, also that the elements existed before the Mosaic account narrated their creation. Though he did not print these views, they could not remain unknown, and many priests and laymen thought him a secret atheist, or at least heretical in some degree.

He drew up for his son's guidance a series of notes on Divine Punishment (*Nemesis Divina*), some of which are given by Dr. Jackson:

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A man freed a thief from the gallows. The same man was taken by enemies and was to be hanged, but a rope was wanting; the thief came and gave a rope;

there are also certain psychical experiences, not of a convincing nature.

When speaking of Linnæus's visit to Philip Miller at Chelsea, I referred to the new names which Linnæus bestowed upon plants; and perhaps the most generally useful boon which he conferred not only upon the scientific world, but upon all who talk about plants, was the introduction of what is known as the binominal system of nomenclature. It will probably surprise most people to know that before Linnæus a plant did not possess a *name*, Latin or scientific, in the sense in which we now understand it; the only way of referring to it was by a *phrase*, often of many words, indicating its distinguishing characteristics. It was not until he was nearing his fiftieth year that Linnæus thoroughly adopted the new plan; in the *Hortus Cliffortianus* (1737) the then usual method was followed, but in his great work the *Species Plantarum* (1753) he assigned to each plant a name consisting of two words, one of the genus, one of the species—a method hence known as the binominal system. It seems probable, though Linnæus does not say so, that the plan was suggested by an analogy with the names of persons, though in inverse order—the surname corresponding with the genus, the Christian name with the species. An example will make the position clear, and will show how greatly the new plan made for convenience. Our common Moon Daisy was known to science as "*Chrysanthemum foliis amplexicaulibus oblongis, superne serratis, inferne dentatis*," and was thus distinguished from all other *Chrysanthemums*; Linnæus, while retaining the specific description, superimposed a name, *Leucanthemum*, and the plant has ever since been known as *Chrysanthemum Leucanthemum*. The plan was so obviously simple and convenient that it was universally adopted, and every plant or animal named on this principle.

It now remains to say something about the Linnæan col-

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lections, by the possession of which England is placed in a specially favoured position in the world of science, inasmuch as it is only in London that can be found the types on which his descriptive work is based. It may be well to explain briefly what is meant by a type, in order that the importance of its possession may be understood.

A type, then, is the actual specimen which the describer had before him when he drew up the description of a plant or animal. Determination from published descriptions may lead to mistakes, and this is especially the case with descriptions such as those of Linnæus, who was faced by the necessity of getting into very limited compass the characters of the plants of the whole world as then known—characters sufficient, perhaps, to differentiate them at the time, but inadequate to distinguish them from later discoveries. It is, therefore, of the highest scientific importance to be able to decide what Linnæus had in view when he drew up the *Species Plantarum* (1753). In this he printed a brief description of every known plant, based upon his own observations or on the published accounts of previous authors; these descriptions are regarded by botanists as the scientific starting-point of the species, and the name imposed by Linnæus has always been retained.

It is obvious that Linnæus could not have seen all these plants in a living state; in drawing them up he was largely dependent upon the dried specimens in the herbarium which he had begun to form when staying with Stobæus at Lund (see p. 208); this at the time of his death contained about 19,000 specimens. To this throughout his life he continued to receive accessions from the botanists of the world, with the chief of whom he was in frequent correspondence. In a document addressed to his wife two years before his death, Linnæus described his collections as the greatest the world had ever seen, saying truly that, invaluable as they then were, they would increase in value as time went on. It was offered by his widow to Sir Joseph Banks, then President of the Royal Society, for a thousand guineas. When the letter con-

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taining the offer came (December 23, 1783) there was breakfasting with Banks Mr. James Edward Smith, a medical student and enthusiastic botanist, then in his twenty-fourth year. Banks suggested that Smith should buy it, and the latter at once acceded, relying on his father, a wealthy manufacturer at Norwich, to provide the sum required. The transaction was completed with such rapidity that it was only after the money had been paid and the vessel containing the herbarium had passed the export customs, that the people of Sweden awoke to the serious loss they had sustained. Of the indignation displayed, Dr. Jackson gives an interesting account:

The people for a long time believed the rumour that directly he had information of the brig's departure, the King [Gustaf III] despatched a warship to follow it and bring it back, but it did not succeed.

The legend, though apparently baseless, gained currency through the publication in 1800 of a portrait of Smith, underneath which was a representation of two vessels within hailing distance, with the legend: "The pursuit of the ship containing the Linnæan collection by order of the King of Sweden." In recognition of his action,

Smith, previously an unknown medical student, became at once famous and esteemed; in so much honour was he held that in the following May he was unanimously elected a Fellow of the Royal Society.

Samuel Goodenough (1743-1827), afterwards Bishop of Carlisle, himself a botanist of repute, expressed the general view of botanists as to Smith's action and the importance of his acquisition when he wrote: "Your noble purchase of the Linnæan cabinet decidedly sets Britain above all other nations in the Botanick Empire." Important as were the herbarium and library, their value was greatly enhanced when, to his surprise, Smith found in the former "the whole of Linné's extensive and valuable correspondence, with all the manuscripts he left"; from the former Smith published in 1821 two volumes of selections.

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It was a natural consequence of his action in purchasing the herbarium that Smith should become the first President of the Linnean Society, which, largely through his exertions, was established in London on what was supposed to be Linnæus's birthday, May 24, 1888—Dr. Jackson has shown that the actual date of Linnæus's birth was May 23. On the occasion of his election Smith said:

I consider myself a trustee of the public, and hold these treasures only for the purpose of making them useful to the world and Natural History in general and particularly to this locality.

He held the post of President for forty years until his death in 1828, when the collections were acquired by the Linnean Society. The herbarium, "carefully secured against London smoke and dust by specially devised envelopes," remained in the green painted cabinets in which it arrived from Sweden until 1915, when the menace of air-raids necessitated special measures of precaution:

The outside cabinets were lined with steel and asbestos, the packets of plants being put into steel boxes, so that in case of fire from enemy bombs they could be rescued easily. Similar precautions were taken as regards the Linnæan correspondence and his annotated copies of his own works, which were lodged in steel boxes for quick removal in case of danger.

The presence of the Linnæan herbarium is sufficient to explain the visits to London of botanists from all parts of the world, but this is only one of the causes which make such visits necessary. The possession by the British Museum of the collections of Sir Hans Sloane (1660-1753), which include not only his Jamaica plants—the earliest known from the island (collected in 1688)—but 334 volumes of specimens from contemporary botanists and collectors everywhere, and of those of Sir Joseph Banks (1743-1820), in which a somewhat later period is equally represented, contain much of the highest historical value, especially to U.S. botanists, who find in them the earliest collections of North American plants, which, prior to 1776, naturally came to England.

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In the Banksian collection—the foundation of the present British Museum Herbarium—are two Linnæan herbaria, second only in importance to the one described above. The herbarium formed by Paul Herman in Ceylon in 1672-79, was at one time in the possession of Linnæus, who on the material it contained based his *Flora Zeylanica*; the specimens are named throughout in Linnæus's hand, and constitute the types of the plants described in the *Flora*. After passing through various hands, the herbarium, consisting of five volumes, was bought by Banks in 1795 for the sum of £75. The other herbarium is that formed by George Clifford (see p. 212), and contains the types of the plants described by Linnæus in his *Hortus Cliffortianus* (1737); this was acquired by Banks in 1791 for £23.

JAMES BRITTEN.

ST. THOMAS AND RELATIVITY

TO deal with mind is to deal with reality in all its various and changing phases. Mind is the golden key that unlocks the door of life and so reveals nature's recesses. Unless the first glance of the human intelligence when it alights upon the material which surges up before it is the grasp of a thought, then no approach to the universe is possible. Unless the first principles of the intellect are of the same texture as thought's objects, then objects have no meaning; and thinking being from a first awakening of thought and sense, is plunged into a sea of chaos. Thought then looks out upon this ocean of reality beating upon it, seeking a response to its own nature, a reply to its own question, or thought itself is an enigma, the very tendency of the mind a contradiction. "The truth is," as Hooker avers in his *Ecclesiastical Polity*, "that the mind of man desireth evermore to know the truth, according to the most infallible certainty which the nature of things can yield. The greatest assurance with all men is that which we have by plain aspect and intuitive beholding." But allowing this hiatus even, the mind itself is not effaced from the *summa verum*. Let the scrutiny of conscious reflection turn upon this tending, which is supposed unsatisfied, and the mind knows the contradiction of a tending without term or polarity and thus reasserts its primitive intelligibleness. Truth is still possessed. Nay, in the very act of doubting, of doubting its own manifesting, the mind affirms both the doubt and that by which it shows it up.

And thence doth doubt
Spring, like a shoot around the stock of truth,
And it is nature, which from height to height
On to the summit prompts us.

DANTE: *Parad.*, can. ii.

Thought is the basic principle common to and enlightening whatever is, unfolding with its own expression whatever emerges. With the hand of intelligence, mind

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reaches out and seizes neither a stranger in its object nor reveals an absurdity in itself. In the act by which the individual human mind touches the object confronting it, without ceasing to be itself, it is already "this other" *qua* "other" immaterially. The invasion of the stranger is quite strictly the becoming one with it in its own proper nature as knowable. The new features are the mind's own features drawn out into a completer vitality and enriched. Awakening life expands, and the awakener himself is made known and enlarged by fusing immaterially with the incoming tide of reality. For the human intelligence, to know is not only to become, but in its principle, it is to be. We are the world when we know it, even the world's concrete nature. We do not mentally figure our objects; we are then in most intimate oneness. They truly inform us, and we assimilate their nature. Our circle of being takes in their own circle. We are acting in them and according to them. The mind, then, not only knows the "other" and always as "the other," but becomes the other being. For, as St. Thomas remarks, "the intellect knows the stone according to the intelligible being which it has in the intellect . . . yet none the less it knows the being of the stone in its proper nature" (I. Par., *Sum. Theolog.*, c. 14).

And the more immaterial the intelligence, the nearer it attains to a certain infinity in the world of spirit. Now this characteristic of intellectual life is only possible because the mind's objects are thought also. "Passive" thought, of course, for they are immersed in a zone of the *summa verum*, of a nature that hides, limits and contracts; that shades off into a mere analogy to thought, yet still possesses a bare tending or desire for thought. And this prevents the passively intelligible nature of objects from rising up to intelligence and expanding beyond their singularity.

Yet is it true

That as, oft times, but ill accords the form
To the design of art, through sluggishness
On unreplying matter.

DANTE: *Parad.*, can. i.

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Or as the poet more fully expresses his thought in the *De Monarchia*, lib. 2 :

We must know that art is found in a triple degree, in the mind, that is, of the artist, in the instrument and in the matter formed by art, so we may contemplate nature also in a triple degree. For nature is the mind of the first mover, who is God; then in heaven, as in an instrument, by means of which the similitude of the eternal goodness is unfolded in variable matter; and as the artist being perfect and the instrument in the best order, if there is any fault in the form of art, it is to be imputed only to the matter. . . .

A Thomist, then, is not enclosed in the realm of Psychology by his thought as a Leibniz would have it. For him active thought and passive thought in their synthesis give us our universe. We are brought thus to suppose something of a common ground above these two existences, human mind and its object, which enables them to be united in a common life. What is this? St. Thomas replies for us, "It is the 'form' of the existence of the known object which communicates itself, not in as much as it is incarnate in a matter, but 'intentionally,' that is, in as much as it is idea. An irradiation of the primal clarity." As we might say of a statue regarded by an observer that it comes to him by its "form," not as this "form" is the superficial limit of the marble—that is incommunicable—but as it is an expression of art. Every object is a work of art, and this art has, as such, plasticity; a tendency that is an imponderable spiritualized existence; *esse viale, esse intentionale*. This it is that enables objects, while remaining distinct in their own existence, to mould themselves on the "other," and in this manner give subjects communication with them. What is there to prevent a new "idea" determining a power which belongs to a being already constituted, that is to say, of realizing as it stands autonomous, an "idea" of nature? Cannot an "idea" graft itself on another as hue upon hue in the rainbow? The "ideas" of nature determine material things. But the composite human being, or a simple being an "idea" subsisting—"The angels! O my

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brother! Impassible and pure"—cannot they be as material with respect to a new determination? Food cannot be a stranger to what it nourishes. An association in nature must join food with the eater. The pasture and the flesh of the beast have similar elements. If then reality nourishes thought and is nutritious of itself, how can we avoid maintaining that real is thought, the real is intelligibly adapted to the intelligence, passive thought befitting active thought? "The universe is full of soul," Aristotle declares. "The world is saturated with law and spirituality; it is spirit and it is law; it is reason; it is art; it is the congealed idea of the practical reason. Knowing by an idea, knowing as we exist, and knowing that which is, we realize that everything communicates in the same essence," to quote a modern commentator, Père Sertillanges. Again he says: "Being extends itself and everywhere shows its character. Being it is that thinks, is thought, or is self-thinking, and beyond this nothing is."

"The universe," in Ravaisson's summing up of his Aristotle, "is a thought which does not think of itself, suspended from a thought which is self-thinking." So that extension into this *summa verum* is not to be measured by the straitened life of our personality but by the vast horizon this theme opens out to us. Intelligence is the eye of nature, and the intelligible object, being above and beyond time and space, is everlasting as it is universal. In the act of knowing, then, I do not become "other," I become "the other." There is a world of difference between these formulas. Knowing consists in being or becoming the "other" in as much as "the other." This is the mystery. I cannot materially become other than what I am. I can immaterially as spirit. I can possess and rest in "the other" in "intentional" being. "There is a knower who is all things by identity, as God is; there is another who is partly by identity and partly by information, as the Angel. Something that is all things by information, as our Soul" (Cajetan in I., 14, i., *Sum. Theol.*).

We cannot omit the important reflection of M.

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Maritain *apropos* of this most actual problem. "The capital fault here," he says, "is to confound what is of the order of entity with what is of the 'intentional' order, and to pretend to explain knowing by any entitative composition of whatsoever kind, the reception of an impression, or the formation of a representation. From this point of view we must say that all the errors of Descartes and of Kant, and more generally the impotence and pusillanimity of modern philosophy in face of the problem of knowing, spring originally from the deviation of scholastic thought in the time of Vasquez and Suarez. These authors, materializing the doctrine of St. Thomas, believed that intellection only consisted in the intelligence being informed by the representative quality (by the "word") which it gives out itself by virtue of a purely productive action; in short, only consisted in receiving the imprint of an image already fashioned: a theory which only leaves subsisting of the understanding what precisely it is not and which can be called the theory of the intelligence *boite à fiches automatique*; by means of the "active" intellect it traces an inscription on a label, the inscription is received, the label is classified, everything is said. The labels and inscriptions become with Descartes innate to the thought, which receives them directly from God; with Kant, who makes them the product of our industry, the labeller will become the world (the world of representation). This was a strange aberration of these scholastic authors—*magna hallucinatio*, as John of St. Thomas calls it—thus to confound the informing (intentional) of the intelligence by the object, or by the thing known, present to the mind in the concept, with the informing (in entity) of the intelligence by the concept itself. "Never does St. Thomas constitute understanding or to know in the informing of the word (*verbum*) or of the representative quality; quite lawfully though in the informing of the object or of the thing known by the mediation of the operation and of its apprehension" (John of St. Thomas). However little we misunderstand the distinction of the being of entity and of "intentional" being, we risk even

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in employing the formula of Aquinas to be subsumed by the man of Königsberg. *Quam rudes fuerunt*—adds Cajetan, the great Commentator, condemning such a mistake in advance—*qui de sensu et sensibili, intellectu et intelligibili deque intelligere et sentire tractantes, tanquam de aliis rebus judicant*. They know not how to elevate their mind and enter another order of things.”

The root notion of Aristotle's philosophy was the conception of “form” or “idea.” Even the ultimate atom incorporates an “idea” that gives a unity of nature and species. Agreeing with the Stagirite, our Saint builds up after a close analysis the marks of knowing. On this central position the system rests implicitly or explicitly; to it all is referred. To ask what is being, is to ask what is this that appears to us. And how can we essay a reply until we have settled what appearance is, what appearance confers or does not confer on the real, so that we can say: That is the objective residue, this comes from the subject, and there is further their common lot. As against the Nominalist of whatever complexion, St. Thomas maintains that through our concepts we attain the essences or quiddities of things; of themselves immensely rich and flowing out into a multitude of properties. These concepts, relative to their object, are not to be paired down to actual and explicit notes or characters in our thought which we use to define objects with. Treated in this fashion we can understand why concepts are called poor and empty by the Nominalist. On the contrary, the objective concept possesses in its comprehension a nature at least virtually great with essential qualities and properties. A nature conceived indeed as independent of all actual existence but as contingently realizable, by extension, in all its co-natural subjects. Knowing, then, is not a fabrication, a construction, but a vital spontaneous act in which the evidence of the object is the light which subjugates it, and also the light where it perfectly completes its vital spontaneity. Firmly planting himself, then, on the positive evidence of nature as expressed in the law of identity, we have elsewhere attempted to show how our

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Doctor perceives that, wherever mind meets reality, it holds enough intelligibility to withstand the disruptive de-simplifying note of pure relativity. Now, securely possessing this core of the real, he straightway proceeds to a system of relation. We have already noticed that the ideas of nature have to be drawn out of an obscure region which, as we shall see later, also encloses them in the narrow area of individual numerical units. The human mind is likewise conditioned, because it functions in a similar realm from which it elevates itself with difficulty. Our conceptions are not complete intuitions in the Cartesian sense. They are only partially so. We "abstract" them. And "abstracting" we parcel out, what is one, fix what is successive, immobilize time and break up substance. We are restricted on the side of the object and on the part of the subject. No "clear and distinct idea"—the innate privilege of the pure spirit—once and for all gives us our first footing on the world. We are met by the opaque. Could the human intellect completely and immediately overcome this obstacle, the object would be instantly and wholly intelligible and the subject also.

For this latter, transparent of itself—it is soul, spirit—would, as the knower, equal its own inherent and proper intelligibility; it would command it. As things are, reality sweeps up to the human mind through the five bodily senses. Things and their relations only manifest themselves by the relations of bodies. The concatenations of the exterior world become the concatenations of the interior, and, as they are reflected in the thought which "abstracts," so they reveal themselves. Our intellectual life begins in a "confused" act, an imperfect act which seizes the real in that feature of it that is general and extensive. As colour is first seen by the eye, sound heard by the ear and internal fact by self-consciousness, so does the human intelligence become aware. Conscious life, in its first operation intellectual or sensitive, passes over whatever is outside the respective levels of each in subject or object. The first prizes of spiritual activity are the intelligible and sensible as such and nothing else. Now this

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peculiarity of human consciousness, be it intellectual or sensible, is called by St. Thomas "abstraction." And "abstraction," above all, is not separation. But it is a regard for the intelligible or the sensible, and a disregarding of any other element where these other elements are also to be found united in existence. Our Saint insists that this mental distinction is called "abstraction" by a just title. It may well be that the propriety of such a term was questioned in his own day. It certainly needs carefully noting. It is not used in the sense in which a modern would use it, nor as Newman does in his *Grammar of Assent*. St. Thomas reiterates that "abstraction" is, and can be, used only precisely where the principles of reality, of which one is conceived and the other ignored, are together. Our world does not disclose all its qualities at once and completely. The mountain peaks of the intelligibles stand out on the first touch of the mind's light, but the rest remains obscure in the shadows. The intellect never apprehends nature in general to be existing without particular elements—it simply disregards them. The truth of apprehension does not exact, our Saint remarks, "that whosoever knows anything should apprehend everything concerning it." In no wise falsely does the mind abstract genus from species in so far as it understands the nature of the genus animal, for instance; and does not perceive the differences—man, horse or dog—when these particulars are before it. And only in this manner can the meaning of a universal notion get due satisfaction in as much as the mind understands beside and beyond the principle by which one "idea" is divided into many instances of it. The mind elevates "passive" thought from potency to its own active immaterial sphere. But the natures, be they animal or man, on which the first intention or notion alights, are in singular things, undivided. Socrates is a man; he is not the species, viz., humanity, although man the universal is a species. No, we must repeat, for it is important, to "abstract" in the Thomist's philosophy is not to separate realities. The reason is because whatever is intelligible is a whole, an indivisible whole. Add or subtract, and the

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objective constitution or meaning is changed. What constitutes the idea humanity cannot be divided without taking away rational animality. And yet there are the elements in objects which do not belong to their essential notes; there are their peculiarities as individuals, the singular instances of the type portrayed in their sensible or accidental adjuncts. However close, then, may be the union between the intelligible idea and the rest which go to the make-up of the existing thing, unless these latter are included in the notes of the idea or strictly depend upon them—or when there is even a necessary but exterior relation between the one and the other—the mind in its own domain can freely and without error “abstract.” The letter of a syllable can be conceived without the syllable, the animality of a horse without the hoofs; and in these cases there is a real union of part with whole. White in a man is conceived without the humanity that is really united with it in an accidental composition. So far only the apprehending power has been described. Attention, however cursory, must now be given to the most important function of mental activity, the act of judging. This again implies “abstraction,” but carried to a further point and of a more definite kind. It calls for further treatment because it is the instrument which discloses nature’s scheme, and of capital importance in this school of thought. In the judgement we are concerned with the drawing out and piecing together of the incomplete and partial grasps of apprehension. And in the process of adding feature to feature the mind asserts that what it has gathered piecemeal pertains to an objective whole which exists in itself. Firstly, there is a confused intuition entailing closer scrutiny, as when we perceive a dim object approaching us and begin a series of comparisons between these relative apprehensions and the object itself as to what is and what is not inherent in it and so applicable to it: the mind putting together or segregating what these “abstractions” have given. And so it acts when we conceive the colour and the other qualities of an apple before us, without knowing the fruit in itself; and in like manner when the

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sense perceives the apple's colour without its odour. Thus, in the acts of judging a real apple, an "abstraction" is made; but in this process, be it remarked, there is no mental division in the apple's intelligible notes. And both kinds of "abstraction," the first of simple apprehension, the other of judging, directly indicate a twofold composition in existing objects or things. A composition of type or "form" with a "somewhat" called "matter" that is tending to this intelligible type, but not attaining it. And a composition of part with the whole. Here again the intellect cannot "abstract" because of the interdependency of these relationships in the essential understanding of the thing. The qualities or accidents are not objects the mind knows, as realized apart from the intelligible wholes in which they inhere. White or walking is never envisaged as a separate absolute reality, but as the white man or the man walking. Now, on the contrary, in the act by which the mind apprehends the accidental qualities of the apple it does "abstract" the quantity from the colour, shape, and smell. Not as though the quantity were distinguished from the matter of the apple, for this would give us the object of mathematic—not anything existing. And, lastly, there are the numerical instances and individual peculiarities of men and apples—to keep to our examples—which are extraneous to their specific types or formal unities. These we abstract from. This condition of human thinking, "abstraction," pertains to the formation of ideas, whatever they happen to be. It is common to every science; and, as that acute French thinker, Hamlin, puts it, "there is nothing scandalous in this particular for anyone who has properly summed up what thought is." In the building up of the science of metaphysic, the "abstraction" takes a wider sweep. In this case the mind regards aspects of being and being itself, passing over all else. St. Thomas remarks also another characteristic. When we seize the type animal, *e.g.*, ignoring the particular instance in the man before us—he calls this *abstractio totalis*—the latter element does not remain in the mind but only animality.

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On the other hand, when a geometrical figure is conceived apart from its physical adjuncts, a circle from a ring—that is to say, the “form” and not the material—both these elements, although conceptually divided, remain. And this, called “formal” abstraction, makes the conception more vital and distinct. The total “abstraction” of the universal nature from the particular, leaves the notion confused and in potency. The more it is simple and “abstract” in the formal sense, the more superior and noble is it in reality. We are far from the *Grammar of Assent*. As briefly as the importance of the matter allows, we must still deal with another mental instrument necessary and vital for the delineation of the lines and degrees of the *summa verum*. Now, this one shows such a cleavage in the mind’s conception that it amounts to a formal and precise exclusion of the elements neglected. A case in point is, when in conceiving the animal kingdom, we exclude whatever is not a principle of spontaneous movement and sensibility, notwithstanding the animal type or form in, say, a man, a horse, or a dog. When we say rightly a man is an animal, we apply the genus animal to the whole subject man; because the mind is satisfied when it “abstracts” from the animal world whatever constitutes the genus, without adding to it or screening it off, which St. Thomas terms making a precision. If we make a precision, using the notion animal by excluding in the above sense, then animal only designates quite strictly a part of the human being, it is no longer a genus and cannot be predicated of a man. And hence this mental precision is not “abstraction” pure and simple. The upshot and application of all this *exposé*, tedious though it must be to the patient reader, is nevertheless most germane to the understanding of the Thomist’s universe.

It contains the clue to the answer of the old Eleatic and modern monistic difficulty, and also allows for a well-grounded relativity. For it is by a simple “abstraction,” and not by a mental precision or screening off, that the notion of being or reality is formed. Thus it enables this object being to conserve the utmost generality of exten-

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sion, and at the same time a capacity of applicability to every realizable and existent entity. For if by a precision, as described above, we exclude from this idea of being any possibility of being added to, then we cannot conceive any object of the universe as a being when and where it has been so treated. Spinoza contended that substantial reality is not only absolutely alike, that is to say, universal, but that it is unique. Given two substances, they either would or would not possess the same attributes. In the former case they would not be distinct; in the latter they would not even resemble each other as substances. Then the multiplicity of substances is an illusory appearance. The first object known by our intelligence is the unique divine being. Does being, then, exclude any addition to it as an object of the mind? The reply is, that this nature is of such quality that, of itself and in itself, it is applicable to and proportions itself to any kind or degree of reality whatsoever. Because of itself it neither includes nor excludes any additional feature. As a similitude of the Purely Immaterial Actuality or Illimitable Mind, it is inseparable from any kind of universe. Of itself it befits all intelligibility, infinite or finite, actual or possible. And what is of greatest import, it bridges the chasm between infinite and finite in the ultimate simplicity of its immaterial tenuity. In its objective signification it is neither the uncreated nor the created, but the juncture of both worlds. Determine and make precise this ultimate simple but confused intellectual object; and, without disruption of note, any dissimplification of essence, it nevertheless diversifies, breaks apart, to such an extent, in God, angel, man, beast or physical element, that its terms are quite determinate and distinct realities. It is found contracted as in man and his qualities, substance and its accidents, intellectual or sensible cognition. That is to say, we have an objectively real concept presenting us with, at once and together, simple diversity and a proportionable or relative unity merely. In the instances given above, each is different by a complete difference and all are alike in the one ultimate note—"that which is." To take the extreme forms of dis-

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similarity, the infinite and the finite which bear no proportion to each other. Yet these, even, can have in a proper sense an essential proportionality, because Necessary Being is to its Uncaused Existence as Contingent Being is to its Caused Existence. We must understand that being is here used in the most real meaning of the term, and not metaphorically. It signifies something proportionably similar in God and the creature. Their difference is emphatically accentuated in the Decrees of the Vatican Council which incorporated our Doctor's teaching, *Inter Creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta similitudo notari quin inter eos maior est dissimilitudo notari*. A further case is intellection and sensation, which are understood under the term "knowing," in as much as the first is to the intelligible as the second is to the sensible. They are proportionable. The pregnant truth that the foregoing analysis discloses is that reality as an essence, also, of its very essence relates, as in the example just given. We find a unity and a relative unity as distinguished from the absolute unity of the Pantheist. Being's note, of an ultimate simplicity, cannot unite incompatible elements; thus nothing opposes a unity of proportionality. Unlike a heap of stones, it is not an accidental or collective unity. There is no composition or juxtaposition in the last notion of the real. The simplicity is ultimate for the mind. This "somewhat" or "quiddity" expresses all that is and can be; and all that is and can be resemble it in so far as they bear one and the same quidditative note. But not as though it were of necessity joined explicitly with all entities actual or possible; rather as disjointed from them; contractable but not contracted by any addition. When this indeterminate likeness is seen, in God and creatures, it has already lost generic significance, it is quite split up. A relativity or proportionality is left. Were the differences, contractions, included of necessity, we should be shut up irretrievably in Monism. Have we escaped a Pluralistic or Dualistic Universe? The answer takes us to a closer inspection of the Thomist's account of essence. There is only one way of being a man; there are innumerable diverse

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manners of existing. Substance differs from accident not only as substance but as to its existence; it does not exist in the same way as accident. And these modes of existing are not extrinsic to being. This leads to the definition of being as that which exists or can exist, and, taking account of the various kinds and degrees—from which it is can only be delineated in an imperfect mental abstraction—as that positive quiddity whose act is to be, to exist. In this respect there is no place for any dualism, because this core of being does not oppose “nothingness” in one univocal meaning, like to a seam running through all the varieties, the same in this note, but as it diversely opposes “non-being” in each individual, be it God, a man, or an element. In other words, this notion cannot be so dissimplified, de-essentiated, so that there remains the mere positive negation of being; so that it does not directly signify this, or that thing as a whole which is opposing nothingness. It is, then, quite unlike the concept of animal that keeps the constitutive note of animality invariable in all existing things, and which is completed by a new extraneous determinant in the different specific kinds. The concept of being cannot be a genus. Scotus, by a univocity in the quiddity of being, is hard put to avoid this quandary, if he does avoid it, with the inexorable consequences. No! In both the definitions given there appears the multiple implicitly contained. And all the degrees of relationship to existence in everything that is, all these “many” merit the name of being. But in no instance is the relationship to existence the same. St. Thomas carefully guards himself from saying that these many relationships can be expressed in the form *Ens est habitudo ad esse*. The right statement is *Ens est id cuius actus est esse*, and this “id,” the quiddity, signifies all the variety of values in the universe, in as much as they possess this unique similitude in their several relations to existence. This relation, therefore, is not accidental, but essential or transcendental. Its ground is the very quiddity of things. With it, and by it, the mind reaches out to all that exists

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and can exist. And this implies that the act or existence of essence does not pertain to the intelligible character of the essence. Falling outside it, although related in the manner described, it is accidental to the essence, taking the term accidental in the widest sense. No doubt now remains that this most important doctrine in Thomistic metaphysic was the Saint's own. Without it he cannot be understood nor his profundity realized. For it alone saves the school from the opposing errors. Dr. Grabman, the Munich *savant*, in a recent exposé of unedited documents of the thirteenth century, has confirmed the Dominican tradition. Siger of Brabant speaks explicitly of the opinion of Brother Thomas in this matter, which he himself (and how many since?) does not understand, for he says: "Brother Thomas holds that the existence is really distinct from the essence without, nevertheless, being an accident." A fragment of a philosophical disputation, held in Paris five years after the Saint's death, gives and defends, as being the opinion of Brother Thomas, that existence in creatures is not a property flowing from the essence but comes to it, *ab extra*. The words of Bernard of Trilia, a Dominican contemporary and a defender of the Master against Henry of Ghent, the *Doctor Solemnis*, are worth quoting. He is supported by his fellow Friars—Bernard of Gannat and Robert of Colletorto. Replying to an objection that if existence were not of the essence of the thing but an accident, the quiddity itself would be an accident (modern relativity), Bernard remarks:

Something is said to be running, and nevertheless a runner is not called an accident, but a substance to which such an accident is befitting. So also something is said to be being, that is by actual existence, and therefore being is not called an accident but substance, which it is befitting to be by an Act, in as much as to be is not of the notes or reason of the being of nature (the quiddity), but itself participates from the first being. And in this way the existence that is in things is accidental, as accident is spoken of as contrariwise to being of itself and *not by itself*, because according to Augustine nothing is a cause of itself, that it may exist. . . .

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Substantial and Accidental "Form" differ in this particular, that the subject of Substantial Form is a "somewhat" in potency, viz., matter; the subject of Accidental Form is a "somewhat" in act, viz., the subject; but being or existence is not such an accident as it is inside the essence of the thing to which it is added. . . . The existence is reduced to the predicament of that whose act it is, as a point which is not the line nor a part of the line is placed by being reduced to the same genus as the line—that is, the genus of quantity.

Thus Bernard of Trilia. Light is predicated of a luminous body by participation; but, if there were any light existing separate and distinct, it would be predicated of it essentially. And in a like manner, existence. Now, there is this one separate distinct Existence, subsisting of Itself, identical with the Essence, God, Individual and unique by reason of this Purity; the Great Exception: to whose Existence all other composite beings refer, on whom they depend in their relative existences. "Wherefore also Plato said that it was necessary to place unity before all multitude. And Aristotle remarked that what is the maximum being and maximum truth is the cause of all being and of all true beings" (St. Thomas, I, p. 9, XLIV, Art. 1). The following are the words the Saint uses to describe this relation:

The creature is referred to God by its substance, as by the cause of the relation: *formally* by the relation itself. In a like manner a thing is said to have similarity by its quality causally; *formally* by the similitude; hence the creature is called similar.

Still more pertinently he proceeds:

When a creature is said to proceed from God immediately, there is excluded a medium cause creating: nevertheless, there is not excluded the medium of a real relation which naturally follows on the production of the creature, as equality follows the production of quantity. This relation is a kind of creature, if we accept by the name creature everything that is from God. But if we take the name of creature more strictly for that which subsists only, then the aforesaid relation is not a created thing but a con-created thing.

That we may make this position more material to our experience of sensible reality we must scan the synthetic

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and concrete conceptions of the mind which comprise the whole thing that exists, as distinct from the conceptions formally abstracted, whether essence or existence. As against a certain interpretation of Plato or Descartes, our Doctor insists that the human intellect cannot assert reality of being in general, or man in general, or animal in general. Our first intellectual grasp of the object is made at the instance and by the material of a sensible image or verbal symbol which serves it up for the mind's active immaterial elaboration or "abstraction." For thus is "passive" thought made actual. It is got under conditions and in relation to a substratum below the level of the mind's intrinsic spirituality. Conditioned, then, as to its birth and signification, active thought relates to, then holds the beyond and by reflection's aid knows itself to realize, this implication. It knows the nature of man in the nature of the individual Socrates, the real and first substance or person. The act of the intellect does not rest or end in the concept but in Socrates himself, and there are not two concepts but one, because to know is the cognition itself with its relation to the object—an absolute and a relative. If the mind performed a precision, screening off the part from the whole, instead of "abstracting," in the Thomist's sense, man from the individual case; if this humanity were affirmed as something one in itself—a unity which pertains only to the intelligible quiddity—hence formal—we should get a universal and solitary type and not a composite interrelated thing. If the mind acted in this way in the sensible order we should get colour, for instance, as an entity without its conditions of visibility. It is not so. Our concept gives us immaterially, intentionally, the actual and concrete humanity, and it is bounded by, and arises from, a sensible image portraying individual features, of size, shape, colour and numerical unity: an organic whole. "But if Socrates were a man by that by which he is Socrates there would be only one man, Socrates." In this cryptic statement we are shown that the individual we know is something other than the nature. But nature and individual are not two distinct things in Socrates or any other person

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or thing. Were that so, we should be again in the Platonic difficulty. Man applies to, and is predicated of, the individual. Socrates is a man. Socrates is not humanity any more than he is animality. These relations, then, the mind conceives as "wholes" in potency, in as much as they contain implicitly and indistinctly the whole that is the individual. Comprehension or the *ensemble* of the constitutive notes is the chief characteristic of the concept's object—the necessary make-up of the quiddity in itself. Its extension is a property of it that follows inevitably the mind's "abstraction." So that in the notion of man there is all the immense intelligibility virtually contained in the two notes, rational and animal; a great world of organic relations, all that falls necessarily within the spheres of rationality and animality, the properties that are *per se* connected with them and virtually contained in them, which open out in never-ending perspective. We see in theology how St. Thomas has utilized them in drawing out the consequences in the matter of the Incarnation, *e.g.*, and in the knowledge of Christ's soul. Our judgements are distinct, incomplete, conceptual objects or wholes, which coalesce in the unity of the existing thing, so that the truth of our intellect is properly a notional identity conformed to a real identity. The copula, the link between the subject and its predicate, is an assertion of their synthesis in existence. *Nam "est" simpliciter dictum significat in actu esse* (St. Thomas). Every proposition, truly, whatever it be, is a synthesis or composition. This dynamism of the mind which in successive "moments" composes concept with concept is a life essentially progressive, a passage from one to the other, an immaterial movement, which brings out the potentiality of one intellect, and which rests finally in a total or global grasp of the real. These relations are not "atoms" of evidence, independent strata or "pieces" of nature, juxtaposed and then clamped together. A Scotus or Leibniz may be taken with such a mosaic structure. Quite other is the "Common Doctor's" scheme of the universe. For him these relative conceptions are also dependent "wholes" and "wholes" interconnected, in

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ascending and descending *atomæ*, from angel to the electron. We have not space to elaborate this plan of the *summa verum*, sketched in broad deep strokes—the “moments” of thought mutually implying and amplifying each other—which the precious *De Ente et Essentia* (*The Metaphysical Introduction of the Angelical*) so profoundly draws out from the features of real essence. It is the very reverse of that Nominalist view which sees in the concept a sum of explicit notes constructed or collected by our mind, given the state of our science in such a moment of history. Of course, it happens—it is the usual case in the inductive sciences—that the constitutive notes of the essence offered to the mind in a concept are never known by us. The comprehension of such a concept is always the gathering up of these notes, and, secondarily, of the properties derived from them; but as they remain unknown by us we must content ourselves with a descriptive definition, by the help of the properties known empirically as characteristic, instead of by an essential definition. And thus we perceive by observation, without being able to bring out deductively, that the character cloven-footed pertains to the comprehension of the concept ruminant. Instead of the “clear idea” our concepts truly put before us the necessary constitution of an essence, but in an occult form, in a way that we cannot use scientifically.

As to essential definition, a Nominalist reasons as though the specific and individual differences contained in the genus—as its variables—are to be found there actually or at least virtually. Nevertheless, the indeterminate state in which they exist in the pure and simple unity of the genus clearly implies that they are there merely in potency. A vertebrate, indeed, is not an animal which has neither hair nor feathers nor scales; no; it is an animal whose tegumentary appendages “can” have such features. These differences are only potentially contained in the generic notion vertebrate. The genus, therefore, is only potentially richer than the species. Actually it is poorer; the specific difference really adds a determination to the generic character. Descartes and his “idealistic” followers cannot

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resign themselves to avow that something remains obscure, as though impermeable to the human mind in the mind itself. Yet the answer to the seeming paradox is not far to seek, and it has been already touched upon. We remarked that humanity, which is a part of the concept man, cannot be predicated of Socrates. A man and his humanity differ as a part differs from the whole. Now, the whole is not an entity, a thing, added on to the part. The whole includes, as does the implicit the explicit, an indeterminate substratum which undoubtedly is, but which is in the character of a privation. The genus animal has a positive signification, a unity in communion with the species man or beast; that sensitive perfection which is also a capacity quite real for a further determination in the several types. But this other capacity below genus in value, to which the intelligible is subjected to produce a whole—thus differing from a clear idea subsisting in itself, or a mathematical “form”—is called “matter” after Aristotle. A necessary co-principle of the essence, it neither distinguishes it, nor puts it into such and such a grade of the universe. Of itself it has no actuality that gives definite value, and yet it enters the definition as a real. It is not that by which anything is found to be in genus and species. But it is the contraction of the quiddity—the essence—to the indefinite, to a want of intelligibleness. In itself it is a mere striving for all “form” or “idea” and this *ad infinitum*. And, because of this opaque “matter,” the intellect’s light fails. This subluminescent area is the field of multiplicity, of contingency, of the flux, of the unpredictable. It is not something that exists and compounds with another. Thus it would already be a principle sufficiently actual or formed, an entity endowed with existence, physical. We ourselves are not all intelligence. We have a residue of this same opaqueness which conditions alike active and passive knowledge. And this essential composition gives objects their rank in the degrees of being. Only, since they differ among themselves as in animal, vegetable, mineral, we find the rank determined in a generic fashion, the idea of material essence on

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nature's part only represents the idea of a genus of beings; and for this reason St. Thomas constantly repeats, matter yields the genus. As to the species, it is furnished by the "form." There is yet another rôle played by this material substrate of the essence.

We have not shown the reason of Socrates, as distinct from Plato or Aristotle, this numerically individual whole in the human species that we apply the predicate man to. A further scrutiny of matter leads to this conclusion :

We must know (says our Doctor) that the principle of individuation is not matter taken in any sense because matter is indistinct, it is matter affixed, marked off, related. I call matter affixed what is considered under determined dimensions. In the definition of man—as man solely—such a matter is not maintained, but it must be in the definition of Socrates if Socrates could be defined. What is asserted in the definition of man is undistinguished matter. . . . We see by this that the essence of man and the essence of Peter have no other differences than that of the unaffixed to the affixed or marked off.

He here recalls that Plato had already stated that the "Great" and the "Little" affect matter as its first differences. The indefinite matter of the quiddity, then, has a capacity for a certain accident, quantity, to which it is submitted. Of itself, substance is neither one nor multiple. Indivisible, and therefore not able to be imagined, it is a stranger to this order. Nevertheless, concrete substances, men or things, in whatever material types they are found, are numerically distinct. It is not a question of two things, viewed imaginatively, clamped on to each other *tanquam pueri imaginationem transcendere non valentes*. . . . Substance must be affected by quantity or order because the notion of concrete number implies discontinuity in space and time. And also the idea of measure in this order, as truly as in the order of essence. A multitude of essences is not a real number. Composite substances, which include matter, profoundly differ in their principle of individuality from the principle that individualizes pure spirits. Where can we find that element which gives numerical difference the while main-

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taining the same degree of substantial sameness? From the division of extension or quantity. Whence comes extension itself? From the matter, since it is by reason of the matter that the substances have relationship with the quantity. Matter affixed to a quantity, with a radical exigency for this or that quantity (dimension is indeterminate in matter), is the Thomist's principle of individuality. It is this feature that confers incommunicability, the essential note of the individual. And the secondary mark, matter determined by such and such a quantity—thus under certain dimensions—inserts it in diverse degree in time and space, renders it tributary to movement and to duration which measures it. *Individuatio fit per materiam individuaalem, id est per hanc materiam* (St. Thomas). Mathematics have no individuality, because, as Cajetan puts the case, "they have no individuality as they abstract from sensible matter, for this line cannot be found except as the term of a sensible body." A line differs from another only by position. Position is of the very essence of dimensive or extensive quantity, because it differentiates number precisely by its position in space. Extension, then, is individualized by something which is of its essence.

Again, extension is the intermediary state between the substance and the qualities that affect it. By it solely, white, e.g., which it supports and qualifies, is made individual. As accidents are not self-supporting, they all inhere in their subject, which is substance. Substance, in the last resort, individualizes them, but extension, as it is their immediate subject, performs this function; so that grafting themselves on "this" matter they enter the constitution of the individual whole. Various are the ways, beside the quidditative differences, in which the being of substance can be modified or affected. They give us the Predicament of Quality: health and sickness, beauty and ugliness, virtue and vice, the figures and powers of bodies, the impressions and dispositions they offer. Everything is not extension and movement. There are things in nature that cannot be designed. Qualities are in nature,

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qualities by whose virtue things are active and passive, but they are not there as independent existences. This brings us to Relation as a Predicament in its own right. And a most vital reality, because in the question of its objective existence nothing less than the order of the universe is at stake. As Beatrice to Dante declaims:

Among themselves all things
Have order: and from hence the form which makes
The universe resemble God. In this
The higher creatures see the printed steps
Of that eternal worth, which is the end
Whither the line is drawn.

Order is made up of multiple relations. Now if each were only a mental abstraction in the modern meaning of the word, that is to say, a construction of the mind, mind would be in the most literal sense the measure of all. But if the universe is, and is an ordered universe, we are confronted by the reality of Predicamental Relations. Real, then, they are apart from the human mind and beyond things even. To say that a body is hot, is to affirm that heat is a natural reality. But one thing is the body, and quite another the relation heat. St. Thomas will not eliminate or dissolve the substance, nor will he curtail our ontology by reducing this accident to one mode only, as so many prefer to do to-day. What they would see everywhere, he, at least so far with them, agrees to find somewhere. Poincaré definitely stated this view: "To say that Science cannot possess an objective quality because it only makes us know relations, is to reason backwards, since only the relations can be regarded as objective." What the Saint will not allow is, that we should read into his position regarding relation a materialization of concepts. To erect relation into a positive thing would destroy its very *raison d'être*, for then it would become one of the very things to be placed in an order. The notion of order would be eradicated. Everything that exists is not a being, a thing existing as a whole. Accidents are not beings, still less relations, but order does exist, and not merely in the mind; extending the bound-

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daries of reality beyond what we style things or facts. Even some philosophies include non-being itself. What, then, are these strange entities, relations? Language is a deceitful instrument. Too dependent on the imagination, hence too gross, it expresses the abstract clumsily. This explains the derision to which these natural relations of the Thomist have been subjected. The heart of this mystery is not that of the accident which inheres in the substance as a determinant, but the fact that real relation not only is similarly situated, but that it plays also quite another rôle. Contrariwise, to these other accidents which exercise an internal function by determining the substance as to its measure or disposition, relation introduces an exterior order between things, without affecting them in themselves. *Nihil mihi advenit de novo per hoc quod incipio fieri similis alteri.* Speaking figuratively, we can say that, in this aspect, relation is not in the subject, but that it is an assistant or link affecting the thing related; as it tends from the thing to something else: a leaning or inclining reality, tangential, with apparently little foundation; whose share of reality seems to be either greatly exaggerated or quite incomprehensible. To quote Beatrice once more:

All natures lean

In this order, diversely: some more,

Some less approaching to their primal source.

St. Thomas would admit that the words used to describe this entity are only *manuductiones*, words for children; but mature minds will recognize that, if the mystery of being is lying in wait, here as elsewhere, we have no cause for denying one of its peculiar marks, for refusing it the best things in existence, order. Things act and react on each other. They are classified as agents or patients; but movement abstracts from both action and passion, so that, should the question arise of distinguishing the action of becoming and of putting it on one side, we are left with a pure relation in the evolution and transformation which appears in this mutual give-and-take of realities.

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Take movement away from this giving and receiving in which they share, then action, according to St. Thomas, supposes only a relation of dependence. But, again, a most real relation. And the entire sphere of active and passive things is something very small in comparison with the heavenly bodies. The universe is an interrelated organic whole of "active" and "passive" thought. It is not a mosaic of entities in juxtaposition and held together by Will.

J. RABY.

A PAGAN CONTEMPORARY OF ST. PAUL

WHILE the twelve Apostles of Jesus Christ were evangelizing the world, paganism also had its teachers. Fashionable folk affected to frequent lectures on religious and philosophical matters. Many lecturers made propaganda for the newest developments in religious philosophy. Such philosophy replaced the simpler and more inarticulate faith of primitive days. The pagan priests of Greece and Rome were indeed ministers of the cult of their gods, but they were not teachers of the people. Whatever teaching of religion took place was given by "philosophers," who professed to discuss the problems of the origins of this world and the purpose of human life. Among such preachers and moralists of the first century there is a remarkable figure, whose words have the ring of sincerity and whose life was not unworthy of the doctrine he taught. We refer to Epictetus of Hierapolis. He is the first pagan who ever mentioned the Christians—Gallians he calls them—and he even seems to betray acquaintance with the New Testament.

Epictetus was born about the time that St. Paul visited Ephesus, and he was born some sixty miles from that famous city, in Hierapolis in Phrygia. In the city of his birth he may well have heard of St. Philip and his three daughters who were spreading the Gospel there, when he was a boy. There is nothing unlikely in his having met either St. John or St. Philip or St. Paul in his native land. He must have been a young man of almost twenty when St. Peter and St. Paul were martyred in Rome.

He was born a slave, "from a slave-mother," says an inscription in his honour in Asia Minor, but we know nothing of his early years. In his writings he makes nowhere a reference to Asia, and he certainly was in Rome as a young man, hence it is not unlikely that he left his

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native country as a boy. Our young Phrygian slave somehow got into the possession of the notorious Epaphroditus, the chief of the bodyguard of Nero. The name of this Epaphroditus is mainly remembered by the gruesome details of Nero's death. When that Emperor heard the horsemen approaching who were to drag him to judgement, he attempted suicide, but would never have summoned courage to plunge the dagger deep enough into his body, had he not been assisted by Epaphroditus. Some twenty years later another Emperor, Domitian, from a morose dread of assassination, had the unfortunate Epaphroditus executed for his share in Nero's death. Epictetus's master seems to have been hard on his slave. Musonius, who became Epictetus's instructor, sometimes tried to frighten the young man with the anticipation of what his owner might inflict on him, but the slave-student seemed imperturbable, and replied that nothing could happen to him beyond what can befall a man.

There is a very ancient story that his cruel master once tortured him so that his leg was nearly breaking. Epictetus said calmly: "You'll see, you'll break my leg!" And when it was broken, he quietly added: "There now, I told you so!" This story, however widespread, is probably only a legend. Celsus first mentions it more than a century later: he prefers the heroism of Epictetus to the meekness of the sufferings of Christ. Epictetus was certainly lame and disfigured, but the best authorities ascribe his lameness to rheumatism, and say he had it from youth. However this may be, the story shows the reputation for self-possession which Epictetus enjoyed in antiquity.

He several times refers to his former master, but in good-natured banter. He tells, for instance, how Epaphroditus had a slave shoemaker, called Felicion. He sold him because he found him utterly useless. It chanced that this slave was bought by one of Cæsar's household, and thus became "Imperial Shoemaker." Epaphroditus suddenly changed his attitude towards his former worthless slave, and whenever possible enquired after him: "How is my dear Felicion? I *did* like that man!" When he had met

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him, he made it his business to refer to it: "I have just spoken to Felicion; now I call him a man of common sense!" This anxiety to be on good terms with his quondam slave became so marked that it was a standing joke among the servants. "Where is Epaphroditus?" asked one. "Why, man, in consultation with Felicion, of course," answered another.

This Felicion became the pet aversion even of the meek and gentle Epictetus. "I would not care to live if I had to owe my life to Felicion and had to bear his vulgarity and insolence. I have experienced what a slave can be, when he thinks that he has come into a bit of good fortune and when he is blind to everything else."

Epictetus tells another story of Epaphroditus. Someone came to his master in fearful distress—in fact, clasped his feet in abject misery and confided to him the awful secret that he was a ruined man; he had only a million and a half sesterces left. This would be in purchasing value something like eighty thousand pounds to-day. Did Epaphroditus laugh in the man's face? Not he. He said with tender concern: "Poor dear; how have you been able to keep that quiet? How have you been able to bear up under it?" Beyond such harmless anecdotes, however, Epictetus says nothing against his former master. This is no doubt in part due to Epictetus's great charitableness. Speaking evil of your neighbour was one of the worst sins in his eyes. On the other hand, one gets the impression that Epaphroditus cannot have been a monster of cruelty. In any case, he gave his young slave a liberal education. Amongst other things he sent him to attend the lectures of Musonius Rufus. This Musonius, or Rufus, as Epictetus always calls him, was a most estimable and upright character, the best product of the paganism of the time. The dominant philosophy of the day was Stoicism, which had found in Seneca its ablest exponent, but not its noblest defender.

However stately and epigrammatic Seneca's words, Seneca's deeds were but a poor illustration of his teaching. Seneca may have met St. Paul; he certainly did not imitate

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him. St. Luke may have written his Gospel and Acts for Seneca's perusal, as some say; but Seneca's words and deeds do not betray their influence.

Musonius was a better man. He was a Roman knight, who devoted his life to raising the moral tone of Rome. He tried to make his school less of a hall for the display of rhetoric and more of a home of virtue, where the young were trained for a solid and respectable life. Idealistic pantheism, the deification of human reason, the duty of stolid indifference to pain and misfortune may be feeble inducements to a life of self-restraint and morality, but Musonius at least honestly tried to apply his principles. Two years before the martyrdom of St. Paul, Musonius was banished by Nero, and he bore his exile with noble fortitude.

Whether Epictetus in Musonius's classrooms ever met his somewhat older fellow-student Titus, the future Emperor, is not certain, but not unlikely. It is certainly to Musonius's credit that he had two such remarkable disciples as our Phrygian slave and Titus the "*deliciae generis humani*."

Epictetus seems to have been used by Epaphroditus as his secretary. In later days he told his students good-humouredly that on awakening too early in the morning he used to worry about reading his letters, but he used soon to compose himself to sleep again, saying to himself: "What does it matter how anybody reads letters? my present job is to enjoy my sleep." His employer must have been a hot-tempered individual and sometimes have given his secretary a hard time of it. Epictetus in his lectures so very often and so feelingly blames as unworthy of a man loss of temper and blind anger with slave folk for trivial offences; he so vividly describes a man's bad humour at breakfast and the discomfort of the household in consequence, that one cannot help thinking that during his slave-life he must have suffered acutely because of it.

We do not know the reason why his master freed him. It was not unfashionable for the rich to grant liberty to some gifted slave and thus to change a slave into a client.

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As client a man could often be of more service to his former master than as slave. The power which freedmen exercised in Rome at the time is astonishing. It is, of course, possible that Epictetus bought his freedom by saving up his peculium, but I should think this extremely unlikely, judging from Epictetus's principles. He seems to have thought nothing of his freedom. When some people told him it was a grand thing, he shrugged his shoulders and said it meant only some twisting and turning before a prætor. From another reference it appears that the five per cent. of his assessed value, which had to be paid on his being freed, stuck in his memory.

On being freed, Epictetus tried outdoor speaking in the streets of Rome as an apostle for his principles of Stoicism, but the results were not very satisfactory. The little lame man had no very striking appearance, and the rough crowd was too much for him. Another apostle, Saul of Tarsus by name, had to admit that "his appearance was contemptible," and in consequence he was often stoned and beaten with rods and left as dead by the roadside, but his courage never failed. Epictetus had not received the spirit of Pentecost: we must forgive him if he retired to the lecture-room. For some years he thus taught in Rome, and when the Emperor Domitian banished all "philosophers"—we would call them "public lecturers and evangelists"—from Rome, Epictetus also left, and seems never to have returned. He settled at Nicopolis, a town near what is now the southern frontier of Albania, but then an important centre of international traffic. His classrooms apparently continued to be well frequented, though the place was not very attractive to the gilded youth from the great cities. Epictetus pictures them as bitterly complaining of the discomforts of the place, and especially of "the abominable baths."

At Nicopolis he became quite a celebrity. He himself describes travellers saying on arrival at Nicopolis by boat: "We have to land here, and before we book our further passage we might go and see Epictetus. Let us see what he'll say!" But on leaving, he pictures them saying:

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"That Epictetus is a nobody; he speaks in solecisms and barbarisms."

For all that he was admired by many. His introductions and letters of recommendation to the great were eagerly sought. Important people became his disciples.

He apparently lived in perfect simplicity. He was never married. He thought marriage would interfere with his vocation as messenger from God and overseer of men. He lived to a great old age, but how and when precisely he died we do not know. He left us no writings by his own hand, but his greatest disciple, Arrian, published eight books of discourses—I would almost have said sermons—of Epictetus and a manual containing the epitome of his teaching. This manual and four of the eight books of sermons are still extant, and the main source of information concerning this remarkable man. Besides these there is but a small collection of fragments, in which some of his most telling sayings are preserved.

On the theoretical and philosophical side Epictetus presents nothing original. He is a Stoic. He takes Stoic philosophy for granted and never departs from it. But his tone and temper is new, astonishingly so. There is a warmth and a tenderness, a piety and a humility, a cheerfulness and a grateful spirit, a love for purity and a delicacy of conscience in Epictetus, and a fervour and a zeal which is utterly un-Stoic. Seneca before him and Marcus Aurelius after him are different. There is a haughtiness and a hardness, a sadness and a despondency in them which is strangely absent from Epictetus. It is true that Marcus Aurelius also, at the moment of death, gives "sincere and true and heartfelt thanks," but it is to *the gods*, not to God. The Emperor is a devout worshipper of the immortal gods; in Epictetus the Greco-Roman pantheon is almost forgotten. The Emperor does indeed proclaim the unity of the godhead in some sense; he sometimes betrays what is called a cosmic consciousness, a trance-like identification of himself with the All; but the ring of almost personal affection for God is lacking, at least in comparison with the intensity and strength of it in Epictetus. The homely

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sentences of Epictetus are more human than the stately style of the Roman Cæsar.

Let us read some of Epictetus's sayings.

He is discussing in what occupation he would like death to find him. He confesses that he would like to be overtaken in some deed of beneficence, public utility, or magnanimity; but if that be not possible, then at least while busy with the improvement of his own soul, in perfect calm and in the wish to give everyone his due. "If death overtakes me in this state, it will be quite enough for me if I can stretch out my hands to God and say: 'Whatever faculties I received from Thee to understand Thy governance and to obey it, those I have not neglected. As far as in me lay, I have not dishonoured Thee. Look how I have used my senses and my thoughts. Have I ever murmured against Thee? Have I ever been displeased with what happened to me? or wished it otherwise? or gone beyond my station? Because Thou hast given me birth, I am grateful for what Thou hast given me. I am well content with as much of what was Thine as I have had for my use. Receive it back again and place it wherever Thou wilt, for Thine are all things, and Thou gavest them to me.' Should a man in this state not be well content to leave this world? What ending could be happier?" (Book IV).

In another place he describes the happy deathbed which he hopes to have, in a similar way, and speaks to God: "Have I murmured against Thy governance? I have fallen sick, because Thou didst will it; others have been sick, but I have been so willingly. I have become poor at Thy will, but I have been so cheerfully. I have held no public office because Thou didst not will it. I have never sought for pride of place. But hast Thou ever seen me sad on that account? Have I come before Thee with a face that was not bright? I was ready for anything Thou shouldst command or signify as Thy pleasure, and now willest Thou that I should depart from the festal crowd? I depart, and I am deeply grateful to Thee that Thou hast deigned to allow me to keep the feast with Thee, to see Thy

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works and to follow Thee in my mind in the governance thereof. May death take me while I am thinking or writing or reading such truths."

The sincerity of these and many other passages is beyond question. He often stresses the omnipresence of God. "Zeus has given to everyone a custodian, everyone's guardian spirit, and he has delivered him to him to guard, and he never sleeps and is never deceived. To what better guardian, what more careful keeper could he have entrusted him? So then, when ye have closed the door and thus brought darkness within, remember never to say that ye are alone, for ye are not, for God is within and your guardian spirit, and what need have these of light to see what ye do" (Book I, 14). "Thou carriest God within thee, and dost thou not realize that thou pollutest him with impure thoughts and sordid actions? In the presence of an image of God thou wouldst not dare to do what thou dost, but when God is present within, seeing all things and hearing all things, thou art not ashamed to do such things, unaware of thy own nature and obnoxious to God" (Book II, 8).

"What speech sufficeth to praise and celebrate [God's] Providence towards us? If we had sense, what else would we do by ourselves and in public but to sing hymns unto the Divine, to praise and to give thanks? Ought we not, while digging or ploughing or while at meals, sing our hymn to God? Great is God who gave us our bodily organs by which we can work the soil; great is God who gave us hands and a mouth and a stomach, who made us such that we grow imperceptibly, and that we breathe even when we are asleep. For such things should we sing a continuous hymn; but we should sing a most grand and divine hymn because He has given us the power to understand these things and to use them in our own way. And surely, as the bulk of you men are too blinded to do this, there must be at least some one person who carries out this duty and who in the name of all sends up a hymn to God! For what else can I do, I, a lame old man, except sing my hymn to God? Were I a nightingale

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I would sing as a nightingale, or if a swan as a swan; but now that I am a rational creature I must sing my hymn to God: that is *my* work, and I do it. I will not leave my post as long as it is given me, and I exhort you people to sing the same song" (Book I, 16).

Nothing, surely, more admirable than such attitude towards God, even in a heathen. If his self-righteousness sometimes grates upon us, we must remember that he had also his humbler moods. "What then, is it possible to be already sinless? No, it is not, but this at least is possible: incessantly to try to live without sin. Even this is dearly to be desired if we, never growing slack in that endeavour, be free at least from some sins" (Book IV, 12).

Towards his fellow-men Epictetus taught patience and forbearance. One passage must suffice:

"So and so has insulted you! I am grateful to him that he did not strike me.—But he *did* strike you! I am grateful that he did not wound me.—But he *did* wound you! I am grateful that he did not kill me. For when or from whom did he ever learn that man is meant to be a meek and sociable animal, and that an act of injustice causes a great injury to him who commits it? Now, as he never learnt this and does not believe it, why should he not follow what seems good in his eyes? A neighbour has thrown stones! Well, is it you who have done wrong?—Oh, but he broke some vases! Are you then a vase? If not, what has he done against you? Are you to be a wolf to bite back, or shall you throw more stones than he? He has done it against *you*, who are a *man*. Well, look in your treasury; what faculties have you got? Those of a wild beast? Those of one lusting for revenge? If a person be meek and sociable, tolerant, and loving to his neighbour, such a one I acknowledge and accept as a man."

It is strange that a person so deeply penetrated with excellent sentiments towards God and men should have been a Stoic.

When reading Epictetus one comes across many noble and exalted thoughts, many true desires for holiness and

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purity, expressions of submissiveness and meekness, which rouse an affection for the writer; but one constantly realizes that the unfortunate man is held between the iron bars of a prison-house, that his soul is like a bird that flutters against the wire of his cage yet never escapes. He is a pagan and a Stoic throughout.

His writings are full of "God," but alas! sometimes he writes "the gods" or "Zeus," sometimes "the Kosmos," the ordered world, "Nature," "the Universe," "the Logos" or Reason, "the Divine." The simple word "God" is by far the more frequent; it comes natural to him. He has passages in which he describes himself as a friend, a son of God; scores of times he emphasizes his gratitude to God, his affectionate admiration for God, his utter obedience to God. God is his leader, his General, his master, at whose bidding he always wishes to act and at whose call he will cheerfully die. He makes God sometimes so vividly personal that he seems to break through the bars of Pantheism, but then he is thrown back again. God is the All, God is the *Anima mundi*, God is the Sum of all things; we are part of God, fragments flung off from the Sun of the light of reason. Epictetus is a Christian Saint in the grim embrace and steel grip of Pantheism. The voice indeed is of Jacob, but the hands, the hands are those of Esau.

Stranger still! Epictetus does not believe in survival after death. His words are clear and unmistakable. Death ends all: there is no life beyond the grave. We are dissolved again into the elements. There is neither punishment nor reward after this life. We ought to be grateful for what God gives us in this world. Ingratitude is a crime; it is a sign of ingratitude on one's deathbed, as a spoiled and foolish child, to be asking for more. It is like whining and crying at the end of a party because it is over. It is bad manners towards God, who wants you to make place for others who are to be born. In such terms Epictetus often refers to those who lament the coming of death.

It seems inexplicable to us that a man who wrote such

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noble things about God, praised Him so fervently, and felt such gratitude towards Him, had no hope whatever of ever seeing his divine Benefactor, and was satisfied to pass away utterly out of His divine Presence at death. I cannot help thinking that the frequency with which he refers to death and the forced gaiety with which he intends to meet it is a little overdone. He seems to linger too long on the thought of kissing the hand of his divine Friend and Master before that Friend and Master dismisses him for ever and sends him into the nothingness out of which he came. He protests too much. Once, however, or twice he uses language which remotely suggests, not a dissolution into the elements of water, air, earth, or fire, but some continuance of spirit. "Is death really evil? Are we not kinsfolk of God (*συγγενεῖς τινες τοῦ θεοῦ*), and have we not come from thence? Let us go to where we came from; let us at last be freed from these chains by which we are bound and laden" (Book I, 9). In one of the fragments (No. 26) he seems to conceive of the soul as a distinct entity apart from the body; he calls it "a little psyche (*ψυχάριον*) carrying a corpse."

Another problem which faces the reader of Epictetus is this. His whole moral system rests on the principle of the freedom of the will. No one can force a human will, not even God, says he. This freedom is the supreme possession of man; in this, at least, he is independent, even from God. Hence there can be no prayer to God in the sense of asking His divine help. God cannot influence the will. None the less, in temptations Epictetus tells us to look up to God, he tells us to undertake no great work "without God"; to refer matters to God, and similar expressions. He seems almost to urge prayer, in the ordinary Christian sense of the word, and then he falls just short of it because his Stoicism did not allow for prayer.

Another difficulty lies in his very conception itself of human free-will. However much he emphasizes it, almost to weariness, none the less his Pantheism is incompatible with free-will. He says distinctly the will can only follow what the mind proposes to it as good. When a man sins,

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the fault lies in his understanding. He must be taught. Evil is ignorance, goodness is knowledge. His sinner is a mistaken man, not a wicked man. That the human will itself is at fault, Epictetus never says. He could not, for his so-called free-will is really determined. The natural consequence is that his system knows of no punishment and reward in the ordinary sense of the word. A man cannot be punished for what he did not know, though he may suffer the necessary consequence of his action. Irreconcilable with this are Epictetus's endeavours, passionate endeavours, to make people good, modest, chaste, faithful, and pious and grateful to God. He realizes full well that the road of virtue is hard and long, that it needs persistent practice; he tells people not to despair, though they have fallen, but to rise and begin again. He tells them to examine their conscience often to see whether they have made progress. All this is strangely inconsistent, for what does it really matter, if in the last resort ignorance implies no moral evil, but is just ignorance and nothing more? Perhaps Epictetus would answer that all sin causes disturbance of soul, makes people unhappy, and must be avoided on that account. Such an answer would be the Stoic answer, for calm of soul is the ideal bliss of Stoicism. But no one can read Epictetus without realizing that sin was to him more than loss of calm of mind and consequent unhappiness. It was foul and loathsome; it was an insult to the holiness of God, everywhere present. This self-contradiction is only half-latent throughout his works, and he never solves it. The bird flutters against the wire of his cage; he can never leave it.

The strangest part of Epictetus's thoughts is the conception of his apostolate. He considers himself a messenger and an overseer sent by God. The Greek words used are "angelos kai katescopos," angel and bishop, for katescopos is but a word akin to episcopos.

When the true Cynic—that is, the ideal philosopher—has prepared himself by abstention from sin, practice of virtue, and realization of the vanity of external things, then, says Epictetus (Book III, 22), "this does not suffice

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for him, but he must know that he is sent as a messenger (aggelos) from Zeus, and sent to men concerning what is good and evil, to show them how they have gone astray and seek the substance of good and of evil where it is not to be found, and how or where it is they have no thought. The Cynic is a true investigator of what is friendly and what is hostile to man, and he must, after careful investigation, come and announce what is true. He must not, overcome by fear, point out as enemies those who are not, nor must he in any way be terrified or confused by fancies. He must therefore be able, when the opportunity offers, to raise his hand and come forward and say what Socrates said: "Men, whither are ye going, what are ye doing? O unhappy men, as blind folk ye are drifting hither and thither. Ye are gone astray on a strange road, and the true road ye have left. Ye are seeking well-being and highest honours where they are not, and when someone shows you ye will not believe him." After having proven that our aim should not be the good of our body, or the acquiring of riches, but the improvement of the inner man, he continues: "Labour then, O wretched men, for this; care only for this, seek only this good. Perhaps ye say: 'But how is this possible? When I possess nothing, when I am naked, without house or home, and in squalor, when I am a slave and a vagrant—how can I lead a happy life?' Lo, God has sent you someone to show you by deed that it is possible. Behold me, I am a vagrant, without home, without possessions and slaves. I sleep on the bare ground; I have no wife or children or estate. Only the earth and the sky and one cloak! And what is lacking to me?"

Well known is the anecdote of the man whom Epictetus urged to get married, and who gave the smart rejoinder: "I am waiting to marry one of your daughters!" Epictetus remained celibate in order to lead the true life of an apostle. His defence of celibacy for an apostle of the true philosophy is surprising on the lips of a Stoic. In a perfect state, he says, "there is nothing to prevent a Cynic—i.e., an apostle of philosophy—to marry and have

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children, for his wife then would be like him, and so would his father-in-law, and his children would be educated in the same way. But as things are at present—that is, in the time of battle—ought not the Cynic be drawn by nothing from the ministry of God and thus be able to move amongst men without being impeded by any private obligations or entangled in his private affections, which he could not set aside without losing the appearance of a true and good man? Yet if he satisfied those obligations and affections he would destroy his character as messenger, and scout, and herald of the gods.” Epictetus then describes a number of distractions of a married man, and finally exclaims: “Where now is that king who is totally devoted to the common weal, the man to whom nations are entrusted and who has care of so great things? How can he have leisure enough, if he be occupied with private obligations? People live without wife and children for the sake of leading a campaign in war, or for some other interest, and such abstinence from marriage is supposed to be amply compensated, and the royal dignity of a Cynic should not be thought sufficient compensation? Perhaps we do not realize the grandeur of his state. . . . As man he has all men as adopted children—the men he has as sons, the women as daughters; thus he can move amongst all and have a care for all. Or do you think that he says harsh things to the men he meets merely as a pastime? He does it as father, as brother, as minister of the common Father Zeus!” (Book III, 22).

This description of the ideal Cynic has never been verified in any Cynic known to history, but it is a true description of the apostles of Christ and of the Christian priesthood. It starts a train of thought till then utterly alien to the Greco-Roman mind, but perfectly natural in St. Paul the Apostle of the Gentiles.

What has happened to Epictetus that, though so like, yet he is so unlike his pagan contemporaries? What foreign body has entered into the sphere of his Stoic-Cynic philosophical system to cause such disturbance in the course of the stars in his heaven?

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He knew the Christians. He often complains of the lack of sincerity in his philosophical followers. They pretend to be Stoics, but they lack courage, they dread pain and death. Then he asks, Could Stoics not do from the dictates of reason what Galilæans do from habit or instinct? The constancy of Christians in martyrdom had roused the reluctant admiration of Epictetus. He probably saw them die in hundreds in the persecution of Nero; he must have known of their sufferings in the reign of Domitian. He refers a few times to the Jews and once to baptism. Perhaps he did not clearly distinguish between Jews and Christians. The latter at first were regarded as a sect of Judaism. Besides, Jews in great numbers had received the baptism of John. The Acts speaks of such baptized Jews at Ephesus, not far from Epictetus's birthplace. There are some sentences, though not many, in Epictetus's discourses which have been pointed out as bearing a close resemblance to phrases in the epistles of the New Testament. The claim of Epictetus for his ideal Cynic cannot but remind us of St. Paul's claim to be an ambassador of God, of St. Paul's praise of virginity, and his teaching that a married man is divided in his interests. Epictetus's advice to think of God, whether eating or drinking or whatever we do, his advice to be continually singing hymns to God, and a number of other details, remind us strongly of St. Paul.

Dr. Bonhöffer maintained some years ago that St. Paul was influenced by the philosophy of Epictetus. This, however, is the height of improbability. St. Paul is at least by thirty years senior to Epictetus, and the other contemporary Stoics, Seneca and Musonius, have nothing of the spirit of St. Paul. St. Paul, moreover, is so intensely individualistic, so much the stronger and more original mind, that an influence of Epictetus on St. Paul is an historical and literary impossibility.

It would not be unnatural, however, to ascribe the strange Christian tone of Epictetus to some contact with "Galilæans" or their writings. Whether this is so, we cannot prove. Marcus Aurelius, the greatest disciple of Epictetus, has lost this Christian tone completely. Marcus

A Contemporary of St. Paul

Aurelius was a determined persecutor of the Christians. Perhaps the Phrygian slave had a heart better attuned to the message from the Crucified Galilæan than the Roman Emperor. Neither accepted Christianity, but the former certainly was not far from the kingdom of God.

J. P. ARENDZEN.

DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT & THE ASSUMPTION OF OUR LADY

I.

DURING the Vatican Council 204 Bishops and theologians pressed for a dogmatic definition of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary into Heaven on the ground that unless "the firm faith of the Church in the Assumption is to be called mere unfounded credulity, which it would be impious even to think," it is "most firmly to be held that this belief has its origin in divino-apostolic tradition—that is to say, in revelation." Should this question be brought up again when the Council resumes its interrupted work, the bearing which its discussion by the assembled Fathers must undoubtedly have upon Catholic theories of doctrinal development will be of high interest to all students of that subject.

Those Bishops and theologians who petitioned the Council for the definition of the Assumption gave what is, according to Catholic principles, an all-sufficient reason for judging any doctrine to have been revealed by God and included in the Deposit of Faith delivered by Christ and His Apostles to the Church. The fact that a doctrine is universally held and taught in the Church is proof of its Apostolic origin and faithful transmission:

For the Catholic it is not necessary to demonstrate positively from coeval documents that the Church has always borne actual witness to a given doctrine. The scantiness of the documents, especially of those belonging to the sub-apostolic age, makes it even impossible. The tradition of the present time, above all if it is attested by an authoritative definition, is quite sufficient to prove the former existence of the same tradition, although, perhaps, only in a latent state. Any further knowledge of its former existence is merely of scientific interest (*A Manual of Catholic Theology*: Wilhelm and Scannell).

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It is true that the Teaching Authority, before defining a doctrine, must investigate Tradition as well as the Holy Scriptures and theological reasons; yet the infallibility of its decision does not depend upon these investigations themselves, but upon the action of the Holy Spirit guiding the Church to a right conclusion.

"The tradition of a truth," say the authors whom I have just quoted, "being once established, a Catholic has no further interest in the investigation of its continuity, except for the purpose of science and apologetics." It is probable that the scientific and apologetic study of Tradition, and as an integral part of this the study also of doctrinal development, were never more necessary or of more practical value than they are to-day. While it is a fundamental principle of the Catholic Religion "that the Deposit of Faith constitutes God's final revelation to men; that no new public revelation of divine truth was promised or is now to be expected to the end of time; that the original Christian revelation may neither be added to nor taken from; yet there is visible all through the Church's history a process of development affecting her doctrine as well as her worship, discipline, polity, and devotion; and exhibiting all the appearances of prolific growth."* One of the aims of the Catholic study of the development of doctrine is to show that this growth is not incompatible with the Church's inviolable principle of the unchangeableness and finality of the revelation given by Christ at the beginning. Another, and in these days a most urgent task of this part of theology, is to disprove the assertion of Modernists and "Liberal Christians" that the developments seen in the Catholic Religion are of purely human origin and elaboration. This is the "intrinsic evolution of dogmas" condemned by Pope Pius X in the Encyclical "Pascendi" against the errors of Modernism.

I am concerned here with doctrinal development only, and especially with the doctrinal development which issues,

* This paragraph is quoted, with slight alterations, from an article by the present writer, "Catholic and Modernist Theories of Development," in the *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, July, 1913.

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or comes to the point when it may at any time issue, in a dogmatic definition by the Church. Historically, this development has taken various forms, some of which would appear to be called "development" in an analogical rather than in the strict sense of the word. By development of doctrine in its wider sense is meant any process by means of which points of doctrine come to be recognized as being in one way or another, explicitly or implicitly, in the original Deposit of Faith; thus becoming susceptible of definition, or even before definition coming to be universally believed and taught in the Church at large. I suppose that no one would deny that the doctrine of the bodily Assumption of our Blessed Lady into Heaven is in this position of universal acceptance now.

The great foundation doctrines of Christianity, those truths of which the explicit knowledge and belief are necessary to all Christians for their sanctification and salvation, have of necessity always been manifestly set forth in the teaching of the Church from the beginning. Such for instance are the doctrines of the Blessed Trinity, the Incarnation, the Redemption, the general doctrine of the Sacraments and of the Last Things. So far as doctrines like these have been susceptible of development, this has consisted mainly in their fuller exposition, their safeguarding by means of chosen phraseology, their more and more definite declaration by the Church in the face of error or for the solution of apparent antinomies. Such was the development in the early centuries of Trinitarian, Christological, and Soteriological doctrines, and of the doctrine of the divine Motherhood of Mary. Always explicitly taught, the great truths of this class were ever in the consciousness of the Christian people: they were read in the Holy Scriptures and recited in the Creeds: the Christian Life and Liturgy and the Church's traditional practice kept them before the eyes of all in a practical way: their light filled every mind: their "development" was occasioned by the inevitable urge felt by believers to possess themselves as fully as possible of the riches of truth which Mysteries so deep offered for contemplation,

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as well as by the necessity of rebutting erroneous interpretations or solving difficulties.

The development of these truths was, then, for the most part neither the making explicit of matters implicitly contained in the Deposit—since they had always been in the manifest preaching of the Church; nor was it in the bringing to light of doctrines that had fallen into obscurity—for they were always in the light; it was indeed a fight for truth; but for truth possessed—a defence of the truth against actual enemies; a fencing it about against future attacks; a glorifying and renewed promulgation of the Faith delivered once to the Saints. As the climax of this kind of development a definition of faith represents the final victory of the truth; the final safeguarding of the defined point of doctrine against further possibility of misinterpretation.

Besides the great fundamental doctrines explicitly taught and believed from the beginning, respecting which it would be an error against Faith to say that they could ever be subject in the Church to even the most temporary obscuration, there were others, also really in the Deposit, but not so plainly manifest there as to be recognized at once, or by all, or in every place. These, equally with the doctrines just mentioned, are part of the revealed Deposit and are binding upon the faith of Catholics as soon as they are recognized and proposed for our belief by the Church's infallible Magisterium. There is no place in the Catholic system for the distinction between "fundamental" and "non-fundamental" doctrines in the sense that belief may be refused to some "secondary" truths that God has revealed. As soon as we know by the voice of the Church that a truth is in the Deposit of Faith, we are bound to believe it.

Nevertheless there are doctrines of which the explicit knowledge and belief are not—at any rate at all times and in all circumstances—absolutely necessary for every Catholic. At the same time, the events which from time to time call for the solemn definition of such doctrines by the Church may also demand a specially hearty profession of them and therefore an explicit knowledge of them by

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Catholics in view of some spreading error, or as the response to a universal impulse of Catholic devotion. Sometimes, not to know and not to believe explicitly a truth of this kind when it has been defined or is universally taught by the Church would be blameworthy and most detrimental to the spiritual life of the individual. It is a commonplace, however, of theological teaching that not all Catholics are obliged to know in detail everything of this kind that the Church has defined. What a Catholic need not know explicitly, he includes implicitly in his act of faith; for he is sure that the Church herself cannot hold or teach anything that is not true.

Doctrines of the kind of which I am now speaking may at one time be currently held, though conceived in terms more or less indeterminate; they may afterwards become to a certain extent obscured and even be called in question by Catholics without detriment to faith. All the same, as Cardinal Franzelin points out, these truths can never become so obscured that a consensus against them could prevail in the Church. Their ultimate definition or universal teaching by the Church may be described as the bringing forth from her treasury jewels of divine truth, once recognized and stored up, then hidden for a time in the vast riches of the Deposit, to be brought out again and by promulgation in more definite formulas polished, as it were, anew, and made to shine more gloriously than ever.*

While theologians have been able with good reason to distinguish various modes of doctrinal development, it is often an affair of considerable delicacy to determine in what category the actual historical development of a particular dogma should be placed. It may appear to many that we have in the dogma of the Immaculate Conception an instance of the kind of development now under consideration. The comparison made by early Fathers between our Blessed Lady, the Second Eve, and Eve sinless before the Fall, would seem to show a recognition, by

* Cf. "Le Développement du Dogme chrétien," by Léonce de Grandmaison, in the *Revue Pratique d'Apologétique*, No. 72. I must express my indebtedness to this author's very full treatment of Doctrinal Development.

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no means obscure, not only of her entire sinlessness in every sense of the word, but of her sinlessness *always*, from the beginning of her existence. This doctrine became obscured to the extent that Saints and theologians denied or doubted that she was immaculate in her very conception. The glorious truth was brought out again, defined in terms that leave no place for doubt in the future, and shines for ever among the brightest jewels in Mary's crown.

On the other hand, there are theologians (M. L. de Grandmaison among them) who see in the history of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception an instance of a third kind of development, now to be touched upon, to which the name of development most properly belongs. It is development in the strict sense, and bears analogy to the organic development of living things. This is the process by which truths that are wholly and simply implicit or latent in the Deposit are brought out into explicit recognition so that we are made sure, by the infallible voice of the Church, of their real inclusion in the body of revealed truths delivered at the beginning. This is a real development of dogma. It is possible to deny that it exists or has ever existed in the realm of *dogma* at all. It may be contended that all doctrinal development is accounted for by the fuller exposition (in the sense described above) of those doctrines that have always been explicit, and the bringing to light of those that at some time have been partially obscured. Yet a real development of dogmas seems to be implied by St. Vincent of Lerins when he speaks of *profectus religionis*, a "growth of religion," and *profectus fidei*, a "growth of the faith," and compares that growth to the organic evolution of the human body or of the seed producing the plant (*St. Vincent of Lerins, Commonitorium* 23).

It is on this question—whether something analogous to organic development has not taken place in respect of certain dogmas of the Faith, and whether it may not take place in the future—that students of development may hope for light from a Conciliar discussion, should it come

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about, of the definition of the Assumption as an Article of Faith. It may surely be said that the bodily Assumption of Mary has long been taught by the ordinary Magisterium of the Church; and there are probably very few Catholics, if any, who could regard as reasonable any doubt that a Conciliar discussion would result in a definition, to be hailed with unbounded joy by the whole Catholic world. To enlarge on this, or to speculate on what will happen, is not within my scope, and might be open to the charge of presumption.

II

Doctrinal development goes on under the providential action of the Holy Spirit, who overrules it, and whose special *assistentia* is with the Teaching Authorities of the Church—the Supreme Pontiff and the Hierarchy in union with him—to ensure them against all error in their final judgements.

On its human side development is regulated by revealed doctrine already explicitly recognized, and is controlled by the Teaching Authority, whose part in it is essential and predominant.* Development could not depart from the lines laid down by truths already defined, or taught by the ordinary Magisterium, without becoming a corruption of doctrine instead of its development. Against the possibility of this we have our Lord's own promises. It is the infallible Magisterium, guided by the Holy Spirit, which ensures that we shall have true developments and not corruptions.

This being said, we may ask in what consists the process of development of doctrine from the implicit to the explicit: what is meant by a doctrine being implicitly

* Some theologians (e.g., Franzelin, "De Traditione," *passim*) prefer to speak of the multiplicity of secondary causes in development— theological study, historical investigations, pious contemplation, the events of history, and so on—as the *preparation* for the "explication" of doctrines, attributing the actual *explicatio* to the final judgement of authority acting under the special *assistentia* of the Holy Ghost. "Development" may be taken to include both the preparation and the "explication," the whole being subject to divine overruling in various degrees, from a general providence up to the special *assistentia* promised to the successors of the Apostles in their authoritative teaching.

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involved in the Deposit: what is the process by which it is brought from the state of implicit inclusion to that of explicit recognition and enunciation by the Church. All doctrinal development has its beginning and "point of insertion" in the Deposit of Faith delivered over to the Church by our Lord and the Holy Apostles. This Deposit consisted in a definite array of objective truths and principles, already a formed body of doctrines; manifesting explicitly the chief dogmas of the Faith necessary to be known by all; and involving implicitly all that ever can or ever will be authentically developed from it to the end of time. "The doctrines and principles contained in the Deposit were communicated to the first recipients of Revelation in the form of concepts and judgements awakened in their minds by divine action. These concepts and judgements were expressed, as they have ever since been expressed, in words and formulas, or by other outward signs such as liturgical actions, practical measures of Church polity, inculcated practices of the Christian life and similar manifestations; and in this way they were and are conveyed to others."* The conceptual nature of the Deposit itself, indicated in this extract, is one of the root causes of doctrinal development. "Revealed truths," writes a well-known theologian, "are not like lifeless stones, but living seeds; and the more profound they are, the richer and more fruitful are they in the conclusions to which they lead. Hence in the apprehension of these truths the human intellect is not merely passive, but is like a field of greater or less fertility in which the seed sown is cultivated and evolved" (Hurter, *Compendium of Theology*).

The conceptual nature of development follows from the conceptual nature of the Deposit, and is the reason why truths can be latent in other truths. Remembering always that all progress, increase, and development are in our knowledge and understanding of the vast treasure of truth contained in the Deposit, and not in the objective Truth as it is in itself, we can conceive that, just as in the

* "Doctrinal Development in the Catholic Church," by Rev. H. G. Hughes, in *The Constructive Quarterly*, 1921.

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ordinary mental operations of each one, so in the mind of the Church at large, truths of which we are not yet aware may be involved in those which have been consciously recognized and formulated. In saying this, due regard must be paid to the fact that doctrinal development has an element of mystery—the mystery of the divine action upon the minds of men in the whole process, from its first preparations to its ultimate perfecting by the infallible utterance of the Church. A single human mind, acted upon by the multitude of influences and impressions that are the occasion of its formulating its own latent concepts, affords but a distant likeness of that vast psychological process which development implies—the action of divine truth upon many minds during many centuries; the reaction of minds to that truth; the co-operation of human action with divine influence.

If we consider these things, and look at the witness of history, it is not hard to admit that the mind of the Church possesses in the Deposit concepts of which all the implications are not yet recognized, and of which the bringing out is a work that she will carry on to the end of time. The progress of revealed truths from the implicit to the explicit may justly be said to constitute the developed truths in a state of new perfection *quoad nos*: it gives us the active and conscious possession of what, when it was implicit, we possessed only passively and unconsciously: it is, therefore, a real progress and a real conquest of truth by human minds which, under divine assistance, come to know and believe that truth as they did not know or believe it before. There is more in this progress of truths from the implicit to the explicit than just the exposition of terms, long and elaborate though that exposition may be when it is concerned with the interpretation of formulas setting forth deep mysteries of the Faith. There is more, also, than the bringing to light of truths which, though they were at one time obscured, or were taught with less insistency, yet were always actually in possession and needed only to be restored to their due place in the treasure-chamber of the Church's doctrines.

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The passage from the implicit to the explicit has analogy, as we saw, with those common physical developments witnessed in the growth of the man from the embryo or the plant from the seed; though any similitude we can conceive between things conceptual and things physical must always be unsatisfactory—and doctrinal development, to say it again, is conceptual; a development, not of the unchanging Truth itself, but of truth as it is received in our minds (*secundum modum cognoscentis*) and in the mind of the Church at large. The crux of the question is to know whether this progress from the implicit to the explicit can take place in respect of *dogmas*; whether certain *revealed* doctrines can be or have been subject to the process by which truths pass from the purely implicit state to become recognized Catholic teaching or Articles of Faith. Is there dogmatic development of this kind, or is such development restricted to truths which the Church can define, indeed, by virtue of her infallibility, but which are to be believed with the "Ecclesiastical Faith" postulated by some modern theologians; not with the Divine Faith which revealed doctrine demands?

Besides involving theological discussions as to the existence or non-existence of "Ecclesiastical Faith" and the place of the *Locutio Ecclesiae*—the utterance of the Church—in the motive of faith, matters upon which there is no space to enlarge now, the answer to the questions just asked depends on the view taken of the implicit inclusion of doctrines in the Deposit of Faith; and here is the point where it seems to the present writer that light may be gained from a Conciliar discussion of the doctrine of the Assumption. We have to ask what kind of implicit inclusion in the Deposit of Faith is sufficient to make a doctrine the potential object of "explicitation" or development, and therefore, whenever its development proceeds so far, definable as an Article of Faith, or capable of so permeating Catholic thought with the idea of its revealed truthfulness as to make it the matter of universal belief and of teaching by the ordinary Magisterium of the Church. It may be said again, without any presumptuous

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anticipating of the decision of Authority, that the doctrine of the Assumption has permeated Catholic thought in this way. It is this fact which makes the doctrine of such importance to Catholic theories of development.

To come back to the question of implicit inclusion in the Deposit, there are two ways in which a doctrine may be implicitly contained in another, or in a complex of doctrines such as constitutes the Deposit of Faith. It may be there *formally* or *virtually*. A doctrine is *formally* implicit in another when all that is needed for its discovery is the analysis of the terms of the doctrine in which it is to be found. Thus the proposition, "Christ has a human body and a rational soul" is formally implicit in the revealed proposition, "Christ is truly Man." So, again, the proposition, "John was conceived in original sin," is formally contained in the revealed proposition, "All the descendants of Adam (except, by a special privilege, the Blessed Virgin Mary) are conceived in original sin." In such instances the mere analysis and exposition of terms is enough to show that the one proposition contains the other.

There is a considerable school of modern theologians who teach that only such doctrines as are thus *formally* implicit in the Deposit—that is to say, in some revealed doctrine or complexus of doctrines already held and taught explicitly—can ever be defined by the Church as objects of divine faith or be the subject of *dogmatic* development strictly so called. On the other hand, theologians of great competency in this matter hold that *virtual* inclusion in the Deposit is in many instances sufficient to render a doctrine definable as revealed by God. A doctrine is *virtually* implicit in the Deposit when there is necessary to bring it out some process other than the simple analysis of terms.*

* Some theologians appear to admit only "theological conclusions," in which a naturally known unrevealed premiss intervenes into the category of truths "virtually" implicit. The view referred to in the text is wider. It supposes that there are other than strictly logical processes or historical investigations by which a truth may become explicit; processes that may and do, under the divine influences working in dogmatic development, bring about the "explicitation" of what is not formally, though it is virtually, implicit in the Deposit. The question is, says M. de Grandmaison (*Revue*

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This process may be by way of theological reasoning or of appeal to some traditional practice of the Church: it may involve historical investigation or argument from the *sensus fidelium*: it may include all or several of these proceedings.*

Does the process thus outlined always result in a logical or historical demonstration, of itself excluding all possibility of doubt, that the doctrine which is its subject is in the Deposit of Faith? It is acknowledged that in Divine Tradition a complete chain of historical evidence for the existence and teaching of a doctrine in the Church from the beginning is neither necessary nor always possible. Must, then, the process of eliciting doctrines from the Depositum always present *demonstrative* evidence that they are really contained in the original Revelation? I do not speak merely of the strong confirmation of their inclusion in the Deposit which is to be obtained in abundance for our doctrines from history or from theology. I speak of demonstration such as, even apart from the Church's witness, would produce certainty. If such demonstration were really needful and were always present to give us the assurance that a doctrine was contained in the original Deposit, it is hard to see how the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, for instance, could have been denied by Saints and theologians writing before its definition. Even if we consider this dogma to be one of those which simply fell into temporary obscurity the objection still holds good—for how, we may then ask, could a doctrine of which the inclusion in the Deposit was demonstrable by human reasoning and investigation fall into obscurity for centuries so as to be denied by some whose

Pratique d'Apologétique), to know whether the Church cannot recognize and proclaim a revealed truth where all our reasonings, all our investigations, can arrive only at a theological conclusion, *or even less*.

* Not, however, that reasoning which, by the introduction of a non-revealed premiss, results in a "theological conclusion." It is commonly held now that a theological conclusion cannot *as such* or by virtue simply of the particular form of argumentation by which it is reached, become the object of a definition of faith. Should the *truth* enunciated in a theological conclusion be defined, it will have been reached, according to the view of those who hold the virtually implicit to be definable, by one of those processes of which I am now speaking.

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orthodoxy was not only beyond suspicion but a pattern to all?

The objection comes with greater force still from those theologians who consider that the Immaculate Conception is a truth that was only virtually in the Deposit. If, they ask, the Immaculate Conception can be evolved, as has been asserted, from the Angelic Salutation, "Hail, full of grace," by the simple exposition of the terms of the latter, how could that doctrine not only have been doubted, but denied, not by heretics only, but by most faithful children of the Church? That the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception is implicit in the "Hail, Mary," no one will deny; but that it is *formally* therein, or *formally* taught in any other revealed proposition, is difficult to prove.

III

Truth is of many kinds, and there are many ways of learning it. Supernatural truth is known to us who are of the Christian dispensation by the revelation of God speaking through His Church. When we can say *Roma locuta est*, we can also say *Causa finita est*. Yet we are not forbidden to ask, for the purposes of apologetic, how the Church is conscious of the full content of the message that is hers to deliver. It is possible that some Catholic answers to this question have blamelessly inclined to the side of over-rationalizing; making development too exclusively a matter of logic and scientific historical investigation; seeming not to dwell enough upon the element of mystery which comes into the process of development with the action of the Holy Spirit upon the minds of those who comprise the Church on earth.

May we not believe—and the belief will account for strictly dogmatic developments which otherwise it would be difficult to explain—that the Church has power, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, to discern in the Deposit and to define as Articles of Faith truths which human reason by itself would fail to recognize as certainly contained therein?*

* Take for instance the condemnation by the Council of Vienne, with the note of heresy, of the teaching that the soul is not in itself and essentially the

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place, and the theological reasons for a doctrine be studied: this is necessary in order that the defining Authority shall act reasonably and *more humano*. Also the reasons given by Authority for a definition have very great weight and the highest confirmatory value; but it is their definition by the Church that gives us the assurance of the inclusion of doctrines in the Deposit where merely human investigation and reasoning would not be competent to come to any compelling decision.

The words of a theologian of a former day, quoted and adopted by Father Schiffini, S.J., himself a theologian of acknowledged competence on the subject, sum up very well the view here indicated: "When theologians say that no new dogmas are brought forward in the Church to be believed *de novo*, they do not mean more than this, that nothing begins *de novo* to be formally and explicitly matter of faith which was not already matter of faith *radically*, *implicitly*, and *virtually* [*italics mine*], inasmuch as the Church defines as to be explicitly believed only such doctrines as by the *assistentia* of the Holy Spirit she perceives to be *virtually* contained in some object of faith already formally revealed."

Should a definition of the Assumption come to rejoice the Catholic world, we may anticipate that its propriety or necessity will be argued not so much by appeal to historical documents—scanty here, and of doubtful authenticity—as by appeal to the *sensus fidelium*; to the constant growth in the Church of belief in the doctrine; and to the fact of the universal faith of all Catholics, teachers and taught—a fact surely all-sufficient on Catholic principles to assure us already that what we believe about our Blessed Lady's Assumption is indeed a truth revealed by God.

For the rest, theological arguments will confirm the

form of the human body (Denz. 481); the definition of the exact number of the Sacraments, and, according to some, the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. "We may find many things," writes Schiffini (*De Virtutibus Infusis*), "which are expressly condemned under the anathema of heresy, the opposites of which do not appear to have any other foundation in divine revelation than the *charisma* of truth promised to the Church in defining doctrines of faith and morals." He gives instances of definitions concerning Holy Orders and Matrimony (*cf. Grandmaison, Revue Pratique, loc. cit.*).

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universal faith by showing the fitness of the saving from corruption of that pure body from which the Son of God took flesh : the fitness also of the quick reunion, body and soul, of the Blessed Mother with her Son. Yet not these reasonings, inevitable as their conclusion must seem to every lover of Mary, will be the ultimate ground of our belief; but the voice of God speaking through the infallible Church. The place which the doctrine of the Assumption has held for so long in the belief and practice of the Church would seem to be already an argument in favour of dogmatic development in its most real sense; and to point to the sufficiency, in some instances, of the virtual inclusion of a truth in the Deposit for its development to the stage of dogmatic definition.

Should the definition of the Assumption become an accomplished fact, the argument will be stronger still, for it would be difficult to point to any explicit doctrine of faith and show that the truth of the Assumption can be elicited from it by the simple analysis or exposition of terms. It would seem to follow, then, that we have here a truth which all firmly believe and of which we can say with the highest probability that it is definable (as, indeed, it appeared to the Fathers who petitioned the Vatican Council for its definition), yet one which at the same time appears to be, not formally, but virtually in the Deposit. A Conciliar discussion may contribute greatly towards the solution of this question of theology.

H. G. HUGHES.

THE LATERAN CANONS AND IRELAND

THE Order of Canons Regular was represented by a very large number of foundations in Ireland before the Reformation. In the last quarter of the eleventh century these Religious entered upon the most flourishing period of their history throughout Europe, and, in a special manner in Ireland, where, in course of time, they held more than two hundred Houses.

It must, however, be noted that these Canons were not all of one Congregation, nor united by any central authority. Some, as Holy Trinity, Dublin, depended on the Abbey of St. Victor, at Paris; some were attached to the Abbey of Arrouaise, and some few were founded from English Communities and maintained a slight connection with them, as Kells, from Bodmin, and one at least from Llanthony. For the most part each house was autonomous, and, except for the Common Rule of St. Augustine and their general scope of life, the Communities were in no way held together by any strict bond. Even the Arrossians and Victorines, little by little, obtained a complete independence, in fact, if not by right, from the respective central authorities across the Channel.

The Abbey of Arrouaise was the most insistent in trying to preserve the dependence of its subject Houses. Popes, as well as the Abbots General, made repeated efforts in this direction. Under Eugenius III, special penances were decreed against the Irish Superiors who failed to attend the Chapters: they should fast for forty days on bread and water and submit to twelve strokes of the discipline in public Chapter on three successive days. Later, in 1201, Innocent III addressed a Bull to the Bishops, Abbots, Priors and Canons, requiring them to send at least one or two deputies from Ireland to the Mother Abbey. But, in spite of all, the Congregations tended always to resolve themselves into self-governing Communities.

Before the Reformation, and for a long time afterwards,

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the Lateran Congregation was not known in the country. In fact, except by the aggregation of previously established Houses, the Laterans did not exist outside of Italy until recent times. It was precisely in order to save the fast dwindling Canonical Order in Ireland that recourse was had to the Lateran Congregation for a union whereby scattered units might be brought together, and new life infused into such Communities as possibly could be assembled in the evil days of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

That the clergy of the Lateran Basilica lived under a certain form of Regular discipline in very early times is suggested by many writers apart from those of the Canonical Order. But it seems generally agreed that this Regular discipline took definite form from the time of St. Leo the Great, who made use of Gelasius, as a disciple of St. Augustine, to introduce a mode of life similar to that of St. Augustine with his clerics at Hippo. In 1061 Alexander II became Pope. He had been a Canon Regular of a Community established at Lucca and claiming origin from St. Frigidian. In treating of Lateran Canons and Ireland it is worthy of note that the early history of the Laterans is connected with an Irishman. Alexander II introduced Canons from Lucca for the service of the Lateran and thereby seems to have given an impetus to the formation of Communities of Regular Canons in various parts. For eight hundred years the Regular Canons remained at the Lateran to the time of Boniface VIII, 1294, by whom they were replaced by Seculars. After another century and a half, Eugenius IV, in 1443, brought back Canons Regular, once again from the Lucca Community, as having recently undergone a reform under a remarkable man, Blessed Bartholomew Colonna, and also as having always retained a traditional connection with the former Lateran clergy. There ensued a long series of disputes with Seculars, not altogether edifying, till, in 1483, Sixtus IV established the Canons Regular at his new church of Sta Maria della Pace, decreeing that they should always retain their title of Laterans with all the rights and privileges which they had acquired whilst serving the Basilica.

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Our purpose here is to put together available information respecting the fortunes of the Irish Canons in post-Reformation times, and their final attempt to save themselves from total extinction by joining up with the Congregation of the Lateran, which, in Italy, had acquired a certain priority over other Congregations, and which happily lay beyond the destructive influences of the Reformation. It should be noted that peculiar difficulties exist in tracing the history of the disbanded Canons in penal times. They had slender claims on any other Communities of their Order abroad, and possessed no means of preserving their records. Furthermore, it was recognized by Canon Law that Canons Regular were eligible to any benefice, and their absorption into the Secular Clergy would in many cases prove the simplest solution to their difficulties. In spite of this, the Order continued in Ireland down to the beginning of the nineteenth century, though at times only a name or two must suffice as links in the chain of continuity. Thus, in 1594, Robert Fleming was collated as Prior of Holmpatrick, and he was succeeded in 1608 by Patrick Duff. In 1620 Donal O'Gryphy, or Griffin, appears as Precentor of Killaloe and Prior of Lorrha (C.R.), and, on May 16, 1625, he was provided by the Pope as commendatory Abbot of Corconsroe.* Four years later he became Vicar General of the diocese of Kilfenora, and on June 26, 1630, Malachy O'Queely wrote to Fr. Luke Wadding "to further the business of Mr. Gryphy, who is sincerely our friend and yours."† Later, his name appears as Daniel, Bishop-Elect of Kilfenora.‡

The Canons retained possession of St. Patrick's Purgatory, Lough Derg, continuously to the end of the seventeenth century. The House escaped suppression until 1632, but even after that the lay owner allowed the Canons to resume residence. In 1660 the name of Dr. O'Clery appears as Prior, and his successor was Fr. Art MacCullen, who continued in charge from 1672 to 1710, at which date

* Cal. State Papers, Charles I. 1625-1632.

† Report on Franciscan MSS. Hist. MSS. Com., 1906.

‡ *I. E. Record*, January, 1924, art. by W. H. Grattan Flood, "Episcopal Succession of Kilfenora."

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the Franciscans were placed in possession of the sanctuary.* As we shall see, too, there can hardly be doubt that the Canons always remained in the neighbourhood of their famous Abbey of Cong.

In 1630 the Hermits of St. Augustine addressed a petition to the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda, requesting to be allowed to take possession of the Church of Holy Cross, Limerick, formerly belonging to the Austin Canons. The Sacred Congregation referred the matter to the Abbot General of the Lateran Congregation, thus foreshadowing the future union of the Lateran and Irish Canons. The decision must rest with the Lateran Abbot, "notwithstanding the reasons of the diversity of Congregation adduced on behalf of the Provincial of the Hermits." "*Non obstantibus rationibus de diversitate religionis illius ab hac Lateranensium pro dicto provinciali allegatis.*" The General of the Order expressed his unwillingness to waive any claims of the Order or to alienate its property. Evidently these Canons concurred with Propaganda in regarding even the units of another branch as in some way connected with themselves. To solve the difficulty the Sacred Congregation required the Lateran General either to abandon his claims or to take steps to provide for the service of the Church in question. In a session *Coram Sanctissimo* on June 26, the Procurator General agreed to the petition of the hermits being granted with the reservation that the property should be restored to the Canons if they should find themselves in a position to take it over. "*Si Canonici regulares monasterium illud repetere vellent, Fratres Sti Augustini restituere teneantur.*" The decision was approved and promulgated by Urban VIII in a brief, dated from Castel Gandolfo, October 18, 1632.†

A similar appeal was laid before Propaganda three years later by Cardinal Anthony Barberini, nephew of Urban VIII, and afterwards Protector of the Kingdom of Ireland, on behalf of the Bishop of Down. The peti-

* *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Lough Derg.

† *Hibernia Dominicana*.

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tioner asked that the priories of Killinshon and Muckmore, the one formerly belonging to the Knights of Malta, the other to the Canons Regular, might be transferred to the Bishop, on the plea that these two Orders were extinct in the country. The Sacred Congregation acceded to the request in a session of June 30, 1635—*cum solita clausula*, that the Bishop should restore these priories if the Knights or Canons respectively should return to claim their property.* As we have seen, the Order, however sadly reduced, was not altogether extinct. We might add that in 1625 Bishop Comerford, of Waterford and Lismore, was appointed to act as Vicar General of Canons Regular and Augustinian Hermits, and the appointment was renewed in 1630 for another five years. In 1666 Abbot O'Gorman of Molana, near Youghal, was recommended for the Vicar Generalship of Lismore. He had studied at the Irish College, Rome, and became parish priest of Templemichael, Co. Waterford. A Father Fitzgerald became Abbot of the Canonical House of Molana after him, was registered as parish priest in 1704, arrested in July, 1714, and died in prison shortly afterwards.† Moreover, at the time when the above appeal was made to take over the Priory of Muckmore, Malachy O'Queely, Archbishop of Tuam, wrote to the Cardinal Protector of Ireland that the Province of Tuam was enjoying perfect repose, and that all the clergy, Secular and Regular, were labouring faithfully in the edification of their flocks and were knitted in perfect concord among themselves.‡ And it was in that Province that the Canons cherished the highest hopes of re-establishing their Communities, and there that they retained the means to do so.

The peace of which the Archbishop speaks was not to last for long. He himself fell a victim in 1645. Being a member of the Supreme Council of the Confederates, he was implicated in the military struggles, and was cap-

* *Hibernia Dominicana*.

† Details given by W. H. Grattan Flood from contemporary documents.

‡ Oliver Burke, *Catholic Archbishops of Tuam*, p. 123.

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tured by the Scotch army and executed. With him suffered a Canon Regular, Fr. Thaddeus O'Connell, "who was seized at the same time as the Archbishop and carried off to be executed. He besought the Archbishop to give him Absolution, and, as the Prelate raised his right hand to do so, the soldiers cut it off, and, at the same moment, cut down Fr. O'Connell."*

From various sources we know that as soon as the disturbances caused by the "rising of 1641" subsided, many Religious returned to their native country. Besides the probability that exiled Canons would seize the opportunity of going back, we find an interesting sidelight on the matter in the life of Francis Kirwan, Bishop of Killala.† After seven years of Apostolic work as Vicar General of Tuam, Kirwan conducted a company of youths over to France and proposed to dedicate himself to the work of preparing them for the Irish Mission. He spent a few years at Caen and had to abandon his design through lack of means. He made a second attempt at Paris, but again met with failure. Here, however, he found the sympathy and encouragement of St. Vincent de Paul, who had lately established his Priests of the Mission in the Priory of St. Lazare, which had been taken over from the Canons Regular, and of Fr. Charles Faure, a Canon Regular of Ste Geneviève, who had become Superior General of his Order, and was then engaged in forming the new "Congrégation de France" out of as many Communities as he could persuade to join his reform:‡

Fr. Charles Faure expressed a burning anxiety to see the Lord's vineyard retilled by his Religious. He thereon assured Francis that he would most willingly receive any of the Irish youths

* D. Murphy, S.J., *Our Martyrs*, p. 303.

† *Pii Antistitis Icon*, by John Lynel, Archdeacon of Tuam, written about 1669. The author says he obtained much of his information from the Bishop's "Chaplain and inseparable companion for fully fifteen years—Fr. Thomas Kelly, or rather Gill-Kelly, Canon Regular of St. Augustine," whom the writer had known from boyhood. The work was republished in 1884 with translation and notes by Fr. C. P. Meehan.

‡ *L'Abbaye de Ste Geneviève et la Congrégation de France*, par M. l'Abbé Feret.

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who might be desirous of joining the Canons Regular. Francis was not more sedulous than fortunate in inducing some of his scholars from Caen and elsewhere to embrace the above-named Order, and we fain would pause to describe his joy on seeing those whom he had trained joining the Canons Regular, for he loved the Order. While in prison and in exile he selected James Lynch, Abbot of Cong, and a member of the aforesaid Religious Order, as the fittest person to preside in his stead over the diocese of Killala. Nay, he indulged a hope that this Order which brought the Christian faith to Ireland would be instrumental in repairing its decay.

To what extent the number of the Canons was increased through the efforts of Charles Faure and Francis Kirwan we cannot decide. The writer of Kirwan's Life says that he continued to send novices to the Canons Regular, and observes that though the condition of Ireland was such that the Canons were more likely to be despoiled of their property than to have it restored, nevertheless "the Irish receive rich benefits (*uberes fructus*) from their labours."

One person connected with the movement was Dom Gregory Joyce. It is stated in the Life from which we have been quoting that "Francis Kirwan did not confine his exertions to enrolling Irish youths in the Order of the Regular Canons, but also caused the Rev. Gregory Joyce, formerly his pupil, to repair to France, after he had completed his studies in Seville and placed him over his young students." Joyce later returned to Ireland, and, according to the same writer, did admirable work for the Faith, earning the affection and commendation of Archbishop Queely of Tuam. In particular he is praised for his influence among the clergy and his zeal to have the sacred ceremonies well performed, and for his reputation as a confessor. "Finally," we read, "to him we must ascribe the founding of the Confraternity of the Most Holy Sacrament in the Collegiate Church of St. Nicholas of Galway: this splendid work was truly his, and his energy secured for it a large number of both sexes." Joyce had been made Warden of Galway, Protonotary and then Abbot of Anaghdune. We find a

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further reference to him in a document printed in the *Hibernia Dominicana*. The Abbot, his brother Henry, a Canon, parish priest in Galway and Chaplain to the Army of Charles II in Belgium, and another brother, Walter, Captain in the Army, were together instrumental in providing a House for the Dominicans at Louvain. Bishop de Burgo gives also the Chapter Act of the Community which undertakes the obligation of a series of Masses and other conventual prayers and grants to these their benefactors the right to choose their place of burial either in the Church or within the enclosure. Abbot Gregory Joyce had thus gone again into exile, and he passed the last years of his life as Canon of Ste Gudule, the Cathedral of Brussels.

Bishop Kirwan returned to Ireland in 1645, at the time that Religious were taking advantage of the better conditions to resume their missionary work. The instructions given by Innocent X to his Nuncio, Archbishop Rinuccini, state that the Regular Clergy were returning in certain numbers. They were to be encouraged and assisted because :

The Regular Clergy have always been the support of the true faith, and the island in times past felt more than any other country the benefit resulting from their labours. The monastic Orders were the first to plant the banner of the Faith there, and, to say nothing of the ancient monasteries founded by St. Patrick, St. Columban and St. Malachy, not unlike those of the ancient anchorites, in more recent times the Regular Canons, Benedictines, Cistercians, and Premonstratensians have established many new colleges and new monasteries. *

In the March of 1646 the Nuncio sends a report to Rome, and in the course of it says : "The Regulars who were hitherto scattered through the towns and private houses, and were not distinguishable from Seculars, have assembled in considerable numbers and put on the habits of their respective Orders, to the great wonder and edification of the people, unaccustomed to behold a friar's

* *The Embassy in Ireland*, translation of *The Nunziatura*, by G. H.

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habit." At the beginning of the year in which this report was drawn up, Dom James Lynch was appointed Abbot of Cong, by Papal Letters, dated from St. Peter's, January 24, 1646; and about six months later he received powers through the Procurator General of the Lateran Canons to appoint Dom Andrew Nugent, Abbot of St. Thomas's, Dublin, Visitor for the whole of Ireland, with faculties to clothe and profess novices. On February 16 of the same year the Nuncio consults the Bishop of Meath, Thomas Dease, as to the restitution of the Priory of Tristenagh to the Order, as it had been claimed by Dom Andrew Nugent, but had been given by the Nuncio to a Secular Priest. "For," he says, "it is the good pleasure of the Sovereign Pontiff that their monasteries should be restored to these Religious, who in times past have laboured much in this kingdom."*

On May 3, 1646, Archbishop Rinuccini writes to Cardinal Pamphili:

I have only further to inform your Eminence that with your letters I received a Memorial from the Canons Regular of St. Augustine and to assure you that I shall closely observe the instructions with which you have favoured me. I have not given away any of their monasteries save one, St. John of Kilkenney, to the Jesuit Fathers for a college or seminary which had been all but made over to them before my arrival.

We may reasonably infer from this evidence that before the middle of the seventeenth century the Canons were found in sufficient numbers in Ireland to afford solid hope of a restoration of the Order. Under the circumstances the best course to adopt would be to form one united body instead of separate Houses. The example of Dom Charles Faure would be in the mind of Bishop Kirwan, of Abbot Joyce, of the Bishop's Chaplain, a Canon Regular, and of other Canons who had returned from France, of establishing a National Congregation, such as in France had met with unqualified success from both the material and spiritual points of

* *Hibernica Dominicana.*

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view. It can hardly be doubted that the idea came from France, but, in any case, in the course of the year 1646, Pope Innocent X issued a Bull uniting all the Canons Regular of Ireland in the one Congregation of St. Patrick.

That efforts were made to re-establish the regular discipline and Community life is evidenced by a letter issued by the Nuncio in favour of Dom James Lynch. Rinuccini states that he had by Apostolic Authority collated Abbots and Priors, commendatory and titular, to various vacant monasteries on the condition that they should pay a certain pension or charge to the Canons towards the restoration of their Communities as occasion might offer. Dom James Lynch, Abbot of Cong, and Commissary General of the Order in Ireland, had now declared himself ready, with other members of his Order, to assemble in Community and to carry out public service for the administration of the Sacraments to the Faithful in the town of Galway and other places. The Nuncio therefore calls upon those who had received appointments from him to pay the stipulated pensions and charges to Abbot Lynch, and grants the faculty for the erection of a church in Galway and the restoration of other convents of the Order. The Abbot must consider himself under the obligation of rendering an account after six months of all monies received, either to the Nuncio or to the Abbot General of the Order. The letter is dated October 16, 1648.

An important Community of Canons Regular in pre-Reformation days was that which served the Cathedral of Holy Trinity, or Christchurch, Dublin. From the time of St. Lawrence O'Toole down to the Suppression, the Canons had been the officiating clergy of this church. Whilst James II resided in Ireland, from March of 1689 to the July of the following year, the Cathedral became the Chapel Royal, and, according to a document in the archives of the Canons Regular, at San Pietro in Vincoli, Rome, he restored the Canons to their old position. The document is a certificate or attestation, made to the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda, in a cause between

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the Irish Bishops and the Canons. Written in French, it is to the effect that S. Lynch, a Captain in the Grenadiers, certifies that he had heard it said by several witnesses that James Lynch, Abbot of Cong, Vicar General of the Canons Regular of St. Augustine, had been put into possession of Christchurch and that the church was served by Canons of his Order, whilst the King remained in Ireland. He has often been entertained by another Canon Regular, John Fitz-James, Abbot of Ballintober, in the Co. Mayo. The date is 1733.

Doubt may be raised as to the value of Lynch's statement because Archdall, in the *Monasticon Hibernicum*, also Dr. Donnelly, Bishop of Canea, in his history of the Diocese of Dublin, mention that Dr. Stafford, a Secular Priest from Co. Wexford, was made Dean, and Dr. Dempsey, afterwards Bishop of Kildare, was appointed Precentor. Various explanations might be suggested. In the difficulties of the times, the two offices might have been held by Seculars, whilst the Canons formed the main part of the Chapter. It is possible that Dr. Stafford and Dr. Dempsey may themselves have been Canons Regular. Or, again, the two Secular Priests may first have been appointed and a change made subsequently.

It seems that the rights of the Canons were constantly being contested, but authority usually upheld them. Dom James Lynch as Commissary General had made appointments of his Canons to several parishes, and the matter was taken to the Rôyal Court. In 1687 the decision was given in favour of the Canons that the custom, rights and laws of the Kingdom attribute to the ancient monasteries cure of souls with jurisdiction in places where they receive the tithes.* In 1697 Dom John Shaughnessy was appointed Abbot of St. Colman, Mayo, with jurisdiction over the parishes of Mayo, Kiloolman, Robin and Theagheen. The Archbishop of Tuam, Dr. James Lynch, then in exile in France, was apprised of this by a letter, dated from Monte Citorio, October 13, and signed by Carlo Morini, Protonotary

* Archives of San Pietro in Vincoli.

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Apostolic and referendary of the Segnatura. The Archbishop is instructed in the name of the Holy Father to place the Abbot in possession of the parishes, and he in turn conveys these instructions to his Vicar General, adding that he had seen several decrees of Propaganda, requiring the monasteries of the Canons to be restored to them.

Towards the end of the seventeenth century the Irish Canons made their petition to be united with the Lateran Congregation. What can have inspired the wish it is difficult to decide. They may have entertained the hope of more securely maintaining their rights by placing themselves under the protection of the Laterans who were so well known at Rome. Or they may have been influenced by the extreme difficulty of training subjects in Ireland and the hope of enlisting the interest of the Roman authorities in this matter. About this period several Orders had abandoned all attempts at receiving novices,* and in the next century it was positively forbidden by Propaganda except with special leave of the Bishops and an examination made by them before each profession.†

The outlook for the Religious Orders at this time must have been gloomy in the extreme and almost hopeless for a Congregation restricted to Ireland.

The petition for union was presented to Propaganda and thence was submitted to the Abbot General, Dom Athanasius Clappini, who responded with a document from the General Chapter. He refers first to the past glories of the Canonical Order in Ireland and to their recent struggles under persecution. Next, he recalls that Fr. James Lynch had been appointed Abbot of St. Mary's, Cong, by Bull of Innocent X, and had been sent to Ireland by the Abbot of the Lateran Congregation with powers of Commissary General to assemble the scattered members of the Order in that kingdom; that he was confirmed in that position and helped by the Apos-

* Cardinal Moran's *Memoir of Archbishop Plunkett*.

† *Spicilegium Ossoriense*.

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tolie Nuncio, John Baptist Rinuccini, Archbishop of Fermo; that previous Abbots had always shown an interest in them and assisted them as far as they were able. Various decrees of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda, moreover, had recognized that they had always been associated with the Lateran Congregation, as the Mother of all other Congregations—so now the Chapter General officially recognized them and extended to them a participation in all rights, privileges and immunities. Since in course of time and through many calamities many of their customs and their Constitutions had perished, the Constitutions of the Lateran Congregation were now prescribed for them—though adapted, so as to suit their particular needs—in the same way as they had been given to Canons Regular in Poland and Moravia. A manuscript copy of the Constitutions, as adapted for the Irish Canons, is preserved in the archives of San Pietro in Vincoli at Rome.

On the 30th January, 1699, Pope Innocent XII issued a brief from St. Mary Major—*Exponi nuper*—stating what had already been done, confirming the decision of the General Chapter of the Laterans and prescribing the common use of their Constitutions. Thus was effected the complete union of the Irish Canons with the Lateran Congregation, though it is noticeable that even in later documents the title of Congregation of St. Patrick was not suppressed.

When we regard the nature of the legislation passed for Ireland under William and Mary, and Anne, it is surprising that we can hear anything more of Regulars at all.* And considering how little assistance accrued to the Canons from their union with the Laterans, it is truly remarkable that we can find even slight evidence that they lingered on for more than another century.

On March 2, 1699, Cardinal Carpineus wrote from Rome to the Abbot of Arrouaise, Dom Augustine Hatté, sending a request from the Pope that he exercise all charity in receiving Canons Regular from Ireland, who

* See the various Acts collected by Fr. Murphy, S.J., in *Our Martyrs*.

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are forced into exile. It is curious to note that the Cardinal addresses him as "Abbot of the *Lateran* Congregation of Arrouaise." Amongst the exiles was a Fr. William Henegan, Canon Regular of Cong, who was admitted into the Community of Arrouaise, and in the beginning of the year 1700 the Canon addressed a formal petition to the Abbot to be allowed to take possession of the vacant monastery of Beaulieu, a dependency of Arrouaise, in the diocese of Boulogne, so that he might reassemble his brethren scattered about in different parts. The Abbot's answer bears the date of March 1, 1700. Whilst safeguarding his own rights and those of the Abbot of the House in question, he gives leave for the Irish Canons to form a Community there, and names Fr. Henegan Prior. Unfortunately the project proved abortive. At the time Abbot Hatté was exerting all his influence to restore several of the vacant monasteries of the Congregation. With some he succeeded. In other cases, and Beaulieu was one of them, he failed through the opposition of commendatory Abbots who pleaded their cause in the civil courts. It is not improbable that the exiled Archbishop of Tuam may have initiated the idea of an Irish Community at Beaulieu. Fr. Henegan would have been known to him, as a Canon of Cong—the Archbishop's residence having been at Clonbur, close to Cong—and the Archbishop was certainly at the Abbey of Arrouaise somewhat later.* Thirty years afterwards Dom William Henegan had returned to Ireland, and bore the title of Abbot of Holy Trinity, Dublin.

Before many years the Canons experienced serious difficulties with the Bishops. Henry O'Kelly had been named Abbot of St. Thomas's, Dublin. The Abbey had in bygone days been one of the most important of the Order, having been founded by Henry II in 1177 for Victorine Canons. Being of royal foundation, it was under the immediate protection of the Crown of England. Its Abbots were appointed subject to the approval of the King; they became members of his Council in Ireland,

* *Histoire de l'Abbaye d'Arrouaise*, by Gosse.

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peers of his Parliament there and administered justice in the Court of the Abbey.* The Community, in the course of its history, had given two of its Abbots as Chancellors of Ireland: Thomas Sherlock in the fourteenth and Thomas Geraldine in the fifteenth century. Within the jurisdiction of the Abbey were included the two parishes of St. James and St. Catherine. It appears that Dom Henry O'Kelly had obtained from Benedict XIII his appointment to the Abbey with all its former rights and privileges. The claim elicited a strong protest from the Archbishop, eight Bishops and seven Superiors of Religious Orders. Their appeal to Rome set forth that Henry O'Kelly had received letters from Benedict XIII, dated from Albano, June, 1729, in four of which he not only styled himself Abbot of St. Thomas's, Dublin, but claimed jurisdiction over a large part of the city, independent of the Archbishop, who had never been informed of this appointment. Should the present holders of monastic property find such Canons and Monks laying claim to the ancient rights and privileges, they would probably raise new difficulties for all the Catholic body. Moreover, the Canons and Monks had not laboured for the flock of Christ to the extent that the Mendicant Friars had done, so that these should be the first to be rewarded by the restitution of benefices. The petitioners therefore request that Henry O'Kelly be ordered to withdraw his claims and that no innovation be introduced.†

The Procurator of the Canons at the time was Fr. Thomas O'Kelly, Abbot of Mayo and Titular Prior of St. Patrick's Purgatory, and on him it devolved to draw up the response for his Order. The document forwarded to Propaganda and to the Cardinal Protector of the Order argued that Pope Innocent X had transferred all the rights and privileges of the former Canons to the Congregation of St. Patrick. This had now been united with all those rights and privileges to the Lateran Congregation, so that they still held good for the heirs of

* Register of the Abbey of St. Thomas, Dublin.

† *Spicilegium Ossoriense*.

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those who first obtained them. In proof of which Dom James Lynch, having been appointed by Innocent X to the Abbey of Cong, had exercised all the ancient rights attaching to that position, as also had his successors. In the same way Abbot Burke of St. Thomas's, Dublin, had held the very office that Henry O'Kelly now claimed, being at the same time Provincial Superior of the Irish Canons. Again, as Commissary General, Abbot James Lynch had made appointments of his Canons to various parishes under James II, and when difficulties were raised, Catholic judges of the Royal Courts had decided that the old monasteries which received tithes were entitled to the cure of souls. The Canons therefore should not be deprived of benefices which had belonged to the Order over so long a period. The document bears the signatures of D. Thomas O'Kelly, Abbot of Mayo and Prior of St. Patrick's Purgatory; the Abbot of St. Thomas's, Dublin, Henry O'Kelly; Andrew Quin, Abbot of Anaghdone; William Henegan, Abbot of Holy Trinity; and Dom William King.

In support of the claim of the Canons various other documents were presented to the Sacred Congregation:

(1) One declares that "the Canons had suffered great injustice from the Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lords of the Province of Tuam and elsewhere" by interference in their rights of holding parishes. The exercise of such rights would in no way prove detrimental to the Catholic Cause in Ireland. Signed by three Augustinian Hermits (two of whom are Priors), one Franciscan, one Secular Priest and sixteen gentlemen. July 4, 1735.

(2) Fr. John O'Malley, O.S.F., *Lector jubilatus*, of The College of St. Isidore, Rome, attests that he forwarded the letter of Benedict XIII appointing Dom Mark Kenny Abbot of Cong, and that, in virtue of that letter, he had received the Abbatial blessing and entered into possession of the parishes annexed to his office. Dated May 23, 1735. (3) Several gentlemen of Mayo testify that the Abbot of St. Colman, Mayo, had always exercised

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jurisdiction over several parishes, and that, to their knowledge, Dom Andrew Porte had been in possession of the Abbey of Mayo with all privileges attached thereto. Dated May 9, 1732. (4) Fr. Patrick Browne, O.S.F., Guardian of the Irish Convent of St. Anthony, Louvain, stated that he was present when Abbot Lynch of Cong collated a priest named MacCullen to St. Patrick's Purgatory.

The result of the appeal to Rome was favourable to the Canons, as appears from a letter of the Abbot General, Dom Angelo Bargotti, to Abbot Thomas Kelly.* In view of the union it is interesting to note the style of address adopted by the Abbot General: "To the Most Reverend Father in Christ, Dom Thomas Kelly, Canon Regular of the Congregation of St. Patrick in Ireland and most worthy Lateran Abbot of Mayo." He expresses his great joy at the reception of the letter, which announces a favourable ending to the great cause which had been treated at Rome for several years. It was due to the Abbot's exertions that this happy result had been secured. A similar appeal was subsequently made to Rome from the Province of Tuam. After seven years' litigation, according to Moroni,† the Archbishop obtained the right of nomination to five benefices previously held by the Canons. But even this decision did not end the matter, since, as late as 1862, the Archbishop of Tuam petitioned Propaganda that he might be placed in possession of certain vacant churches of the Canons Regular. The Sacred Congregation referred the question to the then Abbot General, Dom John Strozzi, who gave the same reply as his predecessor had given two hundred years before. He could take no action which would deprive the Order of any of its rights and possessions.

Bishop de Burgo tells us that Abbot Henry O'Kelly died in 1752. Mark Kenny died in 1763, and the last name of a Canon Regular to be traced is that of Patrick

* Archives of San Pietro in Vincoli.

† *Dizionario*—s.v. *Irlanda*.

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Prendergast, last Abbot of Cong, whose death occurred in 1829.*

In the year 1800 an official enquiry was made as to the organization of the Church in Ireland with a view to making provision for the clergy. The replies of the Bishops show that the clergy numbered 1,826 in all, of whom 400 were Religious. The number of Canons Regular is given as seven. The list, however, accounts for only 187 Religious, leaving 213 Regulars not included in the figures given for the different Orders.†

Though the above notes may constitute but a slight thread of the history of the Canons of Ireland, they serve to direct attention to some points which are of interest to students of the Canonical Order: (1) The Lateran Congregation has been clearly regarded as the representative of the whole canonical system of Augustinian Canons. Possibly it may yet be shown that the difficult matter of the origin of Canons Regular as an Order may be solved by a closer study of the origin of the Laterans. (2) It is to be observed that scarcely any modification was required to unite Canons Victorine Arroasian and those that were independent (Austin or Black Canons) with those of the Lateran. All these have sometimes been regarded as distinct "Orders." (3) Even after the union the Irish Canons never lost the name of "Canons of St. Patrick"—an indication, it would seem, of the traditional opposition to extreme centralization amongst Canons. (4) In consequence of the union of the Irish Canons with the Laterans, the Canons now re-established in England since 1881 find themselves in direct succession with those of Ireland. No such continuity can be established between the present Canons and the Austin or Black Canons of pre-Reformation England.

ALOYSIUS SMITH, C.R.L.

* These and a few other details of the article were supplied from contemporary papers by W. H. Grattan Flood, Mus.D.

† *Correspondence of Lord Castlereagh*, vol. iv, quoted by O. Burke, *Catholic Archbishops of Tuam*.

SOME RECENT BOOKS

MESSRS. BURNS OATES AND WASHBOURNE are to be congratulated on their enterprise in bringing out so handsome a volume as that lying before us—*Adrian Fortescue*, a memoir of the late parish priest of Letchworth, by his friends Dr. Vance of St. Edmund's College and the Hon. John Fortescue, the King's librarian. Dr. Vance was an old friend; Mr. Fortescue knew his namesake only during the last five years of his life, though acquaintance soon developed into intimacy, helped, Mr. Fortescue thinks, by their kinship through a common ancestor who lived five centuries and more ago. This little volume—it contains but some sixty pages—is printed in the best style of the Cambridge University Press; the binding, too, is excellent, and the illustrations, eight in number, leave nothing to be desired. They have been well selected: two portraits of Dr. Fortescue, one of them a collotype reproduction of a coloured drawing; specimens of his wonderful script in Latin and Greek; the high altar in his church at Letchworth; and a couple of bookplates of his design. Not much more could be asked for in a half-guinea book; and, as the season for presents is close upon us, there is good reason for hoping that the publishers may find a speedy sale of a book which would do credit to any house and any country.

The subject of this memoir was a remarkable man. Dr. Vance deals with various aspects of his character, taking his subject in turn as a man, a writer, a speaker, a scholar, a *raconteur*, a priest, a friend. He is a psychologist, and lays bare his friend's soul as a surgeon's scalpel might have laid bare the nerves of his body. Some of his deductions one may be disposed to question; but one thing he makes quite clear: Adrian Fortescue was above all things a priest. "He little knew," Dr. Vance writes, "why he could not shock his friends. They had seen him say mass, and had

Adrian Fortescue

gathered at once from his whole recollected demeanour with what reverence and awe he really stood in the presence of God." And again: "He had the heart and mind of a priest. It was the priest who just before he left Letchworth, as he knew well to meet his death, turned and bade good-bye to his little church, and silently kissed the altar-stone on which he had so frequently offered mass."

Mr. Fortescue saw another side of his friend's character—that of the artist—and thinks that his artistic sense would have found its fullest expression had he been an architect. "He was, as we know, an historical writer, a lecturer, a calligrapher, a musician, no mean painter in water-colour, and skilled alike in heraldic design and in the form and drapery of vestments. In fact he had studied not superficially a good many of the arts. Yet, greatly owing to the nature of his profession, he chose the spoken and written word as the outlet for the power that was in him. But for this, my own feeling is that it would have found fuller and more congenial expression in the work of an architect. Even as things were, he possessed far greater knowledge of the grandest of the arts than most amateurs."

To people in general, however, the side of Dr. Adrian Fortescue which will be best known is that of the scholar, though perhaps it is the side least appreciated in this country. Perhaps his best setting would have been a professorship in his University of Innsbruck. He went there as an undergraduate in October, 1894, after having spent three years at the Scots College in Rome and taken the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. His studies for the degree of Doctor of Divinity lasted for eleven years: five years in residence, and six more during which he was employed in mission work, with examinations in theology, dogmatic and moral, Scripture, Church history, Canon Law, and Semitic languages; and, after all, the writing of a treatise on the authorship of the Fourth Gospel. Reading between the lines of Dr. Vance's memoir, one gathers that Dr. Fortescue had no very exalted opinion of the Roman D.D.

To the ordinary person the official course of studies

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would have been enough, but not so for Dr. Fortescue. He had a plan of study for his free time at Innsbruck comprising classical and modern Greek, Italian, Hungarian, and Sanskrit; whilst the free time of the period he passed in charge of the German church in Whitechapel, after his return to England, was devoted to Icelandic and Old English; and at a later date he added Syriac to his collection. Dr. Vance tells us that he spoke Italian, French, and German at least as well as he spoke English.

The work of his predilection was the history of the Eastern Churches, Orthodox and Uniate, as witness his works: *The Orthodox Eastern Church*, *The Lesser Eastern Churches*, and *The Uniate Churches*, the last unfortunately still incomplete at the time of his death. But these studies by no means exhausted his capacity for work. In his parish of Letchworth he instituted weekly classes in Dante, together with classes in French, Italian, and German, to say nothing of lectures on such diverse subjects as the Religion of Islam, Monasticism, John the Presbyter, the Philosophy of St. Thomas, Science and Faith, Christianity and War, Socrates, the Life of Dante. And, as if all this were not enough, he read Hebrew with some neighbouring clergymen.

Nor were his good works confined to his own parish and town. He lectured on similar subjects at Hitchin, at the Imperial Institute, at Caxton Hall, at Cambridge, and more than once to the members of the St. Thomas's Historical Society (now the Lingard Society). That society had the melancholy privilege of hearing his swan-song, a paper of fascinating interest on the *De Consolatione* of Boethius. He need never have done anything else to prove his mettle as a scholar. He had not then received his sentence of death and heard "the splash of the ferryman's oars": that was to come ten days later. But even then he seemed to foresee that his edition of Boethius, on which he had worked for years, would never be completed, and expressed a doubt to the present writer as to whether it would not be best to bring out the text forthwith. That is now being done by Dr. Vance.

Adrian Fortescue

He was, indeed, an indefatigable worker, and his zeal for study probably hastened his death. Mr. Fortescue writes that at forty-five years of age "the majority of men make the very unpleasant discovery that they are no longer nineteen. Adrian, needless to say, resolutely refused to admit anything of the kind, would acknowledge no decline of physical strength at forty-five or any other age, and went on as usual. He would lecture early in the morning at St. Edmund's College, perhaps more than once, rush from thence to the British Museum and toil there intensely for hours, all without a scrap of food. . . . It could only be a question of time before he broke down. . . ."

E. B.

IN *Some Aspects of Modern Poetry* (Hodder and Stoughton) Mr. Alfred Noyes has given us a volume of literary criticism, well considered, finely informed, and essentially wise. Here and there, perhaps, an uncompromisingly positive manner may provoke a challenge to matter that is nevertheless true. His care for what is good in literature, and therefore in life, is so great that he is disgruntled by the great body of contemporary critics. He almost forgets his own far more important Yea in the Nay he is constantly throwing in their teeth. Let all idle critics go their way, we should like to say to Mr. Noyes. His ways and theirs are so divergent that he and they need never really come into collision.

Poets have not always been good critics, even of their contemporaries. Shelley may only have done the conventionally humble when he called Byron a greater poet than himself—he must have known better. But he really thought the Odes of Keats negligible! Byron himself put Crabbe and Rogers above Keats and Shelley. Dr. Johnson could see no beauty in "Lycidas"; and Scott felt more pleasure in reading "The Vanity of Human Wishes" than in reading anything of Shakespeare's. Similar vagaries, passing down to later generations, hardly prepare us for Mr. Noyes's level head, for a judgement which offers no aberrations, for a strict sense of proportion and of the rela-

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tion which art and life—and mind, heart, and soul—bear to one another. He has that consciousness of two worlds which is necessary to the proper appreciation of either the one or the other; and he has not, by committed lawlessnesses, denied himself the appreciation of the thought and speech that owes duty to discipline and is subject to that traditional reserve and rule in which all liberty and fidelity is enshrined. Every lover can say to his art no less than to his lady:

I cannot be
Faithless to God and faithful unto thee.

In this spirit Mr. Noyes opens his volume by a reprint of the paper on Alice Meynell contributed two years ago to *The Bookman*; and he closes it with a consideration of "Some Characteristics of Modern Literature":

I believe that the time has come, in art and literature, as in every department of life, when we must try to discover the direction in which we are moving and—still more important—the direction in which we ought to be moving. The intellectual world of to-day has lost its religion, and it has lost that central position from which it could once see life steadily, and see it whole, under the eternal aspect. Rules and conventions, being no longer related to any central certainty, have degenerated into mere social codes which are subject to every whim of fashion. I know of nothing sadder than the sight of the young trying to conceal the intellectual wounds that the elderly cynics have inflicted upon them; for the quiet sadness of many of the more thoughtful of the younger generation arises from that bitterest and most desolate feeling of the human heart—"They have taken away my Master, and I know not where they have laid Him."

And again, in the chapter on "Acceptances":

Our work in this twentieth century will be to find that dominating critical position, to see that we are ruled from the centre, not from the circumference. Mere individualism means the disintegration of modern civilization. We must find some principle of unity, and to find it we must make certain fundamental acceptances of a judgment that is more than private judgment.

When, added to a rare rightness of vision, are a ripe knowledge and a ready phrase, the resulting commentary must

Aspects of Modern Poetry

needs be of the satisfying kind, which the hall-mark of Mr. Noyes's name now assures. We follow his placings of Stevenson and Henley and Austin Dobson with a grateful pleasure; and accept such passing allusions as those in which he notes that "there has been more than a little serious work in poetry by Mrs. Eden," or says of Francis Thompson's Shelley essay: "That beautiful piece of prose, written from the point of view of a great historical religion, throws more light, perhaps, on its author than upon Shelley." We have heard the young Etonian's creed—"to fear God, honour the King, and hate Harrow"; but Mr. Noyes, Oxford himself, grudges no praise to Cambridge for her high associations with Spenser, Milton, "rare Ben," Edmund Waller, Crashaw, Cowley, Herrick, Dryden, Byron, Wordsworth, Tennyson, and the rest. Perhaps he consoles himself by thinking that "they learnt in suffering what they taught in song"; and he does actually remind Cambridge that Milton was the last undergraduate to receive corporal punishment at her maternal hands. Moreover, Tennyson wrote an angry sonnet about Cambridge; and, of course, Byron was ribald about the dons, "in manners rude, in foolish forms precise." Mr. Noyes has a happy appreciation of such witty modern versifiers of Cambridge as Calverley and J. K. Stephen; and he flings his gibe at Milton's ponderous elegies on old Hobson, "with the Apocalyptic jest, 'His wain was his increase.'" Had Milton in mind, we wonder, George Peile's earlier loveliness: "Youth waneth by increasing"?

The essays on "Shakespeare and the Sea" and on "The Spirit of Touchstone" are memorable. They show once more that something always remains to be said by the right sayer on great subjects: they are inexhaustible. Mr. Noyes has very right words to say of Emerson, whose "Threnody" he labels "perhaps the most beautiful and profound poem in American literature." Essays like "The Poet of Light" and "Poetry Old and New" are packed with facts, fancies, and allusions such as only a well-stored mind could yield to famished readers. The much that Mr. Noyes has to say about the poverty of current

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criticism may be justified in fact. No doubt it is. But we have an advantage over Mr. Noyes, for, unlike him, we cannot ignore his own part in the expression and formation of existing opinion about books and authors. One critic of high accomplishment—and one does not exhaust the number now—raises the general average of the criticism of his time; and, putting down Mr. Noyes's volume, we are not disposed to do other than congratulate ourselves on contemporary achievement in this important department of the school of Letters. W. M.

THE thirteenth volume of Fr. Kerr's translation of Pastor's *Lives of the Popes* (Kegan Paul) offers peculiar attraction to the English reader, for it covers the striking career of Cardinal Pole, who, during the long Conclave, December to February, 1549-1550, came within one vote of election to the Papacy. During the reign of Julius III, the name taken by the successful Cardinal Del Monte, Pole carried out his historic mission to England, finding death and burial eventually as England's last Catholic Archbishop of Canterbury. It was for this work that no doubt he was providentially reserved during the Conclave, though he carried his solid *bloc* of votes through sixty fruitless ballots. As a zealous reformer he was feared by the worldly Cardinals, and as the candidate of the Imperialist party he was opposed by the French Cardinals. The scene was exciting enough. Twenty-eight votes were necessary for election. "Pole received twenty-three votes. Then Carpi arose, opened his voting paper and declared that he joined the supporters of Pole. Farnese then stood up and made the same declaration. A dead silence followed. Pole only required one more vote. If he could now obtain twenty-six votes he was sure of getting twenty-seven after the agreement during the night, and then he could give the twenty-eighth, the last vote necessary, himself. Full of expectation Pole's supporters watched his opponents and endeavoured by signs to win them over to his support. No one, however, made a movement." It was doubtful if any other Cardinal ever came so near the tiara.

Lives of the Popes

"What Pole himself felt, when he found himself so near the highest dignity on earth, he confided later to a friend. The voting, he said, did not make the least impression on him. He had already given the answer to several Cardinals who urged him to take steps himself for the furtherance of his election that he would say no word, even if his silence should cost him his life, for he adhered strictly to his principle of leaving everything to God." The Cardinals remained in conclavical deadlock week after week; "from the fact that one party awaited the Holy Ghost from Flanders and the other from France. People in Rome betted forty to one that there would be no Pope in January, and ten to one that there would also be none in the following month." Such was the frustrating power of secular princes. In the end a Cardinal pleasing to neither party nor prince was chosen.

The character of Julius is interestingly drawn. He was a cultured peasant, a good canonist, a heavy eater but no gourmet, weak, unrefined and liable to temper; but he showed piety and conscientiousness though he mortified the reforming Cardinals by making his brother's adopted son and the keeper of his ape a Cardinal. "Pole reminded the Pope of the canonical decrees and gravity of the times, while Carafa made still more urgent remonstrances." It was simply an act of personal caprice terribly mortifying to the aristocratic and refined English Cardinal; but there is no proof that the new Cardinal was son of the Pope, though the Pope's action drew the accusation. The amusements of the Pope were innocent but very undignified. The contrasts presented by the Church was amazing. While the Pope enjoyed carnival and comedies, the Sacred College contained Robert de Nobili and offered place to Francis Borgia. The Pope had some idea of beautifying Rome, and his friendship for the aged Michael Angelo was a touching episode. The reconciliation of England was a triumph which, like all others in his reign, was due to the servants rather than the person of the Pope. The fourteenth volume contains the short twenty-two day reign of Marcellus the Second, who lives in memory by the

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exquisite Mass Palestrina dedicated to his memory. He was succeeded by the iron Carafa, the terrible and pitiless Paul the Fourth, who symbolized the scourge with which our Lord once cleansed the Temple. Together with an asceticism that would not permit him the use of a valet went a severe self-assurance, so much so that "he considered an offence against his own dignity as an insult to God." Pastor gives a fascinating account of this human Vesuvius, who showed the priestly ideal in his life yet could never moderate his passionate temper. His dispute with St. Ignatius must have been a collision of giants, but he came to appreciate Jesuits in reforming the Church. He hurled himself unhappily against the political dominance of Spain, and it is curious to recall that Philip the Second was his bitterest enemy and that the Duke of Alba once marched at the head of a conquering army on Rome. The Pope recognized his mistake, and after making terms with the powers of this world devoted himself to unmitigated reform, whether among the Cardinals or the bandits. A village of the latter he simply razed from existence. He smote nepotism; for, once he had learnt the truth about his three powerful nephews, he broke and disgraced them with hearty fury. He made the Inquisition his handmaid, and on the suspicion of heresy unjustly imprisoned Cardinal Morone and even disgraced the long-suffering Cardinal Pole. Ambassadors and Cardinals received fierce doctrinal allocution from a Pope who appeared to know the Scriptures by heart. Rome enjoyed a continual Lent, so that the heretic could no longer rail. When he died the city burst into excess and rapine, the buildings of the Inquisition were burnt and the statue of Paul was destroyed. But simony and nepotism lay dead in the grave of the terrible Carafa Pope.

Both these volumes are worth the closest reading. They represent the most conscientious and brilliant historical writing in the Church to-day. They give a vivid idea of the amazing and portentous times during which England returned to, and then again receded from, the Church.

S. L.

History of Pope Alexander VI

WE can only chronicle the arrival of one of the most remarkable historical collections of modern times in Mgr. Peter de Roo's *Material for a History of Pope Alexander the Sixth*, in five volumes (Desclée De Brouwer, Bruges). Criticism or detailed examination of this astounding work is impossible in any preliminary notice. Suffice to say that it is printed in Belgium in English with comparatively few mistakes in style and spelling, considering that it covers 2,400 pages. Volume One treats the "Family De Borgia"; Volume Two is entitled "Roderic De Borgia from the Cradle to the Throne"; Volume Three describes "Pope Alexander VI as a Supreme Pontiff"; Volume Four, "Pope Alexander as a Temporal Prince"; and the final Volume Five, "Alexander VI and the Turks: His Death and Character." The compiler set out to discover, if possible, a few good actions in a life universally condemned as depraved. On the contrary, "we became aware of the means used to denigrate, of the original stupid slanders, of the suppression of historical facts, and of the forgery of pretended documents in his disfavour." There is no attempt towards a digested or critical narrative, which remains for some brilliant writer (we wish Mr. Chesterton would try his hand) to hew as a sculptor hews a statue out of the marble mass which Mgr. de Roo has quarried so faithfully and monumentally. He himself is satisfied with the result, for "the final conclusion of our researches and studies was that Roderic de Borgia has been a man of good moral character and an excellent Pope." That he was a very great and providential Pope historians are beginning to realize. He was a great religious reformer, and no so-called Reformation broke out in Christendom in his Pontificate. The events of his Pontificate were remarkable enough, calling for the highest moral and political qualities, and who shall say that Alexander failed? The discovery of America, the excommunication of Savonarola, the divorces of the Kings of Hungary and France, the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII, and the menace of the Turks form chapters in that most industrious and far-sighted administration of Christendom. It may well be asked how his

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supposed dissipations left him the time or the health to complete so long and powerful and successful a Pontificate. Besides being the general governor of the Catholic world, he played his part as a political and temporal prince, checking Roman Barons and local tyrants, and incidentally drawing untiring hatred from those whom he checked. Whether he was faced by rebellious Cardinals or the Venetian Seignory or an excommunicate friar, Alexander was adamant, once his mercy had been exhausted. His mighty word prevented the conflict of Spain and Portugal by his division of the Indies, whose spiritual future he envisaged. "Thus was the majestic tree, whose branches extend to-day over one-half of the Catholic world, planted by Pope Alexander VI." When the question of his moral character arises, Mgr. de Roo steps into the lists and, refuting Gregorovius, challenges Pastor and other Catholic historians, who have rather weakly given Alexander away. Few rulers can have been more hated in Italy than Alexander (even by his pontifical successor), and no attempt was made to stem the whirlpool of slander which was directed against him by lampoonists, diarists, and gossiping historians. It is insufficient to find turpitudes recorded against the Pontiff in works of about the same value as most Diaries and Memoirs published to-day. Mgr. de Roo publishes a mass of documents and information pertaining to the greatness of the Pope. In first-class documents there is nothing against his character—only in secondary manuscripts. Historians greedily copied and exaggerated one another until the mass of accusation, including incest and poisoning and adultery, made even the attested achievements of a great reign seem improbable or impossible. Italian Catholic writers made no effort to defend or investigate a Spanish Pope, though "to Leonetti belongs the honour of having had the courage to contest an infamous proscription of four centuries and of being the first to intimate the probability of the fact that the children imputed without any serious proof to Roderic de Borgia were the legitimate progeny of one of the Cardinal's nearest relatives."

History of Pope Alexander VI

The question now becomes, not whether Alexander is fearfully assailed in documents, but what value the documents have, and whether a very secondary and prejudiced source can sometimes attest a fact lost to the historical writers. Mgr. de Roo sums up in an appendix "the credibility of contemporary authors," and has certainly the satisfaction of showing that a great deal that has been taken on trust even by Catholic writers remains non-proven. It was not impossible for a Renaissance Pope to enjoy plays and dances as a spectacle and even to indulge in immorality, but it needs good proof. Catholics, who point to an immoral Pope as one of the most wonderful tests of the divinity and surviving power of the Church, must rehearse their proofs in the case of Alexander VI. That is what it comes to.

We will give an example of Mgr. de Roo's method when dealing with Giustinian, the Venetian ambassador, reporting the Pope's visit to Camerino. Giustinian, "knowing that it was part of the programme of some cities, in receiving the visits of Sovereign Pontiffs, to honour them with modest ladies' dances in front of their hotels, as was done lately in Piombino, accordingly wrote: We may imagine the good time they have over there; the Camertines invite His Holiness to stay where he is and to enjoy himself, as it is publicly said; for every day he has little girls to dance before him and other festivities wherein young ladies invariably take part. Thus did Giustinian see at a distance of a hundred miles and watch, not to relate but to make, the Pontiff's history for a few days. This piece of defamation was found to be too tame by a late publicist. Henry de l'Epinois refers to the passage just quoted; but he commences by doing away with Giustinian's *se judica* (it is thought), and positively asserts as a fact that the Pontiff's recreation consisted in making young men dance before him and in giving feasts in which young ladies always appeared. Nor does he restrict these performances of girls and damsels to the few days that he tarried in Camerino, but liberally extended to every day of his Pontificate. He thus exaggerates the accusation so excessively

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that it becomes simply ridiculous. Charles Yriarte is more mischievous yet in his translation, when he says Giustinian has shown us Alexander assisting at balls which he organized nearly every night. Every day he has young maids to dance before him, and gives feasts of another kind wherein courtesans take part. Such is the dishonesty and, as a consequence, the unreliability of the traducers of the moral life of Pope Alexander VI."

This is a sample of Mgr. de Roo's erudite but voluminous monument, which only needs a master hand to reduce it to a readable and convincing Life for English readers. S. L.

AN anthology in the form of *Selections from the Latin Fathers* has long been among desirable school or library books. This has now been supplied from Notre Dame University in Indiana by Father Peter Herbert (Ginn and Co.), with a preface by George Shuster, who states, with double grace from an American, that "those of us who feel that Latin speech and thought are vital things, not fragments of a dead world, believe there is much of peculiar interest for the present generation in the Christian Latin authors. They were both the inheritors of Roman culture and the spokesmen of the Cross." Father Herbert has collected salient notes from a wonderful octave of the great writers who took the dying splendour of classical Latin and built up that living link which makes European history one. The passages are well chosen, well edited and well printed. Tertullian's letter to the Martyrs, Minucius Felix' stylistic dialogue "Octavius," which has the element of the first Christian novel, and Lactantius' apologetics, *verbis potius quam verberibus*, are familiar. The problem of evil meets no better formula to-day than that of Lactantius: *Deus ergo non exclusit malum ut ratio virtutis constare posset*. Evil apparently could not touch or devolve upon God, but it could stimulate and develop the goodness of God's servants and likewise with His adversaries; "*Deo autem quia repugnari non potest ipse adversarios nomini suo excitat, non qui contra ipsum*

Selections from Latin Fathers

Deum pugnent sed contra milites ejus." Mr. James Joyce's famous passage on the varieties of water seems to us excelled by St. Ambrose's *Wonders of Waters* here quoted, while his account of the Atlantic whales deserves a place on the title-page of *Moby Dick*. And, had Herman Melville known the Fathers, he would certainly have added it to his quotations concerning whales. More familiar is Bernard's allocution to the Star of the Sea and description of the four kinds of men who possess themselves of the Kingdom of Heaven, those using violence, bargaining, or theft, or those who are themselves compelled. The curious injunction to make friends with the Mammon of iniquity applies to such bargainers according to Ambrose. Few laymen, even literary ones, read the Fathers, but this school text enables them to say that they have read a line of Lactantius, and perhaps perused Leo the Great or Jerome, in the Tube. Here and there a phrase will stick like Ambrose's epigrammatic description of the rising of Lazarus: *inseparabili gressu separabilique progressu*; or Tertullian's account of Satan thwarted: *tamquam coluber excantatus aut effumigatus*. Or take Jerome's roll-call of Paganism on the Last Day: *exhibebitur cum prole sua Venus. Tunc ignitus Jupiter adducetur et cum suis stultus Plato discipulis. Aristotelis argumenta non proderunt*. And reading of the Fathers leads to the Vulgate: *Si tanti vitreum quanti margaritum?* S. L.

THOSE whose privilege it was to follow the retreats or to hear the spiritual conferences of the late Dom Columba Marmion, O.S.B., Abbot of Maredsous, together with the readers of his earlier book, *Christ the Life of the Soul*, will know what deep and solid, but yet simple, teaching is to be expected in *Christ in His Mysteries* (Sands and Co.). The book has already run through ten editions in its original French garb, and it is assured of a hearty welcome in English. The conferences contained in this volume are a logical development of the principles laid down in the earlier one. Christ is the Model of perfection and the Author of our sanctification. We may go further,

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for, in the striking words of St. Paul, He is Himself our sanctification. "Christ is made unto us, by God, wisdom and justice and sanctification and redemption." This pregnant sentence may be regarded as a summary of the earlier conferences, and it is this simplification of the plan of the spiritual life which appeals to so many readers at the present day. Now the author gives us a series of studies on the life of our Lord, showing in detail how He is the Exemplar of Christian perfection. More concrete than the earlier conferences, these may be, to some souls, still more helpful. They form an ideal meditation book on the life of Christ. Amongst the most useful sections is that headed "In the footsteps of Jesus from the Pretorium to Calvary," which has already been published separately as a set of devotions for *The Way of the Cross*. The author throughout builds upon the solid base of Dogma, and the reader has the sense of standing securely upon the everlasting rock of Faith.

The author's use of Holy Scripture is a remarkable feature of the book. The quotations are so apt and happy that not only is the writer's argument helped forward, but also a new light is shed upon the meaning of the Sacred Text. Indeed, the whole series of conferences could be described as a codification of the doctrine of the New Testament about our Lord's Person and our relation to Him.

Some knowledge of Latin is presupposed in the reader. True it is, that nearly always with the Latin quotations a reference is given to Holy Scripture or to the Roman Missal; but, even though the reader might go to the trouble of looking up these references, had he not Latin he would miss the useful and interesting extracts, often in the foot-notes, from the Fathers or the Councils of the Church.

We are to infer that these conferences, as is expressly stated of the earlier ones, were not composed with a view to publication. Rarely were they written out before delivery. Notes were taken by the hearers which afterwards were arranged and published under the author's supervision. The conferences carry with them the traces

Christ in His Mysteries

of their origin. In essence they are the spoken rather than the written word. Often we meet with the series of questions, the exclamations, the direct forms of address, the repetitions by means of which the sacred orator seeks to emphasize his lesson. The usefulness of the book is increased by a full table of contents and an analytical index. Here and there in the translation one is uncomfortably reminded of the French original: "for us all is resumed in the knowledge, etc.," "the ineffable exigences," "it is the very subject of this conference." Such phrases, however, are few and far between, and on the whole the translator has done her work exceedingly well. Is it necessary, however, to coin such words as "simultudinous" and "profitfully"?

P. E. H.

THE Canterbury and York Society is to be congratulated on the issue of the last instalment of the *Registrum Johannis de Pontissara* (Oxford University Press), one of the most important, if indeed it be not the most important, of the registers issued by that society. It comprises close upon nine hundred pages of text, together with well over a hundred pages of introduction by the late Canon Deedes, its transcriber and editor. Every episcopal register is of considerable value for ecclesiastical history, but some of them are more than this in being also indispensable to the ordinary historian and to the topographer. Among these this Winchester register stands out pre-eminent.

Master John of Pontoise, who was made Bishop of Winchester in 1282, took his name from Pontoise, a town some seventeen miles north-west of Paris, but there appears to be no reason to doubt that he was an Englishman born. That he was a distinguished civilian may be inferred from the fact that for a time he was professor of civil law at Modena: at the time of his appointment to Winchester he was Archdeacon of Exeter, and two years before had been elected Chancellor of the University of Oxford. He was a man well known at the papal court

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to which he had been sent on the business of his diocesan. That he was a man who did not allow grass to grow under his feet will certainly be allowed by anyone who reads of his doings on his arrival in England after his consecration. He reached Dover on July 30, 1282, spent two nights with the Archbishop of Canterbury, and on August 1 made his profession of obedience in the metropolitan church: and here it may be remarked that later on he was relieved from this oath, he and his diocese being made immediately subject to the Holy See, with no superior in this country, save a legate *a latere*. He spent the next night with the Bishop of Rochester, and on the following day was received by the Austin Canons of Southwark Priory. Next day, August 3, he set out to find the King by way of St. Albans, Stony Stratford, Coventry, Lichfield, Newcastle-under-Lyme, and Chester, reaching Rhuddlan on August 9. Two days later he took the oath of allegiance and received the temporalities of his see. That same day he returned to Chester and delivered the writs of restitution to the custodians of the temporalities.

As a bishop, his life must have been a well-filled one. First of all came the spiritual administration of his diocese, and that was a matter of even more importance than is the case nowadays, for not only had he to supervise the parishes and collegiate churches, but also the great majority of the religious houses which were then diocesan institutions under the pastoral charge of the bishop; and the diocese of Winchester included not a few important houses, the cathedral priory and Hyde Abbey of the Black Monks, Merton and Southwark Priories of the Austin Canons, St. Mary Winton, Wherwell and Romsey Abbeys of Benedictine nuns. But the bishop was also a great landowner, a great feudal lord. The lists of his castles, his manors, his knight's fees, some in his own diocese, some elsewhere, as for example the castle of Taunton and the manor of Taunton Deane, suggest the thought that the administration of his estates must have made no small call upon his time. Then, as if his cares were insufficient,

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came royal commands, and we find him going abroad upon the King's business.

All sides of his life are reflected in his register, and it is this which gives it its extraordinary interest. It is divided into two parts: the first relating to the Bishop's spiritual jurisdiction, the second to his temporal. But it must be noted that no hard and fast line is drawn: in the first part one finds documents which would seem to belong more properly to the second, and *vice versa*. However, in the main, part one contains the records of collations and institutions to rectories, admissions to vicarages and chapels, provisions for the custody of benefices when for some reason the immediate admission of the appointee was inexpedient; documents connected with the election of superiors of religious houses and the visitation of such houses; presentations to other bishops of nominees to livings in the patronage of the Bishop of Winchester; ex-communications.

These are all matters common to bishops' registers, but some of the items in that of Bishop John of Pontoise have a special interest and may be referred to here. To begin with, before the register proper begins there are two documents in which Bishop John's predecessors defined the jurisdiction of the Archdeacon of Surrey, documents which have a distinct interest for the ecclesiastical historian. Then we have notices of appropriations of churches to religious houses, the cathedral priory of Winchester, Breamore and Selborne Priors, and the nunnery at Nuneaton of the order of Fontevraud, the last-named being in another diocese, that of Coventry and Lichfield. In each case the reason given was the poverty of the house, which, too, was the explanation of the permission given to the Austin Canons of St. Denys in Southampton to have their appropriated church of Shirley served by a chaplain instead of by a perpetual vicar as the canon law required; licences of this nature enabled the rector, that is, the religious house, to bargain with some needy priest, and doubtless led to sweating. Those interested in the matter may form some idea of the kind of endow-

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ment thought proper for a vicar in the ordination of the vicarage of Kingston-upon-Thames, an appropriated church of Merton Priory: one item of the offerings allotted to the vicar may surprise the reader—that is, the oblations “*de confessionibus tempore quadragesimali*,” which, however, is by no means singular as the “confession penny” is given to the vicar in other settlements of the same kind. Another surprise, this time for those interested in things liturgical, may be found in an order of Archbishop Winchelsey recorded here. In 1295 that prelate sent out a letter to his suffragans instructing them, *inter alia*, to have a Mass said on Wednesdays and Fridays in their cathedrals, collegiate churches, and parishes churches for the help of the Holy Land and for peace in this realm; the noticeable point being that in this Mass, immediately before the *Pax Domini*, the three psalms, *Deus venerunt*, *Deus misereatur*, and *Ad te levavi*, with versicles and prayers should be said by priest and people all kneeling.

Towards the middle of the first part of the register we find an important set of synodal statutes. As they cover over twenty pages of print, those interested in such matters must go to the register itself, but a few of the more striking points may be noted here. The first portion of the statutes deals with the sacraments, and under the heading of Baptism we find an instruction that parents should be warned not to refuse “like soothsayers” to have their children baptized on the vigils of Easter and Pentecost, and another that a vessel which had been used for private baptism should either be reserved for the use of the church or destroyed by fire. Confirmation should be administered within three years of birth, and in the event of this not having been done, the parents were to be compelled to fast for a day on bread and water, always supposing that the presence of a bishop had given them an opportunity of fulfilling the law. Confession was to be made three times a year, if it might be; at any rate, once a year in Lent. Without a licence no one except the parish priest could absolve, but this did not apply to the friars,

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Dominicans and Franciscans, who had a general licence and should be received everywhere with hospitality and respect. Priests were forbidden to enjoin penances which were of profit to themselves, such as their own Masses, under pain of fasting on bread and water every Friday in Lent and being expelled from the diocese. Another strict enactment is found under the heading Extreme Unction, parish priests being forbidden to pass a night away from their parish without reasonable cause and without leaving a suitable priest to take their place with the sick. Should this decree be disregarded and anyone die without the last rites, through the absence, neglect, or other fault of the priest, then the offender was to be suspended, *ipso facto*, upon proof of the fault, till he had performed some condign penance to be inflicted by the bishop himself or by his official. Under the heading, *De vita et honestate clericorum*, there are strict injunctions in regard to the putting away of clerical concubines, and, since there should be abstinence not only from evil but also from the appearance of evil, clerks are forbidden to visit nunneries too frequently (*nimis*) or to have familiar converse with nuns. It is well to recognize that rules of this kind were made and orders given in the "Ages of Faith," of which too much is often predicated in regard to works, but it cannot be too strongly insisted upon that such mandates are no evidence of general wrongdoing.

Among other interesting matters in this first part are the statutes made for the chapel of St. Elizabeth at Wolvesey, near the bishop's castle, a foundation of Bishop John himself. These statutes were apparently based on those of Barton Chapel in the Isle of Wight, which after revision were confirmed by the bishop and entered in the second part of the register. Anyone who looks at either set will be struck by the fact that, except in the matter of claustration, in practice there could have been but little to choose, in the matter of severity of life and length of choral observance, between these foundations of secular priests and regular communities.

There are a certain number of other entries having

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interest for the lawyer rather than for the politician; incidents of manorial tenure; manumission of a serf; giving seisin of benefices by (1) the bishop's cap or (2) the bishop's ring; a writ to the sheriff of Oxford to take the bishop and two of his officials into custody for trespass, hunting in the King's forest of Witney—but the bishop produced a charter of privilege so to hunt, which was accepted; claim to have a clerk, in custody for two homicides, handed over to him *juxta regni Angliae laudabilem consuetudinem*, which was allowed; and an appeal by another clerk charged with murder for leave to prove his innocence by compurgation, which, too, was allowed.

In view of certain endeavours now being made to stop the horrors of war by inducing the nations to go back to the wholesome practice of medieval times by adopting the principles of canon law, it is instructive to study concrete cases when we happen upon them; and there are documents relating to one such case in this register, probably inserted therein because Bishop John was King Edward's chief plenipotentiary in negotiations arising out of the war. The facts are set out in Professor Tout's biography of Edward I: "While Edward was successfully establishing his feudal supremacy over Scotland, fresh trouble was brewing between him and his overlord Philip the Fair, who availed himself of a series of petty quarrels between French and Gascon seamen, to press severely against the English King the same claims of superiority which Edward was now exercising over King John of Scotland." Those who want an account in detail of what followed will find it in the work referred to: it will suffice here to say that Edward rejected Philip's claim, and preparations for war were begun. At this juncture St. Celestine V stepped in and wrote a long letter to King Edward, begging him not to fight, urging his love of the Church and his consanguinity with the King of France. The Pope's efforts failed; not only was the war not prevented, but it was ten years before peace was finally concluded.

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It has already been said that the late Canon Deedes transcribed and edited this important manuscript. But he died before the printing was finished, and his work was completed by Mr. Charles Johnson of the Public Record Office, who not only passed the last 120 pages of the text, but, with Miss Manley, compiled the excellent index, forty-two pages in double column. Canon Deedes promised a list of *corrigenda*, but this could not be found, so two and a half pages of *addenda* and *corrigenda* have been compiled by Mr. Johnson, the Rev. H. E. Salter, and Miss Rose Graham, the general editor of the Canterbury and York Society's publications. The list seems to be fairly complete; with two exceptions the present writer has not noted the omission of anything of importance, though had he himself drafted the head notes, some few of them would have been worded somewhat differently. One of the exceptions has already been referred to; the other occurs on p. 282, the second head note on which reads as follows: "The prior and convent of St. Swithin assign to the bishop and his successors the 'profession' of all contingent profits in their priory unless the archbishop thinks that at the instance of the King such profession should be granted to themselves." The document is one of a long series relating to the dispute with the cathedral priory bequeathed to the bishop by his predecessors, a dispute in which the King took a hand and complicated by claiming the advowson of the priory for himself. What the document really said was that the bishop should receive the profession of the monks unless the archbishop thought that they themselves, that is, the prior, should do so: [Agreement between the bishop and the prior and convent] *quod dictus reverendus pater habeat et retineat sibi et successoribus [suis] omnium profitendorum professionem in nostro prioratu predicto nisi venerabilis pater frater Johannes Angliae primas ipsam professionem nobis et successoribus nostris ad instanciam domini regis Angliae duxerit concedendam.* This, like the other, is, of course, a bad mistake, but it would be grossly unfair to judge by one or the other this admirable series of registers: and it

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may safely be predicted that nothing similar will be found in the publications of the Canterbury and York Society so long as the accomplished lady, who is now general editor, remains responsible.

Enough has been said to show the value of this episcopal register to the historian, and what is true of this one in particular is true in its degree of every other; few can equal that of John of Pontoise, but there will be very few which do not furnish items of interest to others than ecclesiologists. If history is to be taught, if attacks on the medieval Church are to be met, knowledge of the sources is obligatory. The publications of the Canterbury and York Society (the subscription to which is only a guinea a year) should be in every Catholic library of any importance, those at any rate of religious houses, seminaries, and schools. But, judging from the list of subscribers, these publications appear to be practically unknown to the librarians of such institutions.

E. B.

ANYTHING that directs attention to the Church's Offices deserves a welcome, and this assuredly will not be lacking to the nicely printed and neatly bound little volume of *Hymns from the Liturgy* (Burns Oates and Washbourne) which Father John Fitzpatrick, O.M.I., presents "in a new and faithful rendering." Only "those which are sung on the chief feasts of the ecclesiastical year and are, for the most part, poetry as well as piety," have been selected for translation; and Father Fitzpatrick may be congratulated on having retained both these characteristics in his English versions. So successful has he been that some may regret that the whole of the hymns was not dealt with; but the decision to give only a selection was probably a wise one—it would be difficult in so large a number to avoid the monotony of treatment apparent in Dr. John Wallace's *Hymns of the Church* (1874), which contained a complete rendering of those in the Missal and Breviary. This was obviated by Dom Matthew Britt in *The Hymns of the Breviary and Missal* (1922), who laid under contribution a multiplicity of translators, Catholic

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and Anglican; this volume, containing as it does the Latin of every hymn, with a translation in prose and verse and an account of each, is the most complete compendium of liturgical hymnology with which we are acquainted.

It is inevitable that Father Fitzpatrick's renderings should be compared with those of other translators; the names of Caswall and Neale at once occur as those which hold the field, although others have interpreted individual hymns more happily. With regard to the latter, the late Dr. Adrian Fortescue, in the preface to his book of *Latin Hymns*, now happily accessible through the Cambridge University Press, writes: "After Dr. Neale's beautiful poetic translations of nearly all our hymns it seems vain for anyone else to try to rival them." The comparison, however, cannot be pressed too closely, as Neale's translations are from the unreformed Breviary, while those in the book before us are of course from that at present in use. Nor do we think that, on the whole, Father Fitzpatrick need fear the comparison. Those who, as is the case with most Anglican converts, have been brought up upon Neale or upon some adaptation from him will naturally prefer the rendering to which they have been accustomed; but those to whom translations of *Quem terra, pontus, sidera* are unfamiliar will find little to choose between Neale's

The God whom earth, and sea, and sky
Adore and laud and magnify,
Who o'er their threefold fabric reigns,
The Virgin's spotless womb contains;

and Father Fitzpatrick's

The Lord whom earth, and sea, and sky
Honour, adore, and magnify,
Who o'er this triune system reigns,
To dwell in Mary's cloister deigns

and may quite possibly prefer the latter. Sometimes, however, we feel that Neale is the happier—*e.g.*, in *Crux fidelis*, where he has

Faithful Cross! above all other
One and only noble tree;

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None in foliage, none in blossom,
None in fruit thy peer may be :
Sweetest wood and sweetest iron,
Sweetest weight is hung on thee!

as against Father Fitzpatrick's

Faithful Cross! of all the forest
Thou art far the noblest tree,
None of all its growth produces
Leaf, or flower, or fruit, like thee :
Sweet thy wood is, sweet thy nails are,
And their Burden sweet is He.

Caswall's translation—that in most of our books—of the *Tantum ergo* is, we think, preferable to that of Father Fitzpatrick; and in the *O salutaris*, "Thine aid supply, Thy strength bestow" is better than "Give strength, be our auxiliary."

Among the more noteworthy translations are those of the *Stabat Mater dolorosa* in the original metre, which, it will be remembered, Caswall abandons after the first verse, and of the *Stabat Mater speciosa*, which preserves the tenderness of the original. Those of Pope Leo XIII's hymns for the Holy Family and those for the Feast of St. Joseph strike us as particularly happy.

The first line of the original is given at the head of each translation, but there is no index of these, so that it is not possible to ascertain, without going through the pages, what hymns are in the book. This defect will, we hope, be remedied in the future editions which will doubtless be called for.

J. B.

